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Abstract 
This study presents Preference Cloud Theory, a two-step model of decision making 
under risk. It also includes an experimental study on valuation gap which provides 
supporting results for the new theory. The new theory provides an explanation for 
empirically observed anomalies of Expected Utility Theory such as the Allais Paradox, 
valuation gap, and preference reversals. Central to the theory is the incorporation of 
preference imprecision, which has support in emerging literature, and challenges to the 
alternative models for Expected Utility Theory. Preference Cloud Theory assumes that 
preference imprecision arises because of individuals’ vague understanding of numerical 
probabilities. The theory combines this concept with the use of the Alpha Model 
(which builds on Hurwicz’s criterion) and constructs a simple model, helping us to 
understand various anomalies discovered in the experimental economics literature that 
standard models could not explain.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Decision theories are the building blocks of economic theory, used in 
modelling behaviour in various sub-fields and issues such as finance, 
management, insurance, health economics, game theory, welfare economics, 
life cycle income and consumption, and tax policy. Economists use decision 
models to explain observed behaviour, evaluate policy or market design 
schemes, and provide predictions, as do decision analysts providing 
consultancy services to the individuals and firms who want to make better and 
more coherent decisions. 
This study focuses on decision making under risk, which can be described 
by simple lotteries with monetary outcomes and associated probabilities. In 
general, decision theories can be broadly classified as prescriptive (normative) 
and descriptive theories. Prescriptive theories suggest how a rational agent 
should act in a given circumstance, whereas descriptive ones provide insights 
about how actual individuals make decisions. When we talk about 
prescriptiveness, rational decision theory is synonymous with Expected Utility 
Theory, a standard theory in economics. Until the 1970s, it was also regarded 
as a descriptive theory. Although it had appealing mathematical properties and 
established axioms, new literature emerged as behavioural and experimental 
economics raised doubts about its descriptive validity and predictive power. 
Experimental studies documented various systematic and robust deviations, 
conventionally known as anomalies, from the behaviour predicted by Expected 
Utility Theory, such as the Allais Paradox, valuation gap, and preference 
reversals. In response to those anomalies, several alternative models have been 
proposed, such as Prospect Theory, Rank-Dependent Utility Theory, Regret 
Theory, and Cumulative Prospect Theory.  
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However, there is an emerging literature on preference imprecision which 
challenges the validity of these alternative theories. Experimental studies in 
this new strand of literature suggest that even intelligent and numerate 
individuals find it hard to know their own preferences precisely and are not 
able to state their choices and subjective valuations for goods and risky 
prospects with perfect confidence. Although alternative theories model 
individual behaviour in a non-standard way to explain these observed 
anomalies, they share a common implicit assumption with Expected Utility 
Theory that individuals can articulate their subjective valuations for goods and 
make choices in a precise manner. Therefore, the issues raised by this recently 
emerging literature are not covered by the existing models in the literature 
including both the Expected Utility Theory and its alternatives. These recent 
findings have critical implications as well: if, for example, consumers’ 
preferences are imprecise and prone to being manipulated, this may be used 
against consumers’ own best interests. Moreover, if the inherent characteristics 
of economic preferences are imprecise, the validity of the studies that evaluate 
and analyse the policies and/or market schemes based on the existing models 
of precise preferences should also be reconsidered. In order to reach solid 
conclusions about all of these issues, it is vital to have a better understanding 
and a better model of the imprecise preferences. 
This study is organised as follows: Chapter 1 reviews the early attempts of 
modelling decision under risk, such as Pascal and Fermat’s expected value 
concept and famous Expected Utility Theory, along with a review of the 
anomalies documented by experimental studies that raise doubts about the 
descriptive and predictive power of Expected Utility Theory. The chapter also 
includes the alternative models to Expected Utility Theory, which normalise 
these detected anomalies. Chapter 2 presents a critical review of the emerging 
hypothesis known as preference imprecision hypothesis: it includes a 
discussion of existing modelling approaches for imprecise preferences, i.e., 
stochastic preferences (Section 2.2), and the experimental studies designed to 
elicit imprecision ranges, particularly in valuation tasks (Section 2.3 and 2.4). 
Chapter 3 presents an extended version of Bayrak and Kriström (2016), an 
exploration and re-examination study on valuation gap from the imprecision 
perspective. Our study investigates the existence of the valuation gap when we 
allow subjects to state their subjective valuations as intervals. It extends the 
literature on the willingness-to-pay/willingness-to-accept (WTP/WTA) 
disparity by testing two hypotheses distilled from the literature. It also 
introduces an incentive compatible mechanism for eliciting the imprecision 
range in valuation tasks. Its incentive compatibility is an important contribution 
to the literature because the existing mechanisms in the imprecision literature 
13 
rely on subjects’ self-reporting in eliciting the imprecision ranges, which is not 
conventional to experimental economics. Finally, Chapter 4 presents a new 
decision theory for risk, Preference Cloud Theory, which incorporates 
preference imprecision and explains the anomalies of Expected Utility Theory. 
The new theory can be seen as an extension of Expected Utility Theory as it 
models behaviour over final wealth levels and can explain the observed 
anomalies without incorporating reference dependency and loss aversion.  
I would like to thank the participants of the conferences and departmental 
(economics) seminars where this work is presented: ESA (European Science 
Association) European Meeting (2015), Public Economic Theory Association 
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1 Background: Expected Utility Theory, 
Anomalies, and Alternatives 
This chapter presents the historical background of modelling decision making 
under risk, starting with Pascal and Fermat’s expected value concept that soon 
led the development of Expected Utility Theory (Section 1.1). Section 1.2 
introduces the anomalies observed in the literature that raised doubts about the 
descriptive and predictive validity of the Expected Utility Theory, providing a 
brief introduction to anomalies such as the Allais Paradox, preference 
reversals, and valuation gap. The detailed reviews for these anomalies are 
presented in Chapter 4. Section 1.3 presents the existing theories developed to 
incorporate and explain these reported anomalies in the literature. Finally, 
Section 1.4 paints the overall picture of the literature presented. 
1.1 Early Developments and Expected Utility Theory 
The origin of modelling decisions under risk can be traced back to the 
collaboration of Pascal and Fermat in 1694 on solving what is known as the 
problem of points; the solution led to the development of the mathematical 
foundation of probability concept. The problem of points is based on the 
problem of how to divide up the stakes of an unfinished game between two 
players who have equal chances of winning in each round. The rule is that the 
two players contribute equally to a prize pot and the first player to win a certain 
number of rounds collects the prize. However, unpredicted external 
circumstances interrupt the game before either of the two players wins the 
certain number of rounds. How then to divide the pot fairly?  
The norm that they proposed is the expected value, which is the weighted 
sum of the monetary outcomes where the weights are the corresponding 
probabilities of each outcome. Formally, let represent a prospect 
which specifies the monetary outcomes for each state and the 
 ,
i i
L x p
 1,...i n
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corresponding probabilities satisfying and . Then the expected 
value (EV) of L is calculated as:  
 
   (1) 
 
Their underlying assumption is that the attractiveness of a gamble is 
linearly proportional to the outcomes and the corresponding probabilities.  
The problem with this view was raised by Daniel Bernoulli, Swiss 
mathematician, in his paper Specimen theoriae novae de mensura sortis (1738) 
or ‘Exposition of a new theory on the measurement of risk’. The main purpose 
of the paper is to show that different people may value the same lottery 
differently depending on their different risk attitudes. This view was a major 
breakthrough in the theoretical understanding of decision under risk because it 
accounts for the heterogeneity of individual preferences and personalities. He 
demonstrated his ideas by his famous St. Petersburg paradox, a gamble in 
which a fair coin is flipped repeatedly until it comes tails. If it comes up heads 
in the first toss, it pays $1, then $2 if it comes up heads in the second toss, $4 
in the third toss, etc. The prize is doubled with each toss until the first tails 
comes. The problem is to determine the willingness to pay for such a gamble. 
The expected value of this gamble sums to infinity, which is unreasonable as 
few individuals would forgo more than a moderate amount for a one-shot play: 
 
 1 2 2 1 4 4 1 8 8 ... 1 1 1 ...           EV   (2) 
 
Bernoulli proposed that individuals do not evaluate prospects by their 
expected value but rather by their expected utility, a subjective value. He 
explains the utility concept in his famous work as following: 
 
Somehow a very poor fellow obtains a lottery ticket that will yield with 
equal probability either nothing or twenty thousand ducats. Will this 
man evaluate his chance of winning at ten thousand ducats? Would he 
not be ill-advised to sell this lottery ticket for nine thousand ducats? To 
me it seems that the answer is in the negative. On the other hand I am 
inclined to believe that a rich man would be ill-advised to refuse to buy 
the lottery ticket for nine thousand ducats. 
 
The crucial point about utility is its concavity, which implies that $200 does 
not necessarily mean that it worth double what $100 is worth. Again Bernoulli 
explains this as: 
 
0ip  1 1
n
ip 
  1
n
i iEV L p x 
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. . . the determination of the value of an item must not be based on its 
price, but rather on the utility it yields. The price of the item is 
dependent only on the thing itself and is equal for everyone; the utility, 
however, is dependent on the particular circumstances of the person 
making the estimate. Thus there is no doubt that a gain of one thousand 
ducats is more significant to a pauper than to a rich man though both 
gain the same amount. 
 
This property is known as diminishing marginal utility, explained using a log 
function. Bernoulli then suggests a new method for calculating the value of a 
gamble: 
 
If the utility of each possible profit expectation is multiplied by the 
number of ways in which it can occur, and we then divide the sum of 
these products by the total number of possible cases, a mean utility 
(moral expectation) will be obtained, and the profit which corresponds to 
this utility will equal the value of the risk in question. 
 
Unlike Pascal and Fermat’s linear formulation, Bernoulli suggests that there is 
a nonlinear relationship between the value of a gamble and the payoffs in each 
state, but that relationship is still assumed to be linear in corresponding 
probabilities: 
 
   (3) 
 
This formulation offers a solution for the St. Petersburg paradox by assuming a 
concave utility function or risk aversion since the sum does not lead to infinity: 
 
  (4) 
 
The concavity of the utility function guarantees that, while the expected value 
of the gamble is infinite, its expected utility is finite. Bernoulli’s ideas 
influenced Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s foundational book Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior (Morgenstern, 1976; Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944). They provided the necessary and sufficient conditions 
under which the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) holds, and this becomes the 
standard theory of decision under uncertainty and the core of game theory, 
used in a vast range of economic theoretical models. However, empirical 
evidence accumulated for more than four decades has revealed a variety of 
patterns in choice behaviour that appear inconsistent with EUT. I will follow 
   1
n
i iEU L p u x 
             1 1 11 2 ln 2 1 2 ln 2 2 ln 2 2 ln 2
i ii i
i i iEU i i
  
            
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the convention in the literature and refer to them as anomalies, such as the 
Allais Paradox, preference reversals, valuation gap, and Rabin’s paradox. 
These anomalies raised concerns about the descriptive validity of the Expected 
Utility Theory and led researchers to develop alternative models which 
normalise these anomalies. 
1.2 Anomalies 
This section is a brief introduction to the most prominent detected anomalies in 
the literature. A more detailed review is presented in Chapter 4 while 
presenting Preference Cloud Theory (PCT). 
1.2.1 Allais Paradox 
The violation of the independence axiom was discovered by Maurice Allais 
(1953), and is now known as the Allais Paradox. His seminal work includes 
two hypothetical choice problems which are depicted in Table 1. In the first 
one, known as the common consequence effect, the task is formulated as a 
choice between two pairs of lotteries. The first pair includes choosing one of 
the two prospects: s1 = ($1M, 1) or r1 = ($5M, 0.1; $1M, 0.89; 0, 0.01). The 
second pair includes the two prospects: s2 = ($1M, 0.11; 0, 0.89) or r2 = ($5M, 
0.1; 0, 0.9). An individual whose preferences are compatible with EUT would 
either choose ‘s’ or ‘r’ type of prospects in both choice problems, because 
according to EUT, common consequences added or subtracted to the two 
prospects should have no effect on the desirability of one prospect over the 
other because common consequences cancel out. A closer look would reveal 
that s1 and r1 includes a common consequence of $1M with probability of 0.89, 
and that s2 and r2 are derived by subtracting this common consequence from s1 
and r1, respectively. Therefore an individual who chooses r1 (s1) in the first 
problem should choose r2 (s2) in the second problem. However, Allais argued 
that most people might opt for s1 in the first problem lured by the certainty of 
winning $1M, and r2 in the second problem since the odds of winning are very 
similar but the winning prizes are very different; $1M and $5M. Evidence that 
emerged after his study also supports his predictions; this anomaly is called as 
‘common consequence effect’. 
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Table 1. Common Consequence Effect 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
s1 r1 s2 r2 
Outcome Odds Outcome Odds Outcome Odds Outcome Odds 
$1 M 100% $1 M 89% Nothing 89% Nothing 90% 
  Nothing 1% $1 M 11%   
  $5 M 10%   $5 M 10% 
 
The second phenomenon discovered by Allais is the ‘common ratio effect’. 
This problem has the same structure, there are two choice tasks and each task 
includes a pair of lotteries. The first pair includes: m1 = ($3000, 1) or n1 = 
($4000, 0.8; $0, 0.2) whereas the second pair includes m2 = ($3000, 0.25; $0, 
0.75) or n2 = ($4000, 0.2; $0, 0.8). A fair amount of evidence and Allais’s 
prediction suggests that many people would choose m1 in the first task and n2 
in the second task, a pattern of choice inconsistent with EUT because the 
second pair is formed by multiplying the probabilities of the first pair’s 
winning prizes by a common ratio of 0.25. In order to see it more formally, 
individuals who choose m1 over n1 imply that: 
 
   (5) 
 
   (6) 
 
whereas in the second problem, if n2 is chosen over m2: 
 
   (7) 
 
   (8) 
 
As it can be seen, (6) and (8) show a contradictory result. Allais’s two 
famous examples challenged the independence axiom of EUT, the idea of 
expected utility being linear in probabilities, and finally contributed to the 
development of alternative models.  
1.2.2 Preference Reversals 
Preference reversal is another observed anomaly of the standard economic 
theory; it can be summarised as the dependence of the preference ordering on 
the method of elicitation such as choice and valuation. Conventional preference 
theory predicts that preferences should be independent of the method of 
eliciting them, thus the preferred lottery in the choice task should also be 
   1 1  $3000 0.8 $4000m n u u  
   1.25 $4000 $3000u u
   2 2 $4000 0.0.2 25 $3000n m u u  
   $4000 $3000 1.25u u 
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valued more than the other one. The phenomenon was first observed by 
psychologists (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Lindman, 1971), but it was later 
introduced to economics literature by Grether and Plott (1979a) who confirmed 
the existence of the phenomenon under well-designed, incentive-compatible 
experimental settings and defined it as a threat to the fundamental optimisation 
principles of economics. 
In a typical setting, subjects are asked to make a choice between two 
lotteries and in another task they are asked to state their selling prices. The two 
binary outcome gambles in the preference reversals experiments have distinct 
features: one of them typically called the ‘P-bet’ offers a relatively better 
chance of winning a modest prize, whereas the other bet, the ‘$-bet’, offers a 
relatively small chance of winning a larger prize. Moreover, those two bets are 
constructed such that their expected values are the same or insignificantly 
different. The results show that a significant proportion of subjects choose the 
P-bet in the choice task but value the $-bet more. Moreover, the opposite 
inconsistency, in which the $-bet is chosen but the P-bet is valued more, is 
much less frequently observed. Further studies show that the phenomenon is 
not a special case for gambles but also observed for hiring practices and the 
provision of public versus private goods (Hsee, 1998, 1996). 
The phenomenon is extended to marketing literature as well as typically 
defined as the inconsistency between competitive (joint evaluation of options) 
and monadic (separate judgement of options) elicitation designs. This is a 
major threat for pricing research, because if a subject states a higher value for 
Option A than for Option B in a monadic setting, prefers one option to another, 
it is assumed that the subject would choose Option A over Option B in a 
competitive setting. The experimental research shows that preference reversals 
also exist for consumer durable goods such as televisions, microwave ovens, 
toasters, and cordless phones (Nowlis and Simonson, 1997), thus confirming 
the concerns of the marketing literature as well. 
For policy related issues such as for environmental goods, the phenomenon 
raises doubts about the reliability of the preferences elicited by choice and 
valuation-based surveys: if such a phenomenon exists, valuations elicited in 
contingent valuation surveys might favour the project that would not be chosen 
if the participants were asked to choose between the projects. Therefore it is 
vital to understand the exact nature of this phenomenon. 
1.2.3 Valuation Gap 
The disparity between Willingness-to-Accept (WTA) and Willingness-to-Pay 
(WTP) is one of the most prominent anomalies in standard economic theory. 
WTA and WTP should be similar if the goods in question have close 
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substitutes and if the income effects are small (Hanemann, 1991) The gap 
between WTA and WTP was first documented by mathematical psychologists 
Coombs et al. (1967) and by Hammack and Brown (1974) in an early 
contingent valuation study. Knetsch and Sinden (1984) brought the issue into 
the laboratory using real monetary incentives and found a significant difference 
between WTA and WTP. Knetsch and Sinden (1984) demonstrated the 
disparity in an exchange experiment where the participants were endowed with 
either a lottery ticket or with $2.00. Then, each subject was offered an 
opportunity to trade the lottery ticket for the money, or vice versa. Results 
show that very few subjects chose to switch. Those who were given lottery 
tickets seemed to like them better than those who were given money. Since 
then, the disparity has been documented in an array of studies, contingent 
valuation surveys, and field and laboratory experiments for a wide range of 
goods: mugs, pens, movie tickets, hunting permits, nuclear waste repositories, 
foul-tasting liquids, and pathogen-contaminated sandwiches (Horowitz and 
McConnell, 2002). In a typical experimental setting, subjects are divided 
randomly into two groups as buyers and seller; where sellers are endowed with 
the good but the buyers not. Then the subjective valuations of the buyers and 
sellers are elicited under an incentive compatible mechanism such as a Becker-
DeGroot-Marchak mechanism and a Second Price Auction. Under the typical 
incentive compatible setting, it is optimal to state the maximum buying price 
(WTP) for buyers and minimum selling price (WTA) for sellers.  
The disparity between WTA and WTP has implications for the Coase 
Theorem and EUT. Most policies produce both winners and losers; thus, 
studies that assess policies by assuming reference independence are on shaky 
ground because the presence of a WTA-WTP disparity indicates that the 
assumption is false. The disparity also raises fundamental questions about, e.g., 
the stated preference methods that are used in environmental policy analysis, 
such as contingent valuation and cost-benefit analysis, because the latter 
requires welfare measurement (and thus information about WTA and/or WTP). 
Together with other anomalies (e.g., Preference Reversals and the Allais 
Paradox), the disparity raises further questions with regard to the power of 
standard preference models to describe the economic behaviour of ordinary 
people (Braga and Starmer, 2005). The dominant explanation in the literature 
seems to be the endowment effect coined by Thaler (1980), i.e., goods that one 
owns are valued more highly than identical goods not held in the endowment. 
Thus the lower WTP values are interpreted as the buyers’ potential gain from 
acquisition, and are apparently smaller than the sellers’ or owners’ potential 
loss from sale. The endowment effect is commonly interpreted as the result of 
the ‘loss aversion’ notion of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), 
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which states that losses are weighted substantially more than gains at outcomes 
above the reference point.  
1.3 Alternative Theories 
This section presents the major alternative theories for EUT. The motivation to 
develop such alternative models is to explain the anomalies reviewed in the 
previous section. 
1.3.1 Prospect Theory 
In EUT, the value of the prospect equals the weighted sum of the utilities of the 
outcomes by associated probabilities in a linear manner. However, in the Allais 
Paradox setting this principle is commonly violated: individuals overweight the 
outcomes that are considered certain relative to the merely probable outcomes. 
In their seminal paper, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) present a new theory for 
decision under risk that provides explanations for the reported anomalies in the 
literature. They demonstrate the inconsistent behavioural patterns with EUT in 
a series of experiments, especially by focussing on the independence axiom, 
and introduce a new theory, which incorporates nonlinear probability 
weighting and asymmetric treatment of gains and losses.  
Prospect Theory models decision making under risk as a two-step process 
where the initial phase includes the editing and the last step is the evaluation of 
the gamble. Editing includes the reformulation of the prospects by employing 
heuristics to simplify the decision problem. Therefore, this phase describes the 
underlying process of the individuals’ perception, the way that individuals 
filter and reform the given information. One of the major operations of the 
editing phase is ‘coding’, which consists of the perception of the outcomes as 
gains and losses, rather than as final states of wealth, a major departure from 
the EUT. Gains and losses are defined relative to some reference point that 
usually corresponds to the current wealth level. However, Kahneman and 
Tversky also do not rule out the possibility that the perception of the reference 
point might depend on the presentation of the prospects and the expectation of 
the individual. The second operation of the editing phase is the ‘combination’, 
which includes the simplification of the prospects by combining the 
probabilities of the identical outcomes. As an example, consider the prospect 
X, which consists of two equal outcomes, each with a probability of 0.25. The 
combined version would be the prospect which gives X a probability of 0.5. 
The third operation is the ‘segregation’, which includes the perception of the 
riskless outcome separately than the risky outcome. For example, the prospect 
(200, 0.8; 100, 0.2) can be perceived as a sure gain of 100 and a risky gain of 
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100 with a probability of 0.8. The final operation, ‘cancellation’, can be 
explained by using a game which has two stages, in the first stage there is a 
probability of 0.75 to end the game without winning anything, and a 
probability of 0.25 to move into the second stage (Problem 10 in their study). If 
the game reaches the second stage, a decision maker has to choose one of the 
following prospects: (400, 0.80) or (3000). However, the choice has to be made 
before the game starts. If we combine the first and the second stage by 
multiplying the probability of continuation in the first stage and the probability 
of winning in the second stage, the prospects can be represented as: (0.20, 
4000) and (0.25, 3000), respectively. In this binary choice problem, 78% of the 
141 subjects chose the second option. However, when asked to choose between 
(0.20, 4000) and (0.25, 3000) when the problem is formulated as a single stage 
(in Problem 4), 65% of the subjects opt for the first prospect. Clearly the two 
problems include identical prospects, but differ in their presentation. In 
Problem 4, subjects are presented the combined prospects without 
complicating the problem by separating it into two stages. However while 
answering Problem 10, respondents ignored or cancelled out the first stage, 
which is common to both prospects, and evaluated the prospects by merely 
looking at the second stage. They also suggested additional operations for the 
editing phase such as the ‘simplification’ and the ‘detection of dominance’. 
The first refers to the rounding of the probabilities and outcomes whereas the 
second looks for dominance between prospects and, when detected, decides 
without making further evaluation. Kahneman and Tversky also suggest 
without making further assertions that the reason behind some of the observed 
anomalies and intransitivities can be the combined application of these 
operations in the editing phase. 
After the editing phase, the individual subjectively evaluates the simplified 
decision problem in the evaluation phase, as all decision-making-under-risk 
problems have two elements: probability and outcome. However, Prospect 
Theory undertakes the judgement of these two elements differently than does 
EUT: objective probabilities are not taken into the calculation linearly but 
transformed by the individual in a nonlinear way. This is done by the 
weighting function The weighting function associates each 
objective probability , with a decision weight
 
that reflects the 
subjective evaluation, the individual’s perception, of the objective 
probabilities. Decision weights do not obey the probability axioms and they 
should not be interpreted as measures of beliefs. Therefore, they are not the 
likelihood of the events, but instead imply the effect of the probabilities on the 
desirability of the prospect. They are depicted as a function of objective 
probabilities because in the simplest form, prospects are defined by their 
 .w p  w p
p  w p
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outcomes and their associated probabilities. Therefore, they assume that 
individuals consider the probabilities to be relevant information regarding the 
attractiveness of the prospect. However, in other contexts decision weights 
could be influenced by different factors such as ambiguity.  
In Figure 1, the bold curve depicts Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) typical 
probability weighting function. According to Prospect Theory, low 
probabilities are overweighted whereas high probabilities are underweighted.  
 
 
Figure 1. Nonlinear probability weighting of Prospect Theory 
The outcomes are incorporated in the value function
 
that replaces the 
von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function that measures the deviations from 
the reference points. Therefore measures the deviations from the 
reference point. The rationale for this departure is explained with an example 
from Adaptation-Level Theory (Helson, 1964): When individuals assess the 
attributes of a particular object such as temperature, brightness, or loudness, 
they perceive them as dependent on a reference point. For example, the 
temperature of an object might be judged as hot or cold depending on the 
 v x
 v x
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temperature the individual is exposed to prior to the assessment. Kahneman 
and Tversky assert that the same propensity is valid for attributes such as 
wealth, prestige, and health. The same outcome, for example, might mean 
being worse off for some individuals and better off for others. They suggest 
that the value function under prospect theory is concave for gains and convex 
for losses, which is a major departure from the standard view (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Hypothetical value function of Prospect Theory 
The asymmetric shape of the value function is a result of loss aversion, 
which implies that losses loom larger than gains: most people would find 
unattractive a prospect that offers a gain and loss of an equal amount with 
equal probabilities. This can be interpreted as the value function being steeper 
for losses. 
In Prospect Theory, the overall value of the prospect, denoted by is 
calculated by multiplying these two measures. However the model can only be 
applied to simple prospects, denoted by (x, p; y, q), where x and y are the 
outcomes and p and q are the associated probabilities. Simple prospects are 
defined as the prospects with at most two non-zero outcomes. Therefore there 
,V
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can be an additional outcome that gives zero with a probability of 1-p-q. 
Moreover, a prospect is strictly positive if both x and y are positive and 
probabilities p and q sum to one, whereas a prospect is strictly negative when 
both outcomes are negative and probabilities p and q sum to one. A regular 
prospect cannot be classified as strictly negative or positive. Formally, a 
regular gamble’s value 
 
is calculated as: 
 
   (9) 
 
Further, assume that  and
 
 
The model works with a slight modification for the strictly positive or 
strictly negative prospects if the segregation operation is applied in the editing 
phase. Remember that individuals segregate the riskless loss or gain from the 
risky component with this specific operation. For example, 
 can be transformed into a sure gain of 100 and a risky 
gain of 300 with a probability of 0.75. The formula for these kinds of prospects 
would be: 
 
   (10) 
 
Notice that the value of the risky component is calculated as the difference 
between the subjective values of the outcomes, and not the subjective value of 
the difference in outcomes, 300. Also the decision weight is applied to the 
difference in outcomes for the risky component; it reduces to the equation (9) if 
and only if , however this is not usually satisfied due to the 
structure of the decision weight component of the model. The issue is solved 
by Cumulative Prospect Theory.  
Another crucial departure from the EUT is the treatment of risk attitudes. 
Notice that if the probabilities enter the expected utility calculation linearly 
then the risk attitude is solely determined by the utility/value function (in 
general the function that undertakes the evaluation phase in the decision 
problem) as in the EUT. Thus the curvature of the utility function that implies 
the diminishing marginal utility of money determines the risk attitude of the 
individual. On the other hand, Prospect Theory treats the probability 
component of the decision problem in a nonlinear way as well, therefore under 
Prospect Theory these two functions jointly determine the individual’s risk 
attitude. 
Beside the significant advances and departures from the standard theory, 
their original model has some limitations: i) it can only be applied to prospects 
 , ; ,V x p y q
         , ; ,V x p y q w p v x w q v y   
 0 0,v   0 0,w   1 1.w 
 400,0.25;100,0.75V
(400,0.25;100,0.75) (100) (0.25) [ (400) (100)]V v w v v   
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with at most two non-zero outcomes; ii) it predicts that people will opt for the 
stochastically dominated gambles in some circumstances. Those two 
limitations have been tackled in the latter version of the theory, Cumulative 
Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), discussed in Section 1.3.3. 
1.3.2 Rank-Dependent Expected Utility Theory 
As mentioned in the preceding section, the problem with Prospect Theory was 
that, since the decision weights do not obey the probability axioms, i.e., they 
do not sum to one, the theory allows for the violation of first order stochastic 
dominance.  
The solution for this problem is offered by Anticipated Utility Theory 
(Quiggin, 1982), which soon became known as the Rank-Dependent Utility 
Theory. This theory makes the decision weights dependent on the rank of the 
outcomes and calculates them using the cumulative distribution, instead of 
individual probabilities. This property ensures that the decision weights sum to 
one, therefore solving the problems of violation of dominance. 
Before proceeding with the general formula of the Rank-Dependent Utility 
Theory, it is useful to explain the probability transformation technique. 
According to the theory, individuals rank the outcomes of the prospect from 
worst to best  and the corresponding probabilities are  
As in Prospect Theory, it is assumed that there exists a probability weighting 
function, a strictly increasing mapping from the interval [0,1] onto itself. 
The endpoint probabilities, 0 and 1, are transformed as they are, therefore no 
distortion occurs for these two special objective probability measures. The 
decision weights of the probabilities associated with the outcomes of a prospect 
are calculated in a cumulative way but the probability of the best outcome is 
transformed directly. For the rest, the decision weight of a particular outcome 
is calculated as the difference between the cumulative transformation of the 
probabilities associated with getting equal or better outcomes and the 
transformation of the probabilities associated with strictly better outcomes. At 
this point it is necessary to introduce new notation: as in the previous sections 
small letter implies the individual objective probability transformation, 
cumulative transformation is depicted as the capital , and cumulative 
transformations are the ones used in calculating the subjective value of the 
prospects: 
 
   (11) 
 
Where the cumulative transformation,  is calculated as: 
  
1( ... ),nx x  1( ,..., ).np p
( ),w p
( )w p
( )W p
     1 1, ;...; ,
n
n n i n i iV x p x p W p u x 
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   (12) 
 
   (13) 
 
Subscript  corresponds to the best outcome, thus (12) indicates that the 
transformation occurs directly by inputting the probability of the best outcome 
into the weighting function, whereas (13) shows the transformation method for 
the other outcomes. As an example, consider the second best outcome, denoted 
with subscript ; the cumulative decision weight associated with the second 
best outcome  then will be: 
 
   (14) 
  
The first element of (14) corresponds to the cumulative probability 
transformation of the outcomes weakly better than the second best outcome, 
therefore we sum the probabilities of the outcomes from the second best 
outcome to the best outcome, and then transform using the weighting function,
Since there is only one better outcome than the second best 
outcome, we subtract to find the cumulative probability weighting of the 
second best outcome, .  
This process of transformation avoids the valuation of monotonicity and 
also adds a less appealing new feature to the model: the subjective weight 
attached to the probability of a particular outcome depends on the ranking of 
the outcome within a prospect, therefore it depends on how good or how bad 
the outcome is within a prospect. It might be problematic because a slight 
change in the magnitude of an outcome can change the Rank-Dependent Utility 
of a particular prospect significantly if it changes the ranking of the outcome. 
Moreover, a significant change in the magnitude of an outcome will not change 
the value of the prospect, if the rank of that outcome remains unchanged. 
Rank-Dependent Utility Theory can be seen as the generalised version of 
the classical EUT, because it does not include any nonconventional notions 
such as reference dependency and loss aversion but it does incorporate the 
distortion of the objective probabilities. Since the utility part of the expectation 
formula is identical to the EUT, the crucial element of Rank-Dependent Utility 
Theory is probability transformation, i.e., that the predictions of the model 
depend highly on the shape of the probability weighting function. A concave 
weighting function will result in overweighting the probabilities of the high 
ranked outcomes (good outcomes), whereas a convex weighting function leads 
to underweighting of those outcomes. This curvature is intuitively explained by 
   , if i nW p w p i n 
     1 , if 1n ni k i k k i kW p w p w p i n      
n
1n
1( )nW p 
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the pessimism and optimism levels of the individuals (Quiggin, 1982; Yaari, 
1987; Diecidue and Wakker, 2001).  
 
Figure 3. Inverse S-shaped probability weighting function 
Figure 3 shows one of the suggested forms for the weighting function, 
which is inversely S-shaped and has a switching point at p*. The function is 
concave below the switching point and convex above it (Prelec, 1998; Preston 
and Baratta, 1948). Therefore probabilities below p* are overweighted and 
above p* are underweighted. Quiggin (1982) proposed 0.5 to be the switching 
point, in order to explain the anomalies of EUT such as the Common 
Consequence and Common Ratio Effect. However, empirical studies 
consistently suggest the switching point to be around 0.4 (Wu and Gonzalez, 
1996). 
Since the weighting function is assumed to be nonlinear, it determines the 
risk attitude of the individual, together with the utility function. Therefore, 
unlike in EUT, we cannot make direct inferences about the risk attitude of the 
individual by looking solely at the curvature of the utility function. For 
example, a pessimistic individual with a concave utility function will exhibit a 
universally risk-averse attitude. However, an individual who has convex utility 
function can be risk averse as well, if he or she is sufficiently pessimistic 
(Chew, Karni, and Safra, 1987; Chateauneuf and Cohen, 1994). 
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Although the incorporation of probability weighting enables Rank-
Dependent Utility Theory to explain Allais anomalies, the theory fails to 
explain other anomalies such as valuation gap and preference reversal. The 
next section focuses on Cumulative Prospect Theory that is the synthesis of 
Original Prospect Theory and the Rank-Dependent Utility Theory. 
1.3.3 Cumulative Prospect Theory 
Kahneman and Tversky (1992) presents the cumulative version of Prospect 
Theory; in the new version they solved the problems with monotonicity by 
featuring the cumulative transformation technique of Quiggin’s Rank-
Dependent Utility Theory separately for gains and losses. With the help of this 
advance, the Original Prospect Theory can be applied to prospects with any 
number of outcomes. Moreover they discarded the editing phase in the new 
version of the theory, providing a mathematically tractable model, as it is very 
difficult to determine which operations are employed by individuals in the 
editing phase. Cumulative Prospect Theory retains the important notions of 
Original Prospect Theory such as reference dependency and loss aversion. The 
general form of the Cumulative Prospect Theory is as follows: 
 
  (15) 
 
where the losses are indexed from to thus the gains are from to  and, 
as previously noted, we assume   and are the 
cumulative decision weights for losses and gains, respectively, and are defined 
by: 
 
   (16) 
 
   (17) 
 
   (18) 
 
   (19) 
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) suggested the inverse S-shaped probability 
weighting function that implies that individuals exhibit diminishing sensitivity 
for probability changes near 0.5 and they are relatively more sensitive to the 
changes near the endpoints, 0 and 1. Value function, 
 
has the same 
properties as in the original version of the theory, convex for the losses and 
concave for the gains. Loss aversion is maintained by the following property: 
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where  This feature of the theory is also known as the 
‘diminishing sensitivity’ because it implies that, while comparing a 10 gain (or 
loss) with a 20 gain (or loss) has a significant utility impact, comparing a 100 
gain (or loss) with a 110 gain (or loss) has a smaller impact. The concavity 
over gains captures the finding that people tend to be risk averse over moderate 
probability gains and risk seeking for losses.  
Although loss aversion has a central role in explaining anomalies such as 
preference reversals and valuation gap, it is a seriously limiting property, 
because it limits the number of functional forms that can be used under 
Cumulative Prospect Theory. For instance, many of the functional forms used 
in expected utility such as negative exponential do not meet these 
requirements.  
Cumulative Prospect Theory departs from Rank-Dependent Utility Theory 
by the incorporation of loss aversion and reference dependency and also by the 
specification of different probability weighting functions for gains and losses. 
In that sense Rank-Dependent Utility Theory is a more flexible model in terms 
of the required functional forms, since it does not require diminishing 
sensitivity or loss aversion. However, the trade-off is that Rank-Dependent 
Utility Theory cannot explain procedural anomalies such as preference 
reversals and valuation gap.  
There are also variants of Cumulative Prospect Theory developed recently 
(Baucells and Heukamp, 2006; Davies et al., 2004; Schmidt and Zank, 2008; 
Trepel et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2005), but the notable one is the Third 
Generation Prospect Theory (Schmidt et al., 2008), which allows reference 
points to be uncertain while decision weights are specified in a rank-dependent 
way. In the Original and Cumulative Prospect theories, the reference points are 
assumed to be certainties. The criticism raised by Schmidt et al. is that if 
reference points are restricted to certainties then these theories cannot be 
applied to problems in which a decision maker is endowed with a lottery and 
has the opportunity to sell or exchange it. They accomplish that by defining the 
preferences over acts following a Savage (1972) style framework and 
borrowing the state-contingent, reference-dependence concept of Reference-
Dependent Subjective Expected Utility Theory (Sugden, 2003): consider an 
individual endowed with a reference lottery and asked to evaluate another 
lottery. The gains and losses are calculated as the difference between the 
outcomes of the evaluated lottery and the reference lottery for each state of the 
world. Therefore the reference for each state is the outcome of the reference 
lottery in that state. This implies that gains or losses are defined as the relative 
state-wise attractiveness of the lottery that is being evaluated. The remaining 
'( ) '( )v x v x  0.x 
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operations such as rank-dependent nonlinear probability weighting associated 
with gains and losses are identical with Cumulative Prospect Theory. 
1.3.4 Regret Theory 
Regret Theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1982) provides explanations 
for anomalies by accommodating neither reference-dependence nor nonlinear 
probability weighting, which makes it the most distinct compared to those 
theories explained above. Central to the theory is evaluating a prospect by 
comparing its outcomes with the outcomes of an alternative prospect in a state-
wise manner. Individuals would feel regret for the states in which the outcome 
of the alternative prospect is higher, whereas the individual would feel joy for 
the states in which the alternative gives lower payoff. This intuition later 
contributed the idea for Gul’s Disappointment Theory (Gul, 1991). 
To see how the theory models the decision under risk, consider two 
prospects: and , where and denote the 
outcomes of state that is one of the possible states of the world ; and and 
are the corresponding probabilities. Then, an individual chooses instead of 
and  state of the world occurs.  Thus, the realised consequence is  
instead of  had he chosen differently. In Regret Theory the satisfaction for 
this choice is denoted as which is an increasing function of and 
decreasing function of . Loomes and Sugden (1982) suggest the following 
form for the modified utility function: where is 
analogous to the standard Bernoulli conception of utility function, i.e., the 
psychological experience of pleasure related to the prospect  if the  state 
of the world occurs.
 
is called the ‘regret-rejoice function’,
 
and 
non-decreasing. This function exhibits disutility of regret if or a positive 
utility of rejoice if .  
Notice that in the theories discussed so far, the nature of the available 
options does not affect the level of satisfaction attained from the choice being 
made. If the alternative option has a higher payoff for the realised state, regret 
decreases the utility or the psychological experience of pleasure related to that 
particular choice. The opposite of regret is ‘rejoice’ in the theory’s 
terminology. Therefore the psychological experience of pleasure related to a 
particular prospect incorporates not only ‘what it is’ but also ‘what might have 
been’. They also assume that if
 
then the individual feels neither regret 
nor rejoice for choosing if state  occurs. Therefore, equals only 
the utility of getting  Individuals maximise Expected Modified Utility 
denoted as which is the evaluation of prospect when 
the alternative option is  As in EUT, the Expected Modified Utility is the 
weighted sum of the modified utilities, where the weights are the 
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objective probabilities, , in a linear manner. Thus, Regret Theory 
accommodates EUT as a special case for situations in which the individual 
does not feel any regret or rejoice. We can now write the preference relation 
between and for example, if the individual weakly prefers over
if and only if : 
 
   (20) 
 
The most apparent limitation of the theory is that unlike the theories 
mentioned before, it cannot be a conventional theory that assigns values 
independently to individual prospects because it has to allow comparisons 
between available choice options (Starmer, 2000). Another limitation is that 
the original form can only be applied if there are only two prospects, however 
Sugden (1993) and Quiggin (1994) suggest ways of generalising it to multiple 
choice problems. Loomes and Sugden (1982) suggest reducing the alternative 
options into one single option by calculating the weighted average of all the 
remaining options, and the weights are action weights according to their 
appellation. Therefore if there are more than two options available, an 
individual calculates the Expected Modified Utility of Option with respect to
in this case is the weighted average of the alternative options. However, 
their approach requires developing a sound and solid theory for the action 
weights as well. 
Less attention is given to the question of stochastic dominance. Loomes and 
Sugden (1982) note that regret-theoretic preferences do not preserve first-order 
stochastic dominance in the sense of Hadar and Russell (1969), but that state-
wise stochastic dominance is preserved. Quiggin (1994) shows that violations 
of stochastic dominance are pervasive in regret theory, in the sense that for any 
prospect with more than two distinct outcomes, there exists a preferred 
prospect which is first-order stochastically dominated by the initial one. 
1.4 Conclusion 
Problems of decision under risk are simply represented as lotteries with two 
elements: outcomes and their associated probabilities. As mentioned in Section 
1.1, the story of modelling the issue starts with Pascal and Fermat’s notion of 
expected value, which is basically the weighted sum of the outcomes of a 
lottery with the weights being the probabilities associated with each outcome. 
This notion is challenged by Bernoulli’s St. Petersburg paradox; the solution is 
offered by the first crucial departure, that is, EUT treats the outcome in a non-
decreasing but concave function called the utility function. The important 
ip
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property is the nonlinear and concave nature of this function, known as the 
diminishing marginal utility. As outlined in Section 1.3, a series of anomalies 
are reported in the literature that challenged EUT. Those anomalies led 
researchers to develop alternative models. The alternative theories are different 
in terms of treating the probabilities or outcomes or both. For example, 
Prospect Theory differs both in the probability and outcome parts of the 
decision problem. For the outcome, it introduces the concept of loss aversion, 
which asserts that losses loom larger than gains. Moreover, unlike EUT, 
Prospect Theory assumes that individuals do not use objective numerical 
probabilities directly, but instead use the transformed versions of them. 
Another example is Rank-Dependent Utility Theory, which is an extension of 
EUT because the only difference is the nonlinear cumulative probability 
transformation notion. The monetary outcomes are treated in the same manner 
as EUT. 
Overall, the progress in the literature seems to have been led by the 
anomalies and challenges to whatever the existing theory is. The story of 
modelling the decision under risk started with the linear incorporation of the 
elements into calculations, i.e., the expected value concept, but this concept is 
challenged by St. Petersburg paradox. Next, EUT is offered as a solution to the 
paradox, which treats the outcome element of the decision problem 
nonlinearly, but is soon challenged by anomalies such as the valuation gap, 
Allais Paradox, and preference reversal. These anomalies have led to new 
theories that generally assume that individuals do not perceive the objective 
numerical probabilities linearly, but instead perceive them in a nonlinear 
manner, such as underweighting the high probabilities and overweighting the 
low probabilities. However, those alternative theories are challenged by the 
recently emerging evidence of preference imprecision.   
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2 Alternative to the alternatives: 
Preference Imprecision 
This chapter reviews the emerging hypothesis of preference imprecision, which 
challenges both the EUT and the alternative theories. Although the alternative 
theories reviewed in Chapter 1 can explain the anomalies of EUT, they ignore 
preference imprecision, implicitly assuming that individuals can articulate their 
preferences precisely. Section 2.1 presents an introduction for the new 
hypothesis by explaining how it contradicts the standard notions of economic 
preferences. Section 2.2 presents the attempts in the literature to model the 
imprecision as a stochastic component, added to the existing theories. Section 
2.3 and 2.4 reviews the experimental studies in the literature, which elicit the 
imprecision intervals in valuations tasks. These experimental studies 
investigate preference imprecision as an alternative explanation for observed 
anomalies such as preference reversals, valuation gap, and the Allais Paradox.  
2.1 Introduction 
The central idea of decision theories is to use the attributes of risky prospects, 
such as outcomes and their associated probabilities, and calculate a single 
number that can reflect the subjective attractiveness of these prospects. A 
natural way to think about the theories of decision under risk is that these 
attributes are the inputs and the summary statisticssuch as expected utility 
and expected valueproduced by these theories are the outputs. Alternative 
theories such Prospect Theory, Rank-Dependent Utility Theory, and 
Cumulative Prospect Theory reviewed in Section 1.3 have also their own 
summary statistics, assumed to be the criteria that individuals take into account 
while making decisions. Those statistics represent a measure of expected 
satisfaction or pleasure associated with the risky prospect, and individuals are 
assumed to prefer more to less, such that they make decisions to maximise 
their total satisfaction.  
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Since Pascal and Fermat, researchers have been suggesting different ways 
of incorporating the inputs and calculating the summary statistic that is 
assumed to be the criterion for decision making under risk. In general, based on 
the theories reviewed in Section 1.3, the conventional approach can be 
summarised as individuals (i) take the elements of the prospects such as 
outcomes and probabilities as inputs; (ii) calculate a summary statistic of the 
prospect; and (iii) use this summary statistic to choose among options and/or 
assign monetary valuations to them. Although these theories provide different 
ways to use the two inputs and calculate a summary statistic, varying in their 
treatments of the two inputs, they share one important and implicit assumption 
that individuals can form their subjective valuations precisely.  
Considering the limitations of human perception and cognitive abilities, one 
might see this as a strong assumption. However, when modelling human 
decision making, economists have conventionally assumed that individuals 
have well-behaved preferences that do not allow for preference imprecision. 
For example, Savage (1972) assumes that for any two acts, and , either
, or , or and , which implies . This assumption 
states that the individual either prefers f to g or g to f or is indifferent between 
them, ruling out the possibility that the individual prefers f to g and g to f 
simultaneously. It also ignores the possibility of observing neither nor
;f g  the individual is assumed to be have defined preferences over all sets 
of options and is not allowed to provide inconsistent rankings. This assumption 
ensures that there is no situation where an individual feels indecisive and 
vacillates; therefore it does not allow the incommensurability of the options. In 
reality, individuals might end up in a situation where they cannot determine 
their preferences confidently.  
The standard approach also assumes that every risky prospect has a 
certainty equivalent, a precise amount of money that is equally desirable. This 
might be true for an individual who has sufficient familiarity and expertise in 
risky situations, but ordinarily it is more likely that the certainty equivalent 
would be a range of rounded numbers rather than a precise estimation. 
The related notion of the conventional approach with this precision is 
‘betweenness’: consider the three acts  is ranked as between and
i.e. either  or 
 
Savage (1972) Theorem 4 states that there 
exists only one  such that  To see how this axiom is 
connected to the concept of precision of the certainty equivalent, consider a 
risky prospect which has two possible outcomes and  and 
associated probabilities  and  respectively. To avoid confusion, note 
that we can see and as two degenerate lotteries which give the amounts,
and with certainty. Therefore prospect is a compound 
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lottery that is a mixture of the two degenerate lotteries. Finally we can view
analogous to the certainty equivalent of lottery since is the degenerate 
lottery which promises sure amount of money that is equally desirable as As 
a natural conclusion, there exists another degenerate lottery  which gives a 
more certain amount of money than such that should be strictly 
preferred to  This way of thinking leads to two important 
conjectures about the certainty equivalent of a simple binary lottery: (i) The 
certainty equivalent of a binary outcome lottery should lie between the two 
outcomes, and (ii) two different amounts cannot be the certainty equivalent, 
simultaneously. The second point is important for the concept of preference 
imprecision, because if an individual has imprecise preferences, i.e., cannot 
articulate the subjective evaluations as single amounts, the individual will end 
up with a range of certainty equivalents and be unable to state a precise 
estimate confidently. As the conventional assumptions and axioms seem to be 
problematic for preference imprecision, I offer a new understanding for the 
imprecision concept in Section 4.3.3. 
2.2 Modelling Imprecision as Stochastic Preferences 
Two prominent findings of experimental literature lead economists to focus on 
stochastic preferences. The first is that when subjects face the same pairwise 
choice more than once, a considerable portion of the subjects seem to be 
behaving inconsistently on different occasions in a given experiment (Ballinger 
and Wilcox, 1997; Camerer, 1989; Hey and Orme, 1994; Starmer and Sugden, 
1989). Second, the existing theories of decision under risk seem to be only 
partially successful in explaining the behaviour observed in experiments 
(Loomes and Sugden, 1998). 
The idea of imprecision dates back to 19
th
 century, investigated in the works 
of Fechner and Weber who are considered to be the founders of the 
psychophysics and experimental psychology (Gescheider, 2013). They 
investigate the relation between stimulus and sensation, particularly focusing 
on judgments about stimuli such as light, sound, weight, and distance. Those 
early works suggest that human judgement of stimuli is subject to errors, 
therefore expecting a perfect evaluation from individuals is not realistic 
(Fechner, 1966). Moreover, upon comparing, e.g., the weight of two objects, 
the probability of making a mistake is higher when the weights are very close, 
such as 1 kg and 1.05 kg.  
Psychophysics studies focus on the physical stimuli, however in the realm 
of economics, individuals deal with evaluations of risky prospects, which are 
the main focus of this study. Therefore, risky prospects or lottery tickets in 
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economics are the counterparts of the physical stimuli concept in 
psychophysics. Finally, the ‘preference imprecision hypothesis’ is the idea 
which claims that as individuals’ judgements about objects are subject to 
mistakes, the choices among options and valuations of the goods are also liable 
to imprecision and noise. 
The history of imprecision in economics dates back to 1950s in the form of 
probabilistic choice and random preferences models (Becker et al., 1963; 
Georgescu-Roegen, 1958; Luce, 1959; Luce and Suppes, 1965; Mosteller and 
Nogee, 2006). As reviewed in Chapter 1, researchers tried to explain the 
observed anomalies by developing alternative models, however they do not 
consider the noise and imprecision accounting for these anomalies. Beginning 
in 1990s, the idea of imprecision began to receive attention by researchers in 
the form of modelling it as the stochastic component of a deterministic theory 
such as EUT and/or alternative theories (Harless and Camerer, 1994; Hey and 
Orme, 1994; Loomes and Sugden, 1998, 1995; Sopher and Gigliotti, 1993).  
The common approach employed by these studies is to incorporate the 
imprecision as the stochastic componentthe random and/or error partof a 
core deterministic theory, but these studies do differ in the interpretation of the 
source of randomness. The logic that is employed is to reject a theory if the 
observed behaviour systematically departs from the core theory, if the 
anomalies cannot be explained by random errors or deviations from the core 
theory. However, it seems that no single combination of deterministic core and 
stochastic specification can explain the significant portion of the anomalies 
(Loomes, 2005). There are three major approaches so far in the literature for 
modelling the imprecision as stochastic preferences: the random error 
approach, the trembling hand approach, and the random preference approach. 
2.2.1 Random Error Approach 
At this point it is useful to review the prominent approaches to modelling the 
imprecision and/or noise in the literature; I start with Hey and Orme (1994), 
inspired by Fechner’s (1966) ideas of individuals’ imprecise judgements of the 
stimuli modelled as white noise, normally distributed with a mean of zero. The 
reason for such an error might be the subjects’ misunderstanding the nature of 
the experiment or operational mistakes during the experiment, e.g., pressing 
the wrong key by accident. Moreover, subjects’ inattentiveness, such as being 
in a hurry to complete the experiment and/or having another motivation rather 
than maximising their welfare from participating in the experiment, might be 
the reasons behind those errors.  
Hey and Orme’s (1994) idea is that the preferences can be represented by a 
core theory plus a random error term: 
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where  is the preference functional of a deterministic core theory,  and  
are the two options and  is the stochastic component with a constant variance 
and mean of zero. An individual prefers over if the difference between the 
utility of the two options plus some random error is positive. When  the 
choice solely depends on the core deterministic theory part of the model. 
Notice that if is sufficiently high in the opposite direction of the 
deterministic part, although  the model predicts that the 
individual prefers  over . Moreover, the greater the difference in the 
deterministic part, the less likely it is that the preferences predicted by the core 
theory will be reversed by the error term.  
Hey and Orme’s (1994) data was composed of 100 pairwise choice 
questions answered by 80 subjects; details about the lottery pairs are listed in 
Table 2. 
They estimated eleven different preference functionals including: risk 
neutrality (expected value), Subjective Expected Utility Theory, 
Disappointment Aversion Theory, Prospective Reference Theory, Quadratic 
Utility Theory, Regret Theory with dependence and independence, rank 
dependence with the power weighting function and ‘Quiggin’ weighting 
function, and Yaari’s Dual Model which is a special case of the Rank 
Dependent Utility Theory with the probability function left as general and the 
utility function assumed to be linear. 
Their results provide insights about the winner and loser theories. For 
example risk neutrality is rejected in favour of EUT; on the other hand, at the 
1% level, EUT is rejected in favour of the remaining nine preference 
functionals. Overall, for approximately 39% of the subjects, EUT does not 
perform worse than any of the alternative models. For the remaining portion of 
the subjects, Rank Dependent Utility Theory functionals and Quadratic Utility 
Theory seem to be the strongest models. Next, they find that Regret Theory 
with independence performs better than the one with dependence, which 
suggests that the subjects perceived the two lotteries as being statistically 
independent. Among the remaining nine models Yaari’s Dual Model and 
Disappointment Aversion Theory are the poorest. However, they emphasise 
that the sample consisting of the responses of 80 subjects should not be taken 
as representative. On the other hand, their analysis strongly supports the 
importance of the errors and suggests that deterministic core models do not 
describe the significant portion of the observed behaviour. 
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Table 2. Pairwise choice questions 
p1 p2 p3 q1 q2 q3 
0.6250 0.0000 0.3750 0.3750 0.6250 0.0000 
0.3750 0.6250 0.0000 0.5000 0.2500 0.2500 
0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.1250 0.5000 0.3750 
0.1250 0.7500 0.1250 0.2500 0.5000 0.2500 
0.5000 0.3750 0.1250 0.6250 0.1250 0.2500 
0.2500 0.7500 0.0000 0.3750 0.0000 0.6250 
0.2500 0.6250 0.1250 0.3750 0.2500 0.3750 
0.2500 0.2500 0.5000 0.1250 0.6250 0.2500 
0.1250 0.3750 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
0.1250 0.2500 0.6250 0.0000 0.5000 0.5000 
0.1250 0.8750 0.0000 0.2500 0.6250 0.1250 
0.2500 0.7500 0.0000 0.5000 0.0000 0.5000 
0.6250 0.3750 0.0000 0.7500 0.1250 0.1250 
0.1250 0.5000 0.3750 0.2500 0.0000 0.7500 
0.1250 0.7500 0.1250 0.3750 0.1250 0.5000 
0.3750 0.3750 0.2500 0.5000 0.1250 0.3750 
0.0000 0.7500 0.2500 0.1250 0.3750 0.5000 
0.5000 0.1250 0.3750 0.3750 0.5000 0.1250 
0.7500 0.0000 0.2500 0.6250 0.3750 0.0000 
0.2500 0.3750 0.3750 0.3750 0.0000 0.6250 
0.0000 0.8750 0.1250 0.1250 0.6250 0.2500 
0.0000 0.6250 0.3750 0.1250 0.2500 0.6250 
0.2500 0.5000 0.2500 0.1250 0.8750 0.0000 
0.5000 0.5000 0.0000 0.6250 0.1250 0.2500 
0.2500 0.5000 0.2500 0.3750 0.2500 0.3750 
Notes: The 100 questions were composed of 4 sets of (the same) 25 questions, each set applied to 3 of the 4 
amounts £0, £10, £20, and £30. 
2.2.2 Trembling Hand Approach 
Harless and Camerer (1994) suggest a simpler error-generating mechanism 
analogous to the game theoretic idea of the ‘trembling hand’. Their approach 
assumes that individuals have true underlying preferences characterised by a 
core deterministic theory, but they make the wrong choice with a fixed 
probability of . Although this assumption offers a simpler way, intuitively it 
seems a quite insufficient way to incorporate the stochastic nature of human 
behaviour, since the likelihood of making an error is expected to increase when 
the difference in satisfaction between the options decreases (see Loomes et al. 
(2002) for further discussion). Notice that in their approach, the probability of 
making an erroneous decision is independent of the features of the options, in 
w
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other words, they assume that individuals choose the less preferred option with 
a probability of no matter how much the difference between the utility of 
the options is according to a core deterministic theory. 
They conducted their analysis on 23 data sets consisting of approximately 
8,000 choices that subjects made in Allais type of problems. Overall, they 
found that none of the existing theories perform significantly better than others: 
all theories are rejected by a chi-square test. This implies that the variation that 
is not predicted by the existing core theories can be explained by another 
theory as yet undeveloped, because for every theory the ‘trembling’ part is 
systematic variation rather than being an error. However, they can identify 
some dominated and dominant patterns: the dominated theories are generally 
the ones which assume betweenness rather than independence and assume 
fanning in Machina triangle, whereas the dominants are mixed fanning, 
Prospect Theory, EUT, and expected value. Interestingly, EUT is never 
dominated, but it is never selected as the best model according to the several 
selection criteria such as the Schwarz criterion. 
Another important observation is that the theories like EUT and Weighted 
EUT can be improved by further generalisations to incorporate commonly 
observed patterns in the literature. Moreover, the alternative models such as 
Rank-Dependent Utility Theory seem to allow patterns that are rarely 
observed. Thus, the results suggest not abandoning EUT but extending it.  
2.2.3 Random Preference Approach 
The Random-Error and Trembling-Hand approaches model the imprecision as 
deviations from the true preferences due to the errors that people make in their 
calculations and judgements, and thus can be categorised as Fechner type of 
models. The final approach that I will discuss is known as the ‘random 
preference model’, first discussed by Becker et al. (1963), then generalised by 
Loomes and Sugden (1995). This approach assumes that individuals decide 
according to a core theory, but the parameters of the theory are determined 
randomly for each action. For example, if the core theory is EUT, then the risk 
aversion parameter will be randomly drawn with replacement for each task, 
thus it might not be the same for another action. In other words, this modelling 
approach sees preference imprecision as a set of preference functions that are 
consistent with a theory, rather than as some white noise added to a core 
theory. Intuitively, it views the individual as a collection of multiple selves, 
where the self that is deciding for each task is randomly chosen. Notice that in 
this approach imprecision is not viewed as an error added to a core theory; this 
is a major departure from the standard notion of economic preferences, because 
under the standard view the individual is assumed to have stable preferences, 
,w
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i.e., to exhibit the same parameter values for each action. As an example, 
consider the EUT with a simple power utility function, where the 
parameter  determines the curvature of the utility function, i.e., the risk 
attitude of the individual. Now suppose equals 0.8, implying that the 
individual exhibits risk aversion. The standard view of preferences sees this 
parameter value as an inherent characteristic of the individual and assumes that 
independent of the task type such as buying, selling, or choice, and the 
available options, the individual employs the same value for upon making 
decisions. Whereas in the ‘random preference model’, the value of is allowed 
to change, therefore the personality of the individual is not assumed to be 
stable. 
Compared to the Random Preference Model, one obvious limitation of the 
Fechner type of models is the violation of dominance. We know from the 
previous experimental literature that individuals seldom violate dominance at 
least when it is transparent, i.e., they frequently choose the stochastically 
dominant option (Loomes, 2005). For example Loomes et al. (2002) analyses 
the data presented by Loomes and Sugden (1998), in which the binary choices 
of 92 subjects for 45 lottery pairs are collected. The distinct feature of the data 
is that each pair is presented twice in different orders. Among the 45 different 
lottery ticket pairs, in 5 of them one option stochastically dominates the other 
such as offering a slightly higher chance of winning the same amount or lower 
chance of losing the same amount. What they find is that, although the 
Fechner-type error models predict 10-15% of subjects will violate dominance, 
the ratio was less than 1.5%. Therefore, when we include the dominance cases, 
Fechner models perform poorly, however one can interpret this result as 
individuals not behaving according to these models when the dominance is 
transparent. In other words, in those ‘easy’ decision problems, individuals 
behave according to the predictions of EUT, but when there is not dominance 
between pairs, the stochastic nature of the preferences is more applicable to 
describe the behaviour.  
It is easy to see that the Random Preference Model does not incorporate any 
violations of dominance, because the stochastic component is inherent in the 
individuals’ preferences (Loomes and Sugden, 1995). This means that the 
Random Preference Model underpredicts the observed rate of the violation 
looking at the experimental evidence provided by Loomes et al. (2002), as 
discussed before. Remember that according to the model, for each choice task 
the individual draws the parameters of the core theory randomly, and if the 
core theory predicts behaviour consistent with the dominance notion, then the 
Random Preference Model does too. Consider two binary outcome prospects
and , which gives the same amount X and zero, but the first one has slightly 
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higher probability of winning X, such as 0.25 and 0.20, respectively. The 
expected utility of the prospects are: 
 
   (22) 
  
   (23) 
 
Clearly, expected utility of is higher than since the first one 
stochastically dominates the other. The choice problem can be represented as: 
 
   (24) 
 
Thus, regardless of which parameters are drawn randomly for , if the 
core theory behaves according to the dominance notion, so does the Random 
Preference Model. On the other hand, Fechner-type of models incorporate the 
error term separately: 
 
   (25) 
 
If the error term is negative and sufficiently high, the inequality will be 
reversed and model predicts the dominated option will be preferred over . 
Loomes and Sugden (1998) find that the trembling hand approach of 
Harless and Camerer (1994) performs poorly. Moreover, the frequency of 
cases that exhibit violation of dominance is overpredicted by the random error 
approach of Hey and Orme (1994), where random preference fails to predict 
any violation of dominance. They suggest a future direction can be to 
incorporate a type of trembling notion into a random preference model. 
Subsequently, Loomes et al. (2002) implemented this trembling modification 
to a random error model and a random preference model. They compared EUT 
and Rank-Dependent Utility Theory using different stochastic specifications 
such as a random preference model with trembles, and a random error model 
with and without trembles. Results show that the trembling modification 
significantly increases the explanatory power of the two stochastic 
specifications. The best fitting menu seems to be the Rank-Dependent Utility 
Theory together with a random preference model with trembles. 
 Moreover, they find that the trembles disappear as subjects gain experience 
towards the completion of 90 choice questions. This implies the interesting 
conclusion that the tremble can be seen as a type of error due to the calculation 
or misunderstandings, but the variation incorporated by the random preference 
model is stable and does not decay. They further speculate that this part might 
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be attributed to the preference imprecision and might be inherent. Notice that 
this is the only study in the literature so far where there is a clear distinction 
being made between imprecision and errors: Loomes et al. (2002) view the 
decaying part of the variation as a result of errors but the stable part of the 
variation as imprecision. The latter is the issue that this study develops around 
and presents a new theory for.  
2.3 Experiments in Direct Elicitation of Imprecision Intervals 
Previous sections review the empirical works in which the parameters of the 
various existing models are estimated together with a stochastic specification 
using the choice data. In this section, I review the experimental studies that use 
direct elicitation methods of imprecision intervals mainly relying on the 
subjects’ self-reporting. Self-reported data is often used in social and 
behavioural sciences and in environmental valuation or happiness studies; 
however, it is unconventional in experimental economics to rely on 
unincentivised methods. As a principle, unlike in psychology, intrinsic 
motivation is not seen as sufficient for subjects to reveal their true preferences, 
as it is not a costly action for subjects to lie about their offers (see Camerer and 
Hogarth (1999) for a detailed discussion). In Chapter 3, I introduce a new 
mechanism that is incentive compatible under the given assumptions to 
overcome these problems. Generally, relying of self-reporting is not a desired 
method for experimental economics, but so for it seems difficult to develop a 
better way to elicit imprecision intervals.  
There are two methods used in the literature: the Response Table (Cohen et 
al., 1987; Cubitt et al., 2015), and the Iteration Procedure (Butler and Loomes, 
2007, 2011; Dubourg et al., 1997, 1994). In the first method subjects are asked 
to respond to a series of binary choice questions between a risky prospect and a 
sure amount of money by filling a response table similar to the Table 3: 
Table 3 Example response table 
Certain 
Amounts 
I definitely prefer the good Not sure I definitely prefer the certain amount 
0    
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
6    
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For the example depicted in Table 3, a subject prefers the risky prospect for 
the certain amounts up to and including 2, whereas the risky prospect is 
preferred for the amounts 5 and 6. The imprecision interval corresponds to the 
values 3 and 4, for which a subject cannot confidently state a preference 
between the risky prospect and these amounts. Cohen et al. (1987) included a 
fourth column that states equivalence (indifference) between the two options. 
However, due to participants’ misunderstandings, they combined the 
imprecision and equivalence column in their data analysis. More recently, 
Cubitt et al. (2015) also use the reduced version of the response table 
discarding the equivalence statement. Another difference between the two 
studies is related to payoff determination: in Cohen et al. (1987), if a subject 
stated an imprecision interval, the experimenter randomly determines which 
option is picked, whereas Cubitt et al. (2015) leave the choice to the subjects 
by asking them to determine a switching point inside the imprecision interval. 
The second method relies on an iterative process. For example Dubourg et 
al. (1994) used a numbered disk, which has a small window showing only 
single value at a time. For each value, subjects state their preference by 
choosing one of the three phrases: definitely willing to pay, definitely not 
willing to pay, or not sure. If the response was ‘willing’, the interviewer rotates 
the disk to reveal a higher value through the window, whereas if the answer is 
‘not willing’, the interviewer reveals a lower amount. The experiment 
continues until there is a maximum amount that subjects are definitely willing 
to pay and not willing to pay. If the two amounts are different, then the 
interviewer asks for a ‘best estimate’ of the subject for determining the 
‘switching point’ in Cubitt et al. (2015). 
Butler and Loomes (2007) elicited the valuations for risky prospects using a 
similar method which they call the ‘incremental choice method’. They focused 
on preference reversal phenomenon, so they elicited value and probability 
equivalents for a series of P-bets and $-bets. The procedure is very similar to 
the method described before but this time they included four categories instead 
of three to describe the subjects’ confidence in their choice: definitely 
preferring A, probably preferring A, probably preferring B, and definitely 
preferring B.  
Overall, the existing methods in the literature are the slightly modified 
versions of the ones mentioned above; all rely on subjects’ self-reporting.  
2.4 Patterns Found in Experiments 
Cohen et al. (1987), one of the early studies that used response table method, 
observed that 10% of the subjects exhibiting imprecision, the lowest ratio 
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observed in the literature. Butler and Loomes (1988) focus on decision 
difficulty by using the experimental data first described in an earlier paper 
Loomes (1988) that compares behaviour under three kinds of elicitation 
procedures for certainty equivalents. The major finding is that although 
subjects are allowed to state their valuations in increments of one penny, a 
majority of them preferred to round their valuations to the nearest 50 pence. 
This can be interpreted as a support for the argument that individuals do not 
have cognitively costless access to their precise preferences. Butler and 
Loomes (1988) focus on the iterative elicitation procedure by which they 
elicited the certainty equivalents of the following four binary outcome lotteries 
in Table 4: 
Table 4. Lotteries used by Butler and Loomes (1988) 
Lottery p1 x1 p2 x2 
A1 0.2 £30  0.8 £0  
A2 0.4 £15  0.6 £0  
A3 0.6 £10  0.4 £0  
A4 0.8 £7.5  0.2 £0  
 
For each lottery in Table 4, subjects answered a series of binary choice 
questions where the second option was a sure amount of money. If a subject 
chooses the risky option, the sure amount is increased in the next question; on 
the other hand, if a subject chooses the sure amount, the value is updated 
downwards in the next question. Additionally, subjects are asked to use a 
cursor to state their confidence about their decision. The cursor can be moved 
to 51 different positions, corresponding to the feeling of confidence between 
‘very confident’ to ‘very unsure’. Despite the limitation of their data and 
experimental design, they conclude that as we move from A4 to A1, i.e., as the 
winning amount increases without changing the other outcome, the size of the 
imprecision range increases. However, the balance between the probabilities of 
the two outcomes also affects the size of the imprecision range. Second, their 
analysis provides some support for the hypothesis that as the variance gets 
higher the imprecision range also widens.  
Morrison (1998) tested the prominent explanations of valuation gap such as 
the endowment effect, substitutability, or imprecise preferences using the 
experimental data presented first in Morrison (1997). In this study, three 
responses for each WTA or WTP question were elicited: a lower-bound, an 
upper-bound, and subjects’ ‘best estimate’. They tested the imprecision 
hypothesis by looking at whether the ranges for WTA and WTP intersect 
significantly or not. Results reject the imprecision hypothesis as an explanation 
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for the valuation gap, because the lower bound of WTA is significantly higher 
than the upper bound of WTP; in other words, the ranges of the two measures 
do not overlap. Similarly, Dubourg et al. (1994) elicited WTP and WTA values 
for changes in the risk of nonfatal road injuries using an iterative procedure. 
They found that individuals exhibit a significant amount of imprecision, 
however this imprecision alone is not insufficient to explain the observed 
disparity between WTA and WTP. 
Another important study is Butler and Loomes (2007), which focuses on 
investigating to what extent preference imprecision can explain preference 
reversals, using a similar iterative mechanism as Butler and Loomes (1988). In 
the 2007 study, rather than a 51-point scale of confidence, they use a refined 
version that only consists of four categories or phrases: ‘definitely choose A’, 
‘probably choose A’, ‘probably choose B’, and ‘definitely choose B’. They 
ground the theoretical side of their study on an unpublished but influential 
paper by MacCrimmon and Smith (1986) that conjectures that individuals 
might have interval values rather than precise amounts for the risky prospects 
and claims that preference reversal phenomenon can be explained by $-bets 
having a wider interval than P-bets. They refrain from suggesting a formal 
structure about how individuals form these interval valuations, but they suggest 
that as the risky prospect become more dissimilar to the certainty or degenerate 
lottery the interval widens. Butler and Loomes (2007) found that the 
imprecision argument can be seen as one of the explanations of the preference 
reversals phenomenon, since the intervals found for the $-bet is significantly 
higher than the P-bet, and that more importantly they overlap, which is in line 
with the conjectures of MacCrimmon and Smith (1986). 
Another important study conducted by Butler and Loomes (2011) proposed 
and tested preference imprecision as an explanation for the observed violations 
of independence and betweenness axioms. They use MacCrimmon and Smith’s 
(1986) model of imprecise preferences and demonstrate it on the Marchak-
Machina triangle. Their results confirm the fanning out hypothesis and favour 
preference imprecision as an explanation of the violations of EUT. 
The most recent study is Cubitt et al. (2015), which elicited the imprecision 
intervals by using the response table method; they also asked subjects to state 
their best estimate from the interval. They found that the best estimates of the 
subjects move coherently with the attractiveness of the lotteries, in other 
words, as the attractiveness of the risky prospect increases, subjects’ best 
estimates also increase. Overall, they found that 87% of the subjects exhibit 
imprecision in their preferences. The size of the interval does not seem to be 
dependent on the outcomes of the lotteries. Furthermore, the size of the stated 
intervals is found to be the constant proportion of the distance between the best 
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and the worst outcome of the lotteries, which is in line with Butler and Loomes 
(2011). Their design also enables tests of stability, i.e. whether the size of the 
intervals changes with repetition or not. It is important, because if imprecision 
is merely a result of errors or unfamiliarity with the experimental mechanisms, 
it should disappear with repetition and experience. However, they found no 
evidence for imprecision declining with experience. Their analysis supports 
that imprecision is stable and not temporary; it seems to be the inherent 
characteristic of individuals’ preferences. Although they could not find any 
evidence that imprecision accounts for the violation of betweenness and 
independence, it seems to be an important phenomenon of individual 
behaviour, and the nature of it should be understood further. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Imprecision in economics literature seems to be seen as the errors that 
individuals make in their calculations. This idea is influenced by early works in 
psychophysics literature. I reviewed three major approaches that emerged in 
the economics literature. These approaches model imprecision as a stochastic 
element added to a core deterministic theory. However, as the results indicate, 
even with these specifications, none of the deterministic models seems to 
explain a significant portion of the observed behaviour. The stochastic 
component seems to be systematic, suggesting that new theories should be 
developed to explain this residual. Another important result presented by 
Loomes and Sugden (1998) found that the imprecision should not merely be 
interpreted as the errors that subjects make; instead a portion of it seems to be 
an inherent part of the preferences that does not diminish as subjects gain 
experience. In Chapter 4, I present a new deterministic core theory that focuses 
on this inherent part.  
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3 A Re-examination: Valuation Gap and 
Interval Valuations 
This chapter includes an extended version of the published paper Bayrak and 
Kriström (2016) which is an experimental study on valuation gap. It can be 
seen as an exploration study, which provides insights about the interval 
valuations specifically focusing on the valuation gap. Interval valuation 
concept is directly related to preference imprecision. As mentioned in Chapter 
2, individuals with imprecise preferences cannot state a precise amount 
confidently as their subjective valuation of a good, therefore will end up having 
ranges.  
We extend the literature on the willingness-to-pay/willingness-to-accept 
(WTP/WTA) disparity by testing two hypotheses, distilled from the literature. 
We also introduce a modified mechanism for eliciting the subjective valuation 
range if the individual cannot articulate the subjective value as a precise 
amount confidently. We elicited valuations for four goods: three ordinary 
market goods and a lottery ticket. Under the conventional setting in which 
subjects are asked to state a single precise amount, we observed a significant 
disparity for the lottery ticket. On the other hand, our key finding is that the 
disparity disappears under the intervals treatment, suggesting that response 
format is important, given that earlier experimental studies invariably uses 
point values (i.e. open ended questions about WTP/WTA). Moreover, for the 
risky prospect we observe that from their admissible range the buyers state the 
lower bound as their WTP whereas sellers state the upper bound as their WTA. 
We conclude that this type of behavior can to some extent explain the observed 
disparity at least for the risky prospects. The results lead to the development of 
PCT, which is a new decision theory for under risk and is presented in Chapter 
4. Section 3.1 provides and introduction and explains the motivation of 
investigating the issue with interval valuations. Section 3.2 reviews the 
literature on valuation gap, evaluates the results of three meta-analysis of the 
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issue and presents the three different explanations of the issue existing in the 
literature. Section 3.3 introduces our working hypothesis. Section 3.4 provides 
the details of our experimental design. As mentioned before, we also introduce 
a new experimental mechanism; a modified version of Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak mechanism for eliciting imprecise preferences, Section 3.4 presents 
the incentive compatibility analysis of our new mechanism. Finally, Section 
3.5 presents our results and Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.1 Introduction 
The “valuation gap” refers to the empirically found disparity between WTP 
and WTA. It remains one of the most prominent anomalies in standard 
economic theory, because we expect that WTP and WTA should be similar if 
the goods in question have close substitutes and if the income effects are small 
(Hanemann, 1991). The gap was first documented by mathematical 
psychologists Coombs et al. (1967) and by Hammack and Brown (1974) in an 
early contingent valuation study. Knetsch and Sinden (1984) brought the issue 
into the laboratory using real monetary incentives and found a significant 
difference between WTP and WTA. Since then, the disparity has been found in 
an array of studies, including contingent valuation surveys and in field and 
laboratory experiments for a wide range of goods: e.g. mugs, pens, movie 
tickets, hunting permits, nuclear waste repositories, foul-tasting liquids, and 
pathogen-contaminated sandwiches (Horowitz and McConnell, 2002). 
The gap has many implications for the application of economic theory, but 
also for theory proper. For example, if a cost-benefit analysis is conducted on a 
proposed policy that generates both winners and losers, estimated net benefits 
will then depend on whether WTA or WTP was used in the assessment. At a 
more fundamental level, the gap raises questions about the power of standard 
preference models to explain economic behavior (Braga and Starmer, 2005). 
Explanations of what may drive the disparity include the endowment effect 
which suggests that preferences are reference dependent and losses loom larger 
than gains. Thus sellers perceive giving away the good as a loss and ask for 
more as a compensation for their loss (Thaler, 1980). Theorists have also 
developed alternative models of economic behavior that address the disparity 
and several other anomalies
1
. 
                                                        
1
Briefly, Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), Cumulative Prospect Theory 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), Third Generation Prospect Theory (Schmidt et al., 2008), Rank 
Dependent Utility Theory (Quiggin, 1982), and Regret Theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 
1982). 
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Yet, emerging evidence suggests that, under certain types of procedures and 
settings, the WTP-WTA disparity is smaller than previously observed. Shogren 
et al. (1994) find that the size of the gap depends on the type of good that is 
used in the experiments (e.g., mugs, candies, lottery tickets, and tokens). Other 
researchers find that the disparity declines with trading experience (List, 
2004a, 2003; Loomes et al., 2003; Shogren et al., 2001). Sayman and Onculer 
(2005) conducted a meta-analysis of 39 studies and found that studies that 
employ iterative bidding exhibit smaller disparities. These findings suggest that 
experimental design features are critically important. Indeed, in the most recent 
meta-study, Tuncel and Hammit (2014) find that studies that were published 
after the first meta-study (Horowitz and McConnell, 2002), exhibit lower 
WTP-WTA ratios and interpret this as the improvements in study design 
characteristics. This begs the question of what an “improvement” entails. We 
suggest two criteria that can be used to assess an experiment: 
i. The experimental instructions and procedures should be clear to the 
subject. 
ii. The response format should be close to the “natural way” that 
people think about their valuations. 
The first item has been covered by Plott and Zeiler (2005), who conducted 
experiments to control for subject misconceptions about the experimental 
mechanisms, such as the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism (BDM). 
Their design employs numerical examples, paid and unpaid training rounds, 
anonymity of the subjects’ identities, and verbal explanations of how to obtain 
the optimal response. The disparity is not observed for ordinary market goods 
when procedures to eliminate subjects’ misunderstandings about the 
experimental mechanism are employed: Their result weakened the loss 
aversion explanation of the disparity. However, Isoni et al. (2011) pointed out 
that the disparity persists when using lottery tickets, so the issue extends 
beyond subject misconceptions. 
Our second criterion has not yet been sufficiently explored in valuation gap 
studies in an experimental setting. In the contingent valuation literature, a 
substantial number of papers have been published on the subject of elicitation 
mechanisms. One strand of this literature compares open-ended and 
dichotomous choice formats(Loomis et al., 1997; Reaves et al., 1999). In the 
open-ended format, subjects are simply asked how much they are willing to 
pay, whereas in the latter, subjects are asked to accept or reject a series of pre-
selected prices. More recent elicitation mechanism allows for respondent 
uncertainty in various ways; see Mahieu et al. (2014) for a recent survey.  In 
short, experimental studies that find a disparity, invariably uses an open-ended 
valuation question. This format is not currently much used in contingent 
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valuation, the most important reason being that the response rates are typically 
low. 
The contingent valuation literature rather converged on finding a response 
format that is allegedly closer to the way that individuals think about their 
valuations (Brown et al., 1996). For most individuals, valuation (of the 
maximum/minimum buying/selling price) is not a routine task. Therefore, 
asking individuals for precise estimates of their subjective valuations can be 
cognitively challenging (Mitchell and Carson, 1989), especially for complex 
and unfamiliar goods (Gregory et al., 1995; Ready et al., 1995). We also know 
from the psychology literature that when individuals are faced with difficult 
tasks, they have a tendency to employ heuristics to facilitate them (Shah and 
Oppenheimer, 2008). For example, McCollum and Miller (1994) found that 
44% of the respondents reported $0 due to their inability to provide a precise 
WTP even when they indicated a positive attitude towards the good. 
If the same behavioral pattern is also present in experiments on disparity, 
then it might, for example, cause buyers to understate their subjective 
valuations and cause the observed disparity.  A particularly useful alternative 
mechanism caters for imprecision, without compromising the possibility to 
state a precise amount. In this variation, individuals are asked to state interval 
valuations, in case they are unable to come up with a point
2
.  
In a related literature which focuses on imprecise preferences, subjects are 
assumed to have an admissible range of subjective valuations from which they 
cannot state a precise amount confidently (See Cohen et al. 1987; Butler and 
Loomes 1988, 2007, 2011; and Morrison (1998)).  Butler and Loomes (2011) 
claims that preference imprecision could explain anomalies within EUT. For 
example, Butler and Loomes (2007)
3
 explore imprecision as a way to 
understand preference reversals. They argue that many individuals' choices and 
valuations involve a degree of uncertainty or imprecision, and their findings 
suggest that imprecision explains a significant portion of the preference 
reversal phenomenon
4
. 
                                                        
2
Some researchers in the contingent valuation related literature have suggested the use of self-
selected intervals in surveys. The basic idea behind self-selected intervals dates to at least Morgan 
and Small (1992), who suggested them as a way of overcoming "overconfidence" in surveys and 
to address the anchoring problem. There is also a connection to symbolic data analysis (Billard 
and Diday, 2007), in which intervals play an important role. Detailed statistical theory for 
handling this unusual kind of interval censoring has been developed by Belyaev & Kriström 
(2015). 
3
See Gal (2006) and Neilson (2008) for a theoretical approach to imprecision and empirical 
studies that can be classified similarly but that used non-incentivized elicitation methods for 
strength of preference (Dubourg et al., 1994; Loomes and others, 1997). 
4
They asked the subjects to state their preferences in a series of binary choices in which one 
option (A) was held constant and the other (B) was adjusted upwards or downwards by $1, 
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Interval valuation as a response format is yet to be tested thoroughly in an 
experimental setting. Banerjee & Shogren (2014) explore the bidding behavior 
in second price auctions using an induced value experiment in which subjects 
are given point or interval values and are asked to state point or interval bids. 
In their point value/interval bid treatment, they find that even though the value 
of the object is given exogenously as points, most of the subjects tend to state 
their values in terms of intervals. It appears that subjects form these intervals in 
a way that the expected value of the interval equals the point value. This 
observation is important because it is natural to expect imprecision to be case 
for uncertain and/or unfamiliar goods; yet their subjects prefer to state their 
bids in intervals although the goods has an exogenously given point value.  
As a simple remedy for the problem observed by McCollum and Miller 
(1994), we frame the response format as intervals of which the bounds are 
determined by subjects: if they cannot provide a precise estimate, they are 
allowed to state an interval for their WTP and WTA, and we test whether the 
disparity survives under this framing. If individuals are stating some amount 
lower than they would pay for the good merely because they cannot provide a 
precise amount, but the experimental design asks them to do so, framing the 
response format as intervals can decrease the cognitive burden and make 
subjects think more carefully about their valuations (Response Format 
Framing Hypothesis; RFFH). This is called framing here, because only the 
buyer’s upper bound and the seller’s lower bound are incentivized; the trade is 
determined by comparing only the incentivized bound with the randomly 
selected market price. Consider a buyer who states a range: the subject buys 
the good, if the market price is within or below the stated range. For the seller 
role, trade occurs if the market price is within or above the stated range. We do 
not observe a disparity when we use interval framing, whereas we observe a 
significant disparity for the lottery ticket, when we asked subjects to state 
single points (See Section 3 for details). 
Gregory et al. (1995) found that individuals display a surprisingly large 
WTP range, and when they are asked to state a single amount, they are likely to 
state an amount closer to the middle of their range.  As sellers, subjects tend 
state a point close to the upper bound of their admissible range. This behavioral 
pattern might produce the observed disparity and gives rise to a hypothesis we 
                                                                                                                                
depending on the starting point. (In one treatment, they started from $1 and increased, whereas in 
another treatment they started from a positive payoff of the first lottery and gradually decreased.) 
In each binary choice problem, the subjects stated which option they chose and selected one of the 
following phrases that reflected the strength of their decision: definitely prefer A, prefer A but not 
sure, prefer B but not sure, and definitely prefer B. However, “preference strength elicitation” is 
not incentivized under their design. 
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call the Preference Cloud Hypothesis (PCH). The Preference Cloud Hypothesis 
posits that individuals cannot intrinsically determine precise single points, but 
able to identify a range of values for their personal valuation of the good. If the 
experiment forces them to state a point, they employ a heuristic: buyers state 
the lower bound while sellers state the upper bound in their admissible range.  
To test this hypothesis we first have to focus on the good which we observe 
a significant disparity under the conventional setting as our baseline, in our 
case it was only for the lottery ticket that we observed a gap. For comparison 
we use the bounds of the intervals elicited in another treatment (Buyer-Seller 
Uncertainty, BSint hereafter) in which subjects are allowed to state intervals, 
not knowing in advance whether they are buyers or sellers (the role is 
determined randomly after they stated their offers). Statistical tests confirm our 
hypothesis that WTP in baseline treatment and lower bound of the offers in the 
intervals treatment comes from identical distributions, whereas WTA in the 
baseline treatment and upper bound of the interval treatment comes from the 
identical distributions (See Section 3 for details).We now turn to empirical 
analysis and begin by explaining the experimental design. 
3.2 Literature Review 
There is no consensus on the size and the existence of the disparity in the 
literature. In order to show this, we begin by presenting findings of three meta-
analyses. This will paint a useful overall picture of factors behind the existence 
(and size) of the disparity. We then outline three major strands of the literature, 
in order to focus sharply on the various disagreements. 
3.2.1 Three Meta-Analysis Studies 
There are three notable meta-analysis studies about the disparity and their 
findings are reported in Table 5. The earliest is Horowitz and McConnell 
(2002) (HM, hereafter) who analyzed a set of 45 studies and found that 
experiments with real incentives do not give significantly different results 
compared to hypothetical experiments. Interestingly, experiments that use 
incentive compatible designs find higher WTA\WTP ratios. Another important 
finding is that the experiments with public and non-market goods have higher 
ratios than ordinary market goods. HM report no systematic difference between 
the studies using student or non-student subjects. 
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Table 5. Results of three meta-analysis 
Study Design Characteristics HM (2002) SO (2005) HT (2013) 
Public vs. Ordinary private goods Larger for public Larger for public
 a
 Larger for public 
Incentive compatible designs Larger
 b
 Smaller Smaller 
Student vs. Non-student subjects No difference NA No difference 
Within subjects design NA Smaller in Within No difference 
Out of pocket payments NA Larger  NA 
Iterative bidding NA Smaller No difference 
Experience NA Smaller Smaller  
Notes: HM: Horowitz and McConnel, SO: Sayman and Onculer, HT: Hammit and Tuncel. NA implies that 
corresponding study does not include that specific factor as an explanatory variable so result is “not available”. 
a
 The disparity is larger also for the health-related goods. 
b 
They find that experiments includes real payoffs do not result in significantly different disparity compared to 
the hypothetical payoff experiments. 
 
Sayman and Onculer (2005) analyzed data from 39 studies, focusing on the 
effects of design and method on the size of the disparity. They found that 
iterative bidding and within-subjects designs decrease the disparity and, on the 
other hand, out of pocket payments increase it. In the case of iterative bidding, 
subjects are asked whether or not they would pay a given amount (starting 
point or bid) for the good described. If the participant is willing to pay 
something, the interviewer revises the bid upwards until a maximum 
willingness to pay (or downwards until a minimum willingness to accept 
compensation) is reached. This method seems to contribute the subjects’ 
learning their personal values because they are asked to state “yes” or “no” 
answers for several amounts during the interview. Therefore they are lead to 
think about them more carefully.  
The most recent meta-study is Hammit and Tuncel (2014) which can be 
seen as an updated version of HM, since they include more recent studies and 
some methodological refinements such as using the natural logarithm of the 
WTA-WTP ratio. Their findings are in line with HM about the type of good 
(public and ordinary private goods) and the subject profile (student and non-
student). By contrast, they find that incentive compatible mechanisms result in 
a lower disparity. Most importantly, they find that the studies published after 
HM, exhibit lower WTA-WTP ratios. Their interpretation of this result is that 
this reflects an improvement in study design characteristics.  
To summarize, the meta-studies suggests that the disparity is lower for 
ordinary market goods and with iterative bidding. The size and the existence of 
the disparity are strongly dependent on the exchange mechanisms, the 
experimental procedures and subject experience. 
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3.2.2 Three Strands of the Previous Literature 
We continue the literature review by defining -in the broadest manner- three 
main strands in the literature on explaining the disparity: (i) the psychology 
based approach, (ii) standard economic theory based approach, and (iii) 
experimental design effects and learning based studies. 
 
The Psychology Based Approach 
These studies seek explanations from a psychological perspective and explain 
the observed gap using the loss aversion concept of Prospect Theory. Most 
studies accept the existence of the gap, concluding that it is in the nature of 
individual preferences. Thaler’s (1980) “endowment effect” suggests that 
individuals value goods more when they own it; this is directly related to loss 
aversion notion of Prospect Theory, which posits that losses loom larger than 
gains (Kahneman et al., 1990). In other words, sellers’ perceive transferring the 
ownership of the good as a loss and this causes them to ask for more 
compensation.  
There is another psychological explanation, which is related to moral 
attitudes and ethical concerns, but this type of explanation is not applicable to 
inexpensive ordinary market goods such as mugs and candies; it is more 
applicable to environmental goods, such as preserving species or 
environmental amenities. This is because emotions and responsibility concerns 
are more relevant to these issues (Boyce et al., 1992; Irwin, 1994; Peters et al., 
2003). For example, Boyce et al. (1992), using pine trees as the good for their 
experiment, told the subjects that the trees would be killed if they do not 
purchase the tree (or if they sell the tree to the experimenter). Their results 
show that both WTP and WTA and the ratio between them are higher than in 
the control group (no kill treatment). They explain the higher WTA value in 
the “kill treatment” with the owners’ feeling of responsibility towards 
preserving the pine trees.  
Standard Economic Theory Based Approach 
Another group of studies seeks explanations within the standard economic 
theory. Hanemann (1991) suggested that the gap should be smaller or 
disappear if the good has a close substitute. Therefore the gap should be higher 
for goods such as a national park or a market commodity which has no close 
substitute. Adamowicz et al. (1993) tested Hanemann’s proposition using a 
closed-ended CV format to value the tickets for a particular movie. In one 
group a close substitute was available, but not in the second group. Although 
having a substitute decreases the gap by 30%, they observed a significant gap. 
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Experimental Design Effects and Learning  
The third stream of the existing literature is the newest and focuses on 
experimental design and procedures such as repeated setting, different 
exchange mechanisms, institutional and value learning. The underlying 
question is whether the disparity is robust against the mentioned features of 
experimental design or not. A maintained hypothesis is stable and well defined 
preferences; the observed anomalies thus stem from subject errors due to 
design features such as the lack of opportunity to learn the mechanism 
(institutional learning) and value learning (Braga and Starmer, 2005). 
One of the first studies that investigated the disparity in a repeated setting 
was Coursey et al. (1987). They used a variant of the Vickrey auction and 
asked subjects about their WTP and WTA to avoid tasting an unpleasant 
substance. Results indicate that averages of WTA and WTP converged with 
repetition. However, Kahneman et al. (1990) report a significant and persistent 
gap even in the repeated setting using the BDM mechanism
5
. Shogren et al. 
(1994) conducted a repeated setting experiment with the Vickrey second-price 
sealed-bid auction. Their result suggests that the WTA and WTP values do 
converge by repetition in the market goods case (mugs and candies). However, 
for a nonmarket good with no close substitutes such as “reduced health risk”, 
persistent difference is observed even with the repeated market participation. In 
a related paper, Shogren et al. (2001) compares different auction mechanisms 
effect on the disparity. Results suggest that except for the BDM mechanism, 
the values seem to converge with repetition. 
Plott and Zeiler (2005) focus on subject misconceptions and experimental 
procedures. They replicated the gap with the procedures of Kahneman et al. 
(1990) and conducted additional experiments which control for several 
misconceptions that might rise from specific design features. They 
implemented modifications such as paid, unpaid training rounds and subject 
anonymity. Under these modifications they observed no gap between WTA 
and WTP. However, Isoni et al. (2011) claim that the lottery valuation data 
which is not published in Plott and Zeiler (2005), shows a persistent and 
significant disparity. Isoni et al. (2011) replicated Plott and Zeiler (2005) 
procedures that control for subject misconceptions. Again, there were no gaps 
in the case of mugs, but a significant gap for the lottery valuation task. Why do 
the control procedures for misconceptions eliminate the gap in the mugs round 
but not in lottery ticket tasks? Subject misconceptions apparently play a very 
                                                        
5
 See Knetsch et al. (2001), Brookshire and Coursey (1987) and Price and Sheremeta (2011) 
for further discussion about the effect of repeated setting on endowment effect. 
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important role; the results of Plott and Zeiler (2005) and Isoni et al. (2011) still 
leaves some unturned stones when trying to come to grips with the disparity.  
Summary Of The Three Strands 
The psychology based and standard economic theory explanations of the 
disparity are, quite naturally, disparate. Studies in the third strand of the 
literature generally observe converging WTA and WTP values in repeated lab-
settings or find no evidence for the existence of the disparity. Although these 
findings seem to give support to standard economic theory, there is also 
another way to read the evidence: preference uncertainty or imprecise 
preferences (See Chapter 2). This could be the reason why results are 
dependent on certain experimental settings and procedures.  
3.3 Hypotheses 
Before presenting our hypotheses, we summarize the findings reported in the 
literature. This summary is designed to help the reader understand the support 
for our hypotheses: 
 
 The disparity can be eliminated or minimized under certain types of 
procedures that enable subjects to understand both the experimental 
mechanism and how to find their optimal response (Plott and Zeiler, 2005). 
 Individuals exhibit a significant amount of imprecision, especially in their 
valuations of goods (Cohen et al. 1987; Butler and Loomes 1988, 2007, 
2011; Dubourg et al. 1994, 1997; and Morrison 1998). 
 Response format affects valuation behavior: the “correct” format should be 
close to the subjects’ natural mode of thinking. Otherwise, valuation task 
will be cognitively challenging for the subjects (Brown et al., 1996; 
Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Gregory et al., 1995; Ready et al., 1994). 
When individuals face difficult problems, they have a tendency to employ 
heuristics to facilitate the decision-making process (Shah and 
Oppenheimer, 2008). McCollum and Miller (1994) found that a significant 
portion of the $0 responses were due to the individuals’ inability to arrive 
at a precise amount. 
 Gregory et al. (1995), found that for WTP, subjects are more likely to state 
an amount that is close to the lower bound of their range.  
From the findings in the literature mentioned above, we distill and test two 
hypotheses: i. Response Format Framing Hypothesis (hereafter, RFFH) and ii. 
Preference Cloud Hypothesis (hereafter, PCH).  
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3.3.1 Response Format Framing Hypothesis (RFFH) 
The RFFH states that the WTP-WTA disparity is an artifact of the response 
format. All studies on the disparity have employed an open-ended format, 
which is simply to ask for precise WTP and WTA amounts. Based on the 
findings highlighted especially in the second and third bullet points, we argue 
that allowing subjects to state intervals is closest to the way that people 
naturally think about their subjective valuations. Therefore, using intervals as 
the response format can be the next extension of the experimental study design 
characteristics that fulfill criterion ii in Section 3.1. This design approach will 
ease the decision-making process and thus eliminate the effect that results from 
the burden of having to determine a precise estimate of WTP and WTA. 
3.3.2 Preference Cloud Hypothesis (PCH): 
Drawing from especially the third and fourth bullet point, we propose the PCH: 
individuals cannot intrinsically determine precise single points, but identify a 
range of values for their personal valuation of the good. If the experiment 
forces them to state a point, they employ a heuristic: buyers state the lower 
bound while sellers state the upper bound in their admissible range. Thus, if 
subjects are asked to state a precise amount from their range, they begin to play 
a “guess your true personal value” game. Note that we refer “game” as a 
metaphor to explain the intuition of PCT. Depending on the role, individuals 
draw different values from the range: being in the buyer role causes individuals 
to employ a distribution that is skewed to the right, while those in the seller 
role tend to employ a distribution that is skewed to the left. They project these 
distributions onto their admissible range of their subjective valuations and 
calculate the mean accordingly. The main motivation for this type of behavior 
can be seen as caution. If this hypothesis is confirmed, it will open up a new 
way of modeling the decision-making process. This new theory should answer 
two questions: i. How do individuals form these intervals? ii. From this 
interval, how do they decide on a single value as their WTP or WTA if they are 
asked to state a precise amount? 
To sum up the two hypothesis: RFFH states we will not observe disparity if 
we give subjects the freedom and flexibility to state in terms of intervals or 
points, we will not observe disparity, because most individuals can come up 
with a range of values not single precise amounts as their subjective value for a 
good. Therefore, thinking and response format compatibility is important. PCH 
states that when we ask them to state single points depending on their role, they 
state different bounds of their true personal value (if they are buyers they state 
the lower bound, if they are seller they state the upper bound of the true range). 
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In addition to this, we expect this hypothesis to be more applicable to the good, 
which include uncertainty such as lottery tickets. 
Next section details our experimental design and explains how we test these 
two hypotheses. 
3.4 Experimental Design 
We conducted a between-subjects experiment with two treatments: Points and 
Intervals (See Table 6 for an outline of the experimental design). The only 
difference between the two treatments is that in the Intervals treatment subjects 
were allowed to state their valuations in terms of ranges. Subjects are allowed 
to state single amounts if they prefer. In Points only single amounts are 
allowed, there were the usual two groups: Buyers and Sellers denoted Bp and 
Sp, respectively. In Intervals, we use three groups: Buyers, Sellers, and Buyer-
Seller Uncertainty (Bint, Sint, and BSint, respectively). 
In the Points treatment: subjects state their offers, and then a market price is 
determined randomly. If the market price equals or is below the stated offer, a 
buyer pays the market price and buys the good. For sellers, if the market price 
equals or is above the stated offer, the seller gets the amount of money equal to 
the market price and gives away the good. As noted, Bint and Sint groups of 
Intervals treatment is a new type of framing, because only the buyer’s upper 
bound and the seller’s lower bound are incentivized; the trade is determined by 
comparing the incentivized bounds with the randomly selected market price. 
For the buyer only the upper bound of the stated range is binding. For the 
seller, trade occurs if the market price is within or above the stated range. 
Therefore only the lower bound of the range is binding. The only difference 
between Points and Intervals is the response format; thus, any difference in the 
results is due to this feature. We compare the values elicited by Bp, Sp, Bint, Sint 
to test the RFFH, (WTPp, WTAp, WTPint, WTAint; respectively). If we observe 
a statistically significant difference between WTPp and WTAp but not between 
WTPint and WTAint, RFFH is supported. 
Testing PCH is not straightforward; we need to compare the point offers 
with ranges that are elicited in an incentive compatible way. Remember that 
PCH claims that buyers state the lower bound, whereas sellers state the upper 
bound of their admissible range (this is the underlying reason for observing the 
disparity). We elicit the usual point offers in Bp and Sp however we cannot use 
the ranges elicited in Bint and Sint because only one bound of those ranges are 
incentivized. They are only appropriate to test RFFH which is a hypothesis 
focusing on the framing of the response format. 
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To accomplish this we developed BSint which is a modified version of BDM 
in which both the lower and upper bounds were incentivized (See the appendix 
for details): At the end of the experiment, roles were determined randomly; the 
probability of being a buyer is ½ (likewise, the probability of being a seller is 
½). If subjects overstate their valuations, there is a 50% chance of being a 
buyer and a risk of paying an undesirably high amount. If they understate their 
values, they might be a seller and would have to sell the good for an 
undesirably low amount. 
Table 6. Summary of the Experimental Design 
Anonymity Assigning subjects an ID number randomly 
Instructions Also read aloud 
 Numerical examples to explain optimal response 
 Hypothetical Training Round 
Goods Four goods with real incentives 
      Good 1 Premium bitter chocolate 
      Good 2 Created their own package of three cans, from five different flavours of a 
beverage brand 
      Good 3 Select one of the ten different flavours of a chocolate brand 
      Good 4 Lottery ticket: winning 30 SEK with a probability of 0.5, zero otherwise 
Incentives Show-up fee of 100 SEK≈$12 
 One of the four goods and a market price selected randomly  
 Only in BSint group, subject role (buyer, seller) is also selected randomly after 
value elicitation 
 
The roles were determined after the four tasks were completed using the 
following procedure: The experimenter wrote “buyer” and “seller” on two 
separate pieces of paper, placed them in two separate envelopes, one of them is 
picked from an opaque bag. In addition, the procedure was explained to the 
subjects in detail when the instructions were provided. To see the incentives 
under this mechanism see Section 3.5. 
We recruited the subjects by announcement (flyers and posters) from Umeå 
University and the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU)
6
. In 
total, 38 subjects participated in points, and 54 subjects participated in 
intervals, most of whom were master’s degree students from various fields of 
study. The sessions lasted approximately 40 minutes, and the average earnings 
were 108 SEK
7
 (including a 100 SEK show-up fee). Each subject chose an 
                                                        
6
These two universities are very close to each other and can considered the same campus area. 
Umeå University has over 20,000 students, whereas SLU is a much smaller university. 
7
1 SEK is approximately 0.15 US Dollars. 
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envelope marked with an ID number upon entering the room. We told the 
subjects to keep these ID cards and to use them to retrieve their earnings after 
the experiment. The instructions were read aloud, and the participants were 
instructed not to communicate with each other or react verbally to any events 
that occurred during the experiment. 
In both experiments, following Plott and Zeiler (2005), certain training 
procedures were employed to minimize or prevent subject misconceptions, i.e., 
anonymity was ensured and numerical examples were used to explain the 
mechanism
8
 together with examples to show the subjects why stating their true 
value is the dominant strategy. In addition, the participants were provided with 
an unpaid training round in which the good was a candy. As indicated in Plott 
and Zeiler (2005), the provision of paid practice rounds is not an essential 
procedure: No disparity is however found between bids submitted in the paid 
and unpaid practice rounds. 
After the training round, the subjects were encouraged to ask questions. 
They wrote their questions on pieces of paper and raised their hands; the 
experimenter silently read the questions and answered them by writing on the 
same piece of paper. 
The practice round was followed by four tasks (goods), and the subjects 
were told that these four tasks had an equal chance of being selected and the 
payoffs will be determined according to the randomly selected task.  
In task 1, the good was a premium bitter chocolate. In task 2, the subjects 
were given a list of five different flavors (regular, light, zero, vanilla, and 
cherry) of a nonalcoholic beverage brand. They were asked to create any 
package of three cans; thus, they were allowed to mix and match among the 
five types. Then, they stated offers for their created package. The good in task 
3 was similar: In that case, 10 different flavors of the same brand of chocolate 
were provided, and we asked the subjects to select one of the flavors. 
Goods 2 and 3 are homogenous for all subjects, since prices in local shop 
do not vary with the flavors and these two goods can be considered as vouchers 
providing the right to choose a favorite flavor. We included these to contribute 
the literature by re-examining the disparity with a new type of goods. Also, the 
endowment effect might be stronger for these goods since the subjects picked 
their favorite flavors; thus, they might have felt more attached to these goods. 
                                                        
8
The numbers that are used in the examples are completely unrelated to the possible range of 
prices in the experiment to avoid any anchoring effects (e.g., 1000–1020 SEK, whereas the 
experiment market price can be between 1 and 30 SEK). The numerical examples were part of the 
written instructions provided, and they were explained on a board. 
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The participants were not provided with any information about market 
prices during the experiment. The prices of the goods in tasks 1, 2, and 3 were 
19 SEK, 24 SEK, and 22 SEK, respectively, at a local shop. 
Finally, the fourth good was a lottery ticket with the following prospects: 
winning 30 SEK with a probability of 0.5 and winning nothing with a 
probability of 0.5. The lottery outcome was determined by using one hundred 
ping-pong balls that were numbered from 1 to 100 and placed in an opaque 
bag. At the end of the experiment, a ball was selected from the bag. If the 
number on the ball was 50 or below, the lottery paid 30 SEK; otherwise zero. 
After a task had been completed, the response sheets for that task were 
collected, and the next response sheet was handed out to prevent cheating. The 
subjects were given the goods and told to examine them before recording their 
offers. The sellers were told that they owned the good; the buyers were told 
that they could inspect the good but did not own it. 
When all four tasks were completed, one task was chosen as “real,” and the 
market price was drawn for that task. In all of the tasks, including the unpaid 
training round, the subjects were told that the market price would be randomly 
selected from a range of 1 to 30 SEK using the ping-pong balls. The market 
price was determined by picking one ball out of 30, each with a single price 
written on it. To avoid any bias that might result from the potential market 
price range, we used the 1–30 SEK range as a potential market price range for 
all of the tasks (see Bohm et al. (1997) for a comprehensive discussion of this 
issue). 
At the end of the experiments, the subjects were given both a questionnaire 
requesting demographic information and test of their understanding of the 
instructions. Only the subjects who answered all quiz questions correctly were 
included in the analysis. 
3.5 Incentives under Buyer-Seller Uncertainty Mechanism 
Before presenting the results, it is useful to analyze the incentives under the 
new mechanism. In order to accomplish that we have to make three 
assumptions: the first assumption we make is that there are three possible cases 
or groups of people [A1]: 
i. Individuals who have a precise estimate of their WTA and WTP and they 
exhibit no endowment effect therefore behave according to the Standard 
Economic Theory: The optimal response for them is obviously to state the 
precise estimate as a single point and they are allowed to do so in BS. Note that 
for this type WTP equals WTA. 
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ii. Individuals who have a precise estimate of WTA and WTP but exhibit 
loss aversion, therefore their WTA is higher than their WTP: 
 
    0 0 0u y WTA X u y      (26) 
 
    0 0 0u y WTP X u y      (27) 
  
where
0y  is the wealth, X is the good in question and lambda is the loss 
aversion parameter. Obviously when 0  , we have WTA>WTP, individual 
exhibits a WTA WTP disparity.  So far is standard in studies which explain 
endowment effect (WTA-WTP disparity) with loss aversion concept. However, 
under BS mechanism, individual does not know whether his or her role is 
buyer or seller in advance (both is equally likely, determined by a random 
mechanism). Optimal offer *( )u offer under this setting is given by: 
 
      * 1 12 2u offer u WTA u WTP    (28) 
 
Note that for type ii individuals, an optimal offer does not guarantee a 
positive payoff in all cases: Consider an individual who has a WTA of 10 and 
WTP of 5, thus states 7.5. Now suppose the randomly selected market price is 
8 and the individual is designated as seller, randomly. Thus, trade occurs: the 
individual sells the good for 8 which is lower than 10 (WTA). However stating 
the mid-point is still optimal: optimal does not mean that the payoff will be 
positive in all states of the world; it means it is the best strategy among the 
possible ones. If the subject stated a bid equal to 10 which is the WTA, then 
there is a ½ probability that the subject would be a buyer: Subject would buy 
the good for 8, although WTP is 5, thus ending up having a loss of 3. Stating 
an interval is not optimal for this group, because in the buyer role the trade 
occurs if the market price is inside or below the stated range and in the seller 
role the trade occurs if the market price is inside or above the stated range. 
Obviously, the bounds which are valid for payoff determination is lower bound 
for selling and upper bound for buying. This rule ensures that the subject 
cannot state a selling price higher than the buying price, the best he or she can 
do is to minimize the expected loss and state the weighted average of his or her 
WTA and WTP, where the weights are probability of being a buyer and seller 
(in our case 1/2 for each).  
iii. Now consider the case in which individual cannot come up with a 
precise estimate of his or her subjective value but a range from which cannot 
confidently state a single amount. For this case, we make another assumption 
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[A2] that individuals with imprecise preferences have “equivalence intervals” 
rather than having precise points of indifference between alternatives 
(MacCrimmon and Smith, 1986). This suggests that individuals assign interval 
values to the goods instead of precise points and individual is indifferent 
between the good and the values inside this range. For example consider an 
individual comes up with a range of values between 5 and 10 dollars but 
cannot state one of them confidently. This implies that individual is indifferent 
between $5 and the good, $6 and the good, and so on. For a theoretical 
discussion of the issue see Luce (1956) which discusses the notion of just 
noticeable difference and semiordering. To understand the intuition, suppose 
you are given several cups of tea which have different amount of sugar in it, 
and the difference between the cups are very small amounts such as 1 mg. You 
start tasting the cups of tea starting from the one which has the lowest amount 
of sugar to the highest one. You might not be able to distinguish the difference 
between them, therefore not be able to state your preference between cups, 
confidently. However, you would be able to state your preference between two 
cups confidently if the difference was large enough, which is called the just 
noticeable difference. 
We develop a much simpler understanding of the imprecision range to 
demonstrate the incentives under Buyer-Seller Uncertainty mechanism. Denote 
the equivalence interval as [ , ],L H where L H corresponds to the lower bound 
and upper bound of the range, respectively. For any good X , an individual 
stating [ , ]L H as his or her subjective valuation for the good implies:  
 
 ...X L H   (29) 
 
Which means that, individual is indifferent between the good and the sure 
amount of monetary amounts between L and H.  
Denote the surplus from the trade as 1( , ) ( )S X p u X p  for buying task, 
and 1( , ) ( )S X p p u X  for the selling task, where [ , ]p a c  is the randomly 
determined market price. For our experiment, a  is 0 SEK and c  is 30 SEK. 
Thus, the expected surpluses for buyer and seller role are
9
: 
 
     10[ ( , )] bE S p X u X p f p p     (30) 
 
     10[ ( , )] bE S X p p u X f p p     (31) 
 
                                                        
9
 The similar approach of analyzing the incentive compatibility of a mechanism can be found 
in Kaas and Ruprecht (2006). They analyzed BDM and Vickrey auction and we adapted their 
approach to Buyer-Seller Uncertainty mechanism.  
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where b  is the stated bid of the individual and ( )f p denote density function 
of the market price. Note that in our experiment we employed uniform 
distribution, and market price can be any value from the range of [0 SEK, 30 
SEK]. Figure A1 shows the surplus for each market price, separately in the 
case of buyer and seller roles. When the market price equals the values in the 
equivalence interval, surplus is 0, which follows from A2. To calculate the 
surplus outside the imprecision range, we need to make further assumption 
[A3]: we assume that individual takes the mean of the range as the benchmark 
for the good X, denoted by  . This may seem problematic when we look at the 
issue from the standard view of “well behaved” preferences; however one 
should note that we are in the realm of preference imprecision which indeed 
implies that preferences are not “well-behaved” objects
10
.  
 
 
Figure 4. Trade surplus for individuals with imprecise preferences 
 
                                                        
10
 Note that the theoretical aspect of the issue is not central to our study, but one way to 
connect the nonstandard terminology with the imprecise preferences or equivalence intervals can 
be the following: Denote the just noticeable difference as L h      , therefore, if we see
 as the true subjective value, the equivalence interval is constructed around it by adding and 
subtracting .  
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In Figure 4, left panel shows the surplus of buyer and the right panel shows 
the surplus of seller. Note that in Buyer-Seller Uncertainty mechanism, both 
roles have equal likelihood. After stating the bids, if the individual is assigned 
to the role of being buyer the payoffs are calculated according to left panel; 
whereas if the selected role is being seller the right panel is applicable. 
Remember that individual is allowed to state either as a point or interval, if 
individual stated a point and assigned to be a buyer; transaction takes place 
when the bid is higher than the randomly market price. This part is identical to 
the standard BDM mechanism. On the other hand if individual stated an 
interval, he or she buys the good when the randomly selected market price is 
inside or below the stated range. For the seller role, if individual states a point, 
selling transaction occurs when the market price is higher than the bid. Finally, 
if individual states a range, he or she sells the good when the market price is 
inside or above the stated range.  
[L,H] is the privately known true interval, we see that it is weakly dominant 
strategy for individual to state either the true range, [L,H], or any single point 
from this interval. The expected surplus will be the areas I and II if the 
assigned role is being buyer, and III and IV if the role is being seller. Since we 
employed uniform distribution, we can suppress the probability part for 
simplicity.  
Stating narrower intervals or points from the true range: However, if an 
individual with imprecise preferences, states a point from the true range or a 
narrower interval but keeping it inside the true range, still obtains I and II as 
surplus in the case of buying and III and IV in selling but he or she decreases 
the chances to buy or sell the good at a desirable price. Suppose the individual 
has a true range of 5 and 10 dollars but he or she overstates the lower bound 
such as a range between 7 and 10 dollars; if the individual is randomly 
assigned as being a seller at the end of the experiment, the individual loses the 
chance to sell the good for prices between 5 and 7 dollars. Now consider the 
case of understating the upper bound: Suppose the individual states a range 
between 5 and 8 dollars; if the individual is assigned as a buyer at the end of 
the experiment and the market price is between 8 and 10 dollars, individual 
misses the chance to buy the good for these prices which are inside the 
individual’s acceptable range. 
Misstatement outside the true range: If individual understates the true value 
either as a range or point such as b
-
, the surplus shrinks to area I for the buyer 
role and for the seller role it becomes III+IV-II which is lower than III+IV. If 
individual overstates such as b
+
, the surplus from buying is I+II-III which is 
lower than I+II and the selling surplus shrinks to III from III+IV.  
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To summarize, individuals belong to either group i or ii, prefer to state 
precise points. Additionally some of the subjects who have imprecise 
preferences (group iii) might also prefer to state points. Because of this we 
conduct the test of PCH by eliminating the point responses too, but the results 
still confirm PCH. Looking at the analysis above, subjects who stated an 
interval definitely belongs to group iii, thus having imprecise preferences. 
Looking at table 2, the ratios in parenthesis in second column, we can say that 
more than half of the subjects have imprecise preferences except for good 3 for 
which the ratio is 46%. Considering the possibility of some subjects stating a 
point from their range although they have imprecise preferences, we can 
speculate that the ratio of subjects having preference imprecision can be even 
higher than the observed ratios.  
As reviewed in Chapter 2, existing studies rely on the subject’s self-
reporting which is certainly not incentivized. Typically subjects are asked to 
fill a response table as in Table 7, where the first column includes sure amounts 
increasing incrementally. For each amount subject states his or her preference 
by choosing one of the three phrases which are in the remaining columns.  
Table 7. Example Response Table 
Certain 
Amounts 
I definitely prefer the good Not sure I definitely prefer the certain amount 
0    
1    
2    
3    
4    
5    
6    
 
As an example, in Table 7, we see that for sure amounts equal and below 2, 
good is definitely preferred over the sure amounts for an imaginary individual. 
However, for the sure amounts, 3 and 4, the individual exhibits imprecision by 
stating “not sure” about his or her preferences. Finally, for the sure amounts 5 
and 6, the individual definitely prefers the certain amount. Looking at this 
example response table, we say that the imprecision range corresponds to the 
value between 3 and 4. After the subject fills the response tables, usually a 
random mechanism draws a single amount from the imprecision range to 
determine the payoffs. Another procedure that can be used under this scheme is 
to let the subject determine the single amount chosen from the imprecision 
range. However, the disadvantage of this method is that subjects do not have a 
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monetary incentive to reveal the true bounds of their imprecision range, if it 
exists. The reason is that the payoffs are determined by looking at a single 
amount either chosen randomly or by the subject from the imprecision range, 
and the information about the bounds of the imprecision range relies on the 
subjects’ self-reporting.  
We do not claim that Buyer-Seller Uncertainty mechanism is the perfect 
method for eliciting the imprecision range, but considering the hypothetical 
nature of the existing methods reviewed before, Buyer-Seller Uncertainty 
mechanism is superior in terms of incentive compatibility. We hope it finds the 
fruitful applications in the literature will be developed more in the future 
studies. 
The following numerical examples are provided to help the reader to 
understand the incentives under this mechanism intuitively: 
a. Overstating the lower bound: Suppose the individual states a range 
between 7 and 10 dollars; if the individual is randomly assigned as being a 
seller at the end of the experiment, the individual loses the chance to sell 
the good for prices between 5 and 7 dollars and remember that these are 
inside the true subjective valuation range (5-10 dollars). 
b. Understating the lower bound: Suppose the individual states a range 
between 3 and 10 dollars. If the individual is randomly assigned as being a 
seller at the end of the experiment and the market price is randomly 
determined as some amount between 3 and 5 dollars, then the individual 
sells the good for an undesirably low price. Note that the true range is 
between 5 and 10 dollars. 
c. Overstating the upper bound: Suppose the individual states a range 
between 5 and 12 dollars; if the individual is assigned as a buyer at the end 
of the experiment and the market price is between 10 and 12 dollars, 
individual has to buy the good for an undesirably high price. 
d. Understating the upper bound: Suppose the individual states a range 
between 5 and 8 dollars; if the individual is assigned as a buyer at the end 
of the experiment and the market price is between 8 and 10 dollars, 
individual misses the chance to buy the good for these prices which are 
inside the individual’s acceptable range.  
3.6 Results 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 8. The second column indicates the 
percentage of subjects that preferred to state intervals. Except for the BSint 
group for good 3, a majority preferred intervals. 
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Table 8. Summary Statistics 
 Treatment Mean L Mean U  Median L Median U  σ L σ U 
Good 1          
(Premium bitter Bint (71%) 17.3 20.2  18.0 22.0  6.6 5.4 
chocolate) Sint (83%) 18.9 21.8  20.0 22.0  4.5 4.7 
 BSint (62%) 14.9 17.8  15.0 17.8  3.2 3.9 
 Bp 14.3  15.0  6.3 
 Sp 13.5  14.0  5.1 
Good 2          
(3 cans of Coke) Bint (65%) 15.0 18.4  15.0 18.0  9.4 9.5 
 Sint (56%) 18.6 20.5  17.5 20.0  7.2 7.9 
 BSint (62%) 14.6 17.5  15.0 18.0  6.7 6.6 
 Bp 13.9  15.0  8.0 
 Sp 19.1  18.0  6.8 
Good 3          
(Chocolate) Bint (75%) 13.3 16.6  13.5 15.0  5.6 4.5 
 Sint (50%) 19.0 20.7  17.0 20.5  6.5 5.7 
 BSint (46%) 14.3 16.2  15.0 16.0  5.3 5.7 
 Bp 16.4  15.0  6.4 
 Sp 19.3  19.5  6.8 
Good 4          
(Lottery ticket) Bint (59%) 11.8 14.5  10.0 15.0  8.7 9.3 
 Sint (61%) 14.3 17.2  15.5 18.0  6.9 7.4 
 BSint (54%) 12.5 18.2  14.0 15.0  6.2 6.7 
 Bp 12.5  11.0  5.6 
 Sp 20.2  20.0  7.2 
       
Notes: The subscripts L and U denote the lower and upper bound, respectively. σ denotes the standard 
deviation. The values in bold are the incentivized ones. In the treatment column, the percentages in parentheses 
denote the portion of subjects stating a range of values for the specific task. Sample size for each treatment: 
Bint=17, Sint=18, BSint=13, BP=19, SP=14.  
 
Overall, statistical tests confirm both PCH and RFFH. To test the PCH, we 
should look at the first and second set of results in Table 9: For good 2, a ratio 
of 1.20 is significant with a p-value of 0.0449; the W statistic is 86.0 according 
to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test. For good 4, the ratio is 1.82, 
which is significant with a p-value of 0.0014 and a W statistic of 51.0. 
Since the significance of the gap for Good 2 is on the edge (p-
value=0.0449), we focus on good 4 (p-value=0.0014) and compare the point 
bids with the bounds that were elicited in the BSint. The second set of results 
presents these comparisons, showing that the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests 
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support our hypothesis: We cannot reject the hypothesis that the mean WTP in 
points and the mean lower bound of BS bids were drawn from the same 
distributions as the mean WTA in points and the upper bound of BS bids. 
To examine the support for RFF, we look for the existence of the WTA-
WTP disparity in points and its absence for intervals. For the Points, we 
observed a significant disparity for good 2 (p=0.0449) and good 4 (p=0.0014) 
(beverage and lottery ticket respectively). For the intervals, test results 
comparing the incentivized bounds (3.Sint
L
/Bint
U
) suggests that although the 
ratio of WTA to WTP is not exactly one, the difference in Intervals is not 
statistically significant. 
Table 9.  
  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test                              
(Null hypothesis: identical distributions)    
 Ratio
a
 W p-value Conclusion (α = .05)   
1. Sp / Bp      
Good 1 0.93 141.5 0.6299 Cannot reject null  
Good 2 1.20 86.0 0.0449 Reject null  
Good 3 1.30 97.5 0.1005 Cannot reject null  
Good 4 1.82 51.0 0.0014 Reject null  
      
2. Good 4
b
      
Bp
 
/ BSint
L
 0,79 115.5 0.7699 Cannot reject null  
Bp / BSint
U
 0,73 64.0 0.0211 Reject null  
Sp/ BSint
L
 1,43 145.0 0.0087 Reject null  
Sp / BSint
 U
 1,33 111.5 0.3233 Cannot reject null   
      
3. Sint
L
 / Bint
U
      
Good 1 0.91 176.5 0.7871 Cannot reject null  
Good 2 0.97 168.0 0.6959 Cannot reject null  
Good 3 1.13 122.5 0.1594 Cannot reject null  
Good 4 1.03 148.0 0.4407 Cannot reject null  
a
 Median ratios. 
b
 Two sided 
 
In order to explore the power of our statistical tests we used the method of 
Plott and Zeiler (2005).We test the null hypothesis of WTA=2∙WTP for the 
results obtained in the intervals treatment (See Table 10). The reason for 
multiplication by two is the same that Plott and Zeiler (2005) suggested. In the 
previous literature several authors claim that WTA is twice the WTP (e.g. 
Dubourg et al., 1994 and Knetsch et al., 2001). A t-test assuming unequal 
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variances led to a rejection of the null in favor of the alternative, WTA < 
2∙WTP for all goods (See Table 4 first two columns). A two-sample Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney rank-sum test gives the same result (See Table 4 last two 
columns).  
Table 10. Power of the tests 
Goods T-test (Unequal Variances) Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test 
 T p-value z p-value 
1 -7.5642 0.0000 4.810 0.0000 
2 -3.6934 0.0007 3.255 0.0011 
3 -5.4225 0.0000 4.437 0.0000 
4 -3.0386 0.0032 2.267 0.0234 
 
Our design also enabled us to draw further conclusions which are useful for 
contingent valuation studies (See Table 11). We test whether subjects in buyer 
and seller role stated the true bounds for their valuations although only single 
bound is incentivized i.e. affect their final payoff. We compare these with the 
bounds elicited in Buyer-Seller uncertainty mechanism in which both bounds 
affect the subjects’ final payoff from the experiment.  
Additional Result 1: Binary comparison between BS group and buyers 
shows that, although the lower bound of buyers is not incentivized, subjects do 
not misrepresent (over or understating) their values both in terms of lower and 
upper bounds.  
In order to see the support for this result, we should look at the first (“1. 
Bint
L
 / BSint
L
”) and second (“2. Bint
U
 / BSint
U
”) set of results. In the first set, the 
comparison is between lower bound of buyers (Bint
L
) and that of the BS group 
(BSint
L
). In the second set of results, we consider upper bound of buyers (Bint
U
) 
and the BS group (BSint
U
). Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test results support the 
hypothesis that the two samples come from identical populations. 
Additional Result 2: Binary comparison between BS group and sellers 
shows that, although the upper bound of sellers is not incentivized, subjects 
apparently do not lie about their values (over or understating).  
Consider the third (“3. Sint
L
/BSint
L
”) and fourth (“4. Sint
U
/BSint
U
”) set of 
results. In the third set, the comparison is between the lower bound of the 
sellers (Sint
L
) and that of the BS group (BSint
L
); whereas, in the fourth set, it is 
between the upper bound of sellers (Sint
U
) and that of the BS group (BSint
U
). 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test results again support the idea that the two 
samples come from the identical populations, except for good 1 (Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney tests reject the null hypothesis with a p-value of 0.019).  
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Table 11. Additional Results 
  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test (Null Hypothesis: 
Identical Distributions)   
 Ratio
a
 W p-value Conclusion (α = .05) 
1. Bint
L
 / BSint
L
     
Good 1 1.20 146.5 0.1346 Can’t reject null 
Good 2 1.00 113.0 0.9325 Can’t reject null 
Good 3 0.90 89.0 0.5198 Can’t reject null 
Good 4 0.71 107.0 0.8994 Can’t reject null 
     
2. Bint
U
 / BSint
U
     
Good 1 1.24 145.0 0.1525 Can’t reject null 
Good 2 1.00 125.0 0.5568 Can’t reject null 
Good 3 0.94 103.5 1.0000 Can’t reject null 
Good 4 1.00 86.5 0.3197 Can’t reject null 
     
3. Sint
L
 / BSint
L
     
Good 1 1.33 171.5 0.0299 Reject null 
Good 2 1.17 148.5 0.2126 Can’t reject null 
Good 3 1.13 158.5 0.0998 Can’t reject null 
Good 4 1.11 147.0 0.2328 Can’t reject null 
     
4. Sint
U
 / BSint
U
     
Good 1 1.24 175.5 0.0190 Reject null 
Good 2 1.11 139.5 0.3739 Can’t reject null 
Good 3 1.28 161.5 0.0772 Can’t reject null 
Good 4 1.20 116.5 1.0000 Can’t reject null 
Notes: Rank sum tests are done by using R. The same analysis was also carried out with using different 
programs such as “Minitab”, “Instat” and “Stata”. Although p-values are slightly different across these 
programs, the outcomes about the hypothesis are same.  All tests are two-sided.        
 a
 Median ratios  
3.7 Conclusion 
Allowing subjects to state their sentiments using any interval on the line (of 
which a point is a special case) essentially has an effect on the observability of 
the disparity: When we use the conventional point response format, in line with 
Plott and Zeiler’s (2005) findings, we observe disparity for the risky prospect, 
but not for the ordinary market goods
11
. Moreover, when we allow subjects to 
                                                        
11
 Except “three cans of coke” for which we observe a disparity significant on the edge 
(p=0.0449). 
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state intervals i.e. framing the response format as intervals, the gap disappears 
for all goods we used in our experiment. 
As pointed out by Plott and Zeiler (2005), experimental procedures 
minimizing the subject misconceptions and misunderstandings are crucial. We 
have added the response format; taken together, this raises doubts about 
interpreting the disparity as an evidence for an endowment effect. In short, the 
endowment effect may not be the only explanation of the disparity, when we 
consider the total effect of selected experimental procedures.  
In contrast to our results, Morrison (1998) observed a large gap between the 
two ranges; lower bound of WTA being more than one and a half times the 
upper bound of WTP. However, he did not use any procedures to minimize the 
subject misconceptions. In short, our results suggests that preference 
imprecision should not be discarded as a potential explanation of the observed 
anomalies. In the instructions, Plott and Zeiler (2005) included a guideline 
which explains subjects how to find their optimal offers: For example for 
buyers they suggest them to start thinking about a low amount such as 1 SEK, 
and ask themselves whether they are willing to pay 1 SEK for the good or not. 
If the answer is no, record 1 SEK as WTP. If the answer is “YES”, they are 
suggested to think about a higher amount such as 2 SEK, repeat the process 
until they reach an amount which they would not pay for the good and record 
that amount as WTP. This sequential process is similar to the “iterative 
bidding” scheme, but without an interviewer, in other words subjects interview 
with themselves silently. Similarly, Sayman and Onculer (2005) found that the 
disparity is lower in an iterative setting; the sequential process helps subjects to 
discover their optimal responses. Our results suggest that together with Plott 
and Zeiler procedures, allowing subjects to state intervals lead them think 
about each value more carefully like a sequential process, decrease tendency of 
biases and heuristics. 
Consequently, many questions are left to be explored in more detail. For 
example, why do we observe a disparity for lottery tickets but not for ordinary 
market goods, when we ask for single amounts? How do individuals form 
admissible ranges? Why do buyers/sellers state different bounds?  Thus, the 
area is fertile ground for development of new theory and additional testing. 
This could lead to an improved understanding of a long-standing controversy 
regarding the WTA-WTP disparity and potentially to the development of novel 
designs of survey instruments. Because the bulk of empirical research in e.g. 
social science is based on surveys, we do believe that there are good reasons to 
further explore the elicitation mechanisms studied in this paper. 
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Inspired by the results from this experimental study, I present a new 
decision theory for risk in Chapter 4, which incorporates the imprecision and is 
capable for explaining the anomalies detected in the literature. 
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4 Preference Cloud Theory 
This chapter, an extended version of the working paper by Bayrak and Hey 
(2015), introduces a new theory for decision under risk that maintains the 
property of modelling the decision over final wealth levels, as in EUT. The 
theory is characterised as two stages: the first stage describes how individuals 
form the imprecision ranges, whereas the second stage is the selection of a 
single amount from that range taken as the criteria for the decision task.  
Central to the first stage of the model is the incorporation of preference 
imprecision, which arises because individuals perceive each numerical 
probability only vaguely and therefore map them to a range of probabilities. 
The size of the range depends on how sophisticated the individual is in terms 
of understanding the probability concept, and thus depends on an inherent 
characteristic of the individual. For example, an individual with a great 
knowledge of probability and familiarity with the concept, exhibiting lower 
imprecision, will have a narrower range. Since each numerical probability is 
mapped to a range, this leads individuals to calculate a range of expected 
utilities for each risky prospect.  
In the second stage, the problem can be seen as a form of decision making 
under ambiguity since the outcomesthe expected utility range from the first 
stageare known, but the individual has no prior knowledgeprobabilities 
are unknownabout which expected utility from the range is the true one, i.e., 
the individual cannot confidently determine a single expected utility from the 
range. Therefore, the individual forms beliefs and calculates the weighted 
average of the range according to those beliefs. Preference Cloud Theory 
(PCT) uses a simple formulation for the beliefs, which is similar to the 
Hurwicz’s alpha criterion. 
Section 4.1 sets the background for the new theory, and Section 4.2 presents 
the original version of it. We also considered alternative modelling schemes for 
PCT in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 shows how PCT can explain the anomalies; 
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and finally Section 4.5 presents a discussion about the new theory and 
compares it with the other theories. 
4.1 Introduction 
In order to understand the intuition of the conceptual framework, consider the 
following example: suppose you are asked to state your subjective value for a 
lottery ticket which gives $10 with a probability of 0.3 and zero otherwise. Can 
you pin your value down to a single precise number or do you end up with a 
range of values? Some, especially who are familiar with decision theory, might 
be relatively more likely to pin it down to a precise amount, but the ordinary 
person (the majority) is more likely to come up with a range. However, in real 
life we don’t pay and get paid in terms of ranges, therefore while modelling the 
preference imprecision we also have to answer the following question: How do 
we decide whether to buy a good in the market which has a precise price tag on 
it when we have imprecise values for the good?  
We assert that when individuals think the true subjective value of the 
gamble is somewhere within a range but cannot confidently state a single 
amount from this range, they form beliefs about the distribution of the true 
subjective value within this range. As they don’t know the probability 
distribution of their ‘true’ subjective value inside this range, the situation they 
are in can be seen as decision under ambiguity: known outcomes but unknown 
probabilities for them. This scheme can explain the valuation gap too: suppose 
that you are endowed with this gamble and asked to state your WTA, what 
value are you more likely to state from this range? It is more likely that you 
will state a value close or equal to the upper bound of the range, conversely if 
you are assigned to be a buyer you are more likely to state a value from the 
lower bound of the range.  
The name of the theory is inspired from the Electron Cloud Model, a 
product of quantum mechanics wherein electrons are no longer depicted as 
particles moving around the nucleus in a well-defined orbit. Instead, their 
probable location around the nucleus is described as a cloud that represents 
most probable regions with fuzzy boundaries. On the other hand, its 
predecessor, Newtonian mechanics, claims to predict both the location and the 
momentum of a particle with certainty. Quantum mechanics is devoid of that 
luxury. In Figure 5
12
 the left panel depicts the classical model of the atom 
where the electron is a precise particle and travels along the well-defined orbit 
around the nucleus. On the other hand, next to it the Electron Cloud Model of 
an atom shows the electron as a fuzzy region instead of a particle. 
                                                        
12
 http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~infocom/The%20Website/plates/Plate%201.html 
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Figure 5. Physics vs. economics 
Readers should note that we provide this example in order to give the 
intuition of our theory, and to help the reader with a visual. There is no 
resemblance or link between PCT and Quantum mechanics in terms of their 
mathematical and technical aspects. Standard economic theory and alternative 
theories such as Prospect Theory and its variants claim precision in individual 
preferences, i.e., they assert that individuals can confidently pin down their 
subjective valuations of a good to a single precise amount; likewise Newtonian 
Mechanics models the behaviour of electrons and claims to predict the location 
and the momentum of the particle with certainty.  
Analogous to quantum mechanics, there is another line of literature in 
economics that asserts that people might have imprecise preferences and 
cannot articulate their subjective valuations of the goods precisely (see Chapter 
2 for a detailed discussion and review). The idea of imprecision goes back to 
the 1950s and can be found in the stochastic choice models.
13
 However this 
view sees imprecision as noisy preferences.
14
 As psychological mechanisms 
related to two concepts, noisiness and imprecision can be seen as connected; 
noisiness relates to the errors that subjects make (Harless and Camerer, 1994; 
Hey and Orme, 1994), while imprecision can be viewed as 
‘incommensurability’ (Cubitt et al., 2015) or indecisiveness. Moreover, for the 
latter there is an accumulating literature where the main finding is that 
                                                        
13
 The older literature includes prominent papers by, for example, Quandt (1956), Luce (1959, 
1958), Block and Marschak (1960) and Becker et al. (1963).  
14
 Harless and Camerer (1994), Hey and Orme (1994), Loomes and Sugden (1998, 1995) and 
includes Loomes et al. (2002), Hey (2005), Loomes (2005), Blavatskyy (2007) and Wilcox (2008) 
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individuals often exhibit imprecision (Cohen et al., 1987; Butler and Loomes, 
1988, 2007, 2011; Dubourg et al., 1994, 1997; and Morrison, 1998). For 
example, Butler and Loomes (2007) elicited preference strength in a pairwise 
choice experiment, for each task individuals stated their preferred gamble and 
revealed their preference strength by simply choosing one of the four phrases: 
‘I definitely prefer A’, ‘I think I prefer A but I’m not sure’, ‘I think I prefer B 
but I’m not sure’, or ‘I definitely prefer B’. The results favour imprecision as 
an account for preference reversals. Butler and Loomes (2011) take this 
account further by asserting that imprecision might explain other observed 
anomalies of EUT. This assertion has crucial importance because imprecision 
might have been the explanation of the anomalies ab initio, especially after the 
literature’s focus on explaining the anomalies with precise but non-standard 
preferences for at least the last four decades (e.g., Original, Cumulative, and 
Third-Generation Prospect Theory etc.).  
However, the current status of the preference imprecision literature is about 
allowing subjects to state how sure they are about their stated values or 
choices. The related literature does not provide a preference functional or a 
formal theory that incorporates preference imprecision; we provide 
formalisation of the theories floating around in the soft form and a 
mathematically tractable model. Instead the literature focuses on modelling the 
imprecision as a stochastic component of a deterministic theory, as reviewed in 
Chapter 2.  
Throughout this section, the focus is on decision under risk, which has two 
elements: probability and outcome. Therefore imprecision can arise at the 
perception process of one or both of these elements. Perception in psychology 
is defined as the ‘conscious recognition and interpretation of sensory stimuli 
that serve as a basis for understanding, learning, and knowing or for motivating 
a particular action or reaction.’
15
 One reasonable claim is that it is more likely 
that the imprecision comes from the probability element rather than the 
outcome element. Suppose an individual is asked to value a gamble that gives 
$10 with a probability of 0.40 and zero otherwise. Individuals can interpret the 
monetary outcome easily as, e.g., the cost of a lunch. In other words, $10 is 
$10. Yet, the perception of probabilistic information is convoluted for the 
ordinary individual.  
4.2 Original Version of Preference Cloud Theory (βα model)  
In the original version of the PCT (βα model), we assumed that imprecision 
arises due to the decision maker’s vague understanding of the numerical 
                                                        
15
 Perception (psychology). (n.d.) Mosby's Medical Dictionary, 8th edition. (2009). 
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objective probabilities involved. The empirical support for this assertion comes 
from the psychophysics literature; see Budescu et al. (1988). In their 
experiment, subjects were asked to state bids for lotteries where probabilities 
were represented numerically, graphically, or verbally. The results suggest that 
bids and attractiveness ratings are almost identical for the different 
representations of the same lotteries (see Budescu and Wallsten (1990) and 
Bisantz et al. (2005) for further evidence). Wallsten and Budescu (1995) 
explain that the similarity of behaviour under different representation modes is 
due to similarities in the vague understanding of numerical and verbal 
representation of probabilities. We therefore argue that a numerical, objective 
probability is perceived as corresponding to a range of probabilities and that 
individuals use this range in their calculations
16
.  
Zimmer (1984) introduced a useful insight from an evolutionary 
perspective: he noted that the numerical probability is a relatively new concept, 
appearing as recently as the 17
th
 century. However, people were 
communicating uncertainty via verbal expressions long before probability was 
codified in mathematical terms. Zimmer further suggested that people process 
uncertainty verbally and make their decisions based on this processed 
information, not on the numerical information. We therefore assume that 
decision makers perceive each numerical and objective probability in a vague 
manner and the perceived versions can be modelled as if they map any given 
objective probability into an interval. This implies that individuals end up with 
a range of expected utilities (EUs) and they do not have prior knowledge about 
their ‘true’ EU from this range. For the second question, pinning down this 
range to a single value can be modelled as a decision problem under ambiguity. 
We use the Alpha Model (embodying Hurwicz’s criterion) to provide a 
valuation of the prospect, given as the weighted average of the worst and the 
best possible EU.  
Consider the following bet, which gives $100 with a probability of 0.3 and 
zero otherwise  As mentioned in the 
introduction, individuals perceive the objective numerical probabilities in a 
vague way, therefore they map each probability to a range:  
Imprecision level  is a function of objective probability  and the 
individual specific sophistication parameter Figure 6, presents an 
illustrative example of different imprecision levels derived from different 
sophistication levels (depicted with different curves) and for different 
probabilities. A relatively unsophisticated individual would display a relatively 
high resulting in more imprecise preferences. For example, stock brokers 
                                                        
16
 Verbal expressions include ‘rarely’, ‘very likely’ etc. Each expression can be interpreted as a 
range of probabilities that may vary from individual to individual. 
 1 1 2 2: $0, 0.7; $100, 0.3 .K x x    
[ , ].    
 ,    
 .
,
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and gamblers who are expected to be more familiar with the concept of 
probability exhibit lower imprecision than the ordinary individual.  
 
Figure 6. Imprecision parameter and different sophistication levels 
PCT assumes there is not imprecision if the probability is 0 or 1 since the 
events occurring with these probabilities are not probabilistic events in daily 
language, that is, the event either never happens or always happens. Therefore 
the perception of these probabilities is a relatively easy cognitive task 
compared to the perception of 0.5, because it implies the event is neither likely 
nor unlikely, and this ‘incommensurability’ makes it difficult to derive a 
meaning from this probability. Therefore PCT assumes imprecision reaches its 
maximum if the probability is 0.5. Finally, for simplicity is assumed to 
be symmetric around .  
For our simple lottery example, consider that an individual with a zero 
initial wealth has an imprecision level of 0.1 for the winning probability of 0.3 
in the previous example. This is interpreted as ‘0.3 as perceived by this 
individual’ by mapping 0.3 to the range: . Next the individual 
calculates the lower bound of the risky prospect’s expected utility by allocating 
0.2 to the winning state and the remaining probability 0.8 to 
losing state . Similarly, the upper bound is when 0.4 is 
allocated to the winning state and 0.6 to the losing state (without loss of 
generality, normalise: u(100)=1 and u(0)=0)). Thus the vague perception 
causes the individual to end up having a range of expected utilities with the 
following lower  and upper bounds:  
 
 ,  
0.5 
[0.2,0.4]
 2 0.3 0.1   
 21 1 0.3 0.1     
 LEU  HEU
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   (32) 
  
   (33) 
 
The second step of PCT includes the selection of a single expected utility 
from this range as the criterion of decision making: the individual’s problem is 
that the ‘true’ EU lies somewhere in this range, but the individual does not 
have information about the distribution of it, thus this step can be seen as 
decision under ambiguity. PCT models this process of selecting one expected 
utility from the range by a criterion similar to Hurwicz’s -criterion.  is the 
weight attached to the worst case and can be seen as pessimism parameter. For 
simplicity, we assume it is universal and individual specific. In other words, an 
individual exhibits the same for all decision problems, and that can vary 
from individual to individual.  
Therefore the expected utility that the individual considers for this lottery 
under PCT, is calculated as follows: 
 
   (34) 
 
Another way of interpreting this step is that the individual is playing an 
ambiguous binary lottery where expected utility from K is either 0.2 or 0.4, and 
the probability of each outcome is unknown to the individual. At this stage of 
the decision problem there are two states of the world: ‘High Utility’ and ‘Low 
Utility’. In the first state, K provides a utility of 0.4 whereas in the second state 
it provides 0.2. The crucial point about the theory is that unlike EUT or 
theories that assume procedure invariance, PCT allows for different expected 
utilities to be withdrawn from the admissible range for different type of tasks 
such as choice, buying, and selling.  
When individuals are presented with a gamble, they are most likely to end 
up having a range of subjective values. Withdrawing a single amount from this 
range to be the criterion of the decision making for the individual depends on 
the task presented: if it is a buying task the individual would select a value 
closer to the lower bound whereas the opposite is true for the selling task. Thus 
an individual sees the worst case for a buying or choice task as being the lower 
bound of this range as the upper bound for a selling task. Note that we employ 
pessimism/optimism concepts to formulate the individual’s belief about which 
is the ‘true’ expected utility of the good in the imprecision range. However, in 
order to understand how PCT predicts individual’s withdrawal of different 
values from the imprecision range depending on the task, we need to first 
understand the pessimism/optimism concept.  
     100 0.2 0 0.8 0.2LEU K u u  
     100 0.4 0 0.6 0.4HEU K u u  
 

( )EU K
       1worst bestEU K EU K EU K    
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These concepts are not defined over the risky prospects’ bounds of 
imprecision range directly; instead they are defined as the weights attached to 
the worst and best cases, the final wealth levels that the individual is likely to 
reach. The nuance is that the lower bound of the imprecision range is not 
always considered as the worst case. Being worst and best cases depend on the 
task type, whether it is a buying or selling task. Therefore  and  
is determined at the first period depending on the good and the imprecision 
parameter. At the second stage of the PCT, the individual decides which bound 
is the best case and worst case depending on the final wealth levels to be 
reached, which is determined according to the task type. For a buyer, the worst 
thing is that the good has a utility equal to , whereas for a seller the 
worst thing is that the good has a utility of . Therefore the ranking of 
the bounds is different under PCT for different tasks. It also is possible to 
articulate the intuition in different way: for a buyer, buying a good which has a 
high quality is better than buying the one which has a lower quality. For a 
seller, giving away a higher-quality good is worse than giving away a lower-
quality good. 
Table 12 shows how individuals assign best and worst cases depending on 
the task type by focusing on the example of lottery K. 
 
Table 12. Worst and best cases under Preference Cloud Theory 
Task Type Initial 
wealth 
Worst possible final 
wealth 
Best possible final 
wealth 
Desirability ranking of the 
bounds 
Buying M M+u
-1
(0.2)-WTP M+ u
-1
(0.4)-WTP EUH(K)≻ EUL(K) 
Choice M M+ u
-1
(0.2) M+ u
-1
(0.4) EUH(K)≻ EUL(K) 
Selling M M+WTA- u
-1
(0.4) M+WTA- u
-1
(0.2) EUL(K) ≻EUH(K) 
 
 
Task types such as choice, buying, and selling are shown in the first column 
whereas M denotes the initial wealth shown in the second column. The third 
and fourth columns are the worst and the best possible final wealth levels, 
respectively. In the buying task, for an individual with an initial wealth level, 
M, the worst case is to pay WTP, and the true expected utility of the good is 
0.2 which is the lower bound of the imprecision range formed in the first stage 
of PCT. On the other hand, for the selling task in which the individual is 
endowed with the lottery ticket M, the worst case is different: the individual 
receives the WTA and gives away the good which has an expected utility equal 
to 0.4, which is the upper bound of the imprecision range. For the choice task, 
the worst case is similar to the worst case from the buying task: an individual 
 .LEU  .HEU
 .LEU
 .HEU
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has an initial wealth of M and the good has an expected utility equal to the 
lower bound of the imprecision range, 0.2. The last column shows the 
desirability of the imprecision bounds formed in Stage 1 of PCT according to 
the final wealth levels by simply comparing the third and the fourth columns. 
For the buying task, the upper bound of the imprecision range is more desirable 
since  for all  similarly for 
the choice task  On the other hand, for the selling 
task where the good is to be given away, the lower bound is more desirable 
since , for all  Therefore, the 
desirability of the imprecision bounds are not done according to the bounds, 
but instead according to the resulting final wealth levels. As a result of this, 
individuals view buying and selling differently under PCT.  
4.3 Alternative Frameworks 
In this section we present alternative modelling frameworks for both stages of 
PCT. These extensions provide different ways of understanding preference 
imprecision and its behavioural foundations under PCT. A possible future 
study is to test the relative performance of these schemes empirically with a 
similar approach used in the stochastic preferences literature (reviewed in 
Section 2.2). Another possible research question can be centred on explaining 
the anomalies and testing and comparing the existing theories together with the 
models of PCT in terms of predicting the anomalies. In order to do that, a 
binary choice experiment must be used to estimate the parameters of the 
models, and then these parameters are used to predict the behaviour of the 
individuals in settings such as preference reversals, valuation gap, and the 
Allais Paradox. Finally, comparison between the predicted and actual 
behaviour observed in the anomalies’ setting might be compared to make the 
necessary assessments. 
4.3.1 Fixed Bucketing 
In the previous sections we modelled the first stage of PCT by assuming that 
individuals perceive numerical objective probabilities in a vague way: each 
numerical objective probability is mapped to a range of probabilities modelled 
by (imprecision parameter). In the fixed bucketing scheme, individuals use 
the verbal correspondences of the numerical objective probabilities and 
calculate the EU of the goods according to the verbal correspondences. 
In daily language most people use the phrases such as ‘most likely’, ‘less 
likely’, or ‘you never know’ to express the probability or randomness of an 
event. It is very rare to see people communicating the probability of an event as 
1 1(0.2) (0.4)M u WTP M u WTP      0;WTP 
1 1(0.2) (0.4).M u M u   
1 1(0.4) (0.2)M WTA u M WTA u      0.WTA

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‘with a probability of 0.4’; while most people prefer to receive information 
about the probabilities of chance events quantitatively, they prefer to express 
such information qualitatively. One explanation for this is that individuals’ 
cognitive capacity is more suitable for the qualitative correspondence of 
probabilities, not the numerical ones, because the former is more natural and 
familiar (see Zimmer, 1983). Quantitative probability concepts date back only 
to 17
th
 century, whereas human beings have been communicating and dealing 
with uncertainty for thousands of years. It is natural to assume that individuals 
are more familiar with the verbal expressions of probability rather than the 
numerical ones. For ordinary individuals, it is rather difficult to perceive what 
a probability of 0.4 means, however it is relatively easy to understand the 
verbal representations such as ‘less likely’. 
The standard economic view assumes people can understand probabilistic 
information, so they know what 0.36 or 0.70 means and they can distinguish 
the difference between 0.30 and 0.36. This is a strong assumption because it 
expects the ordinary person to understand the frequentist approach, e.g., that a 
probability of 0.4 should be understood as the event occurs 4 out of 10 times. 
An individual who is more sophisticated and familiar with probability concepts 
such as gamblers or stockbrokers can understand the mathematical expression, 
as mentioned before, however for the ordinary person, the majority of people, 
it is difficult. Without an understanding of the numerical information, how can 
a person use it in expected utility calculations? This problem is not specific to 
the EUT, indeed, all of the existing decision theories for risk incorporates the 
probability in a precise manner, even the alternative models reviewed in 
Chapter 1. These theories assume that individuals understand the numerical 
probability, but overweight or underweight it and then use the transformed 
version of the probabilistic information. But, the transformed version of the 
probabilistic information is also a precise number. 
In the fixed bucketing scheme, we assume individuals interpret the 
probabilities according to their predefined buckets, which are verbal 
correspondences such as ‘less likely’, ‘likely’, ‘more likely’, etc. In addition, 
each correspondence is defined as a range of probabilities. Thus, the number of 
verbal correspondences that an individual is able to define spans the unity 
probability line, such that if we add the individually defined verbal 
correspondences they will cover all the probabilities from 0 to 1. Similar to the 
model suggested in Section 4.2, we assume that the number of verbal 
correspondences that an individual can define depends on how sophisticated 
the individual is about probability concepts and how familiar with the nature of 
uncertainty. For example, an individual who is not familiar with the nature of 
probability might be able only to define two buckets: for the events that occur 
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with a probability less than 0.6 individuals sees them as less likely events and 
highly likely for the events which occur with a probability higher than 0.6. 
Thus, if a lottery pays out $10 with a probability of 0.4 and pays 0 otherwise, 
an individual derives a meaning to be used for utility calculations by assigning 
it to the corresponding bucket. The probability of winning is perceived as less 
likely because it is between the corresponding boundaries for the bucket of 
‘less likely’ (0,0.6). On the other hand, an individual who is highly 
sophisticated in probability concepts might be able to define more buckets for 
the unity probability range, 0 to 1. As the number of buckets that an individual 
can define increases, the imprecision decreases.  
One problem with this framework is that it is difficult to extend it to 
lotteries with more than three outcomes. Another problem is the violation of 
monotonicity: the individual who can only define two buckets will end up 
having the same expected utility range for the two lotteries: A gives $10 with a 
probability of 0.4 and zero otherwise, and B gives $10 with a probability of 0.5 
and zero otherwise. We can overcome this problem by assuming an editing 
phase, similar to that of the Prospect Theory, in which individual eliminates the 
stochastically dominated options before calculating the Expected Utility range. 
Another possible solution can be assuming the pessimism parameter not only 
depends on individual characteristics but also on the winning probability of the 
lottery. Thus, the pessimism parameter employed to withdraw a single amount 
for B will be lower than for A since the winning probability of B, 0.5, is higher 
than A, 0.4. 
4.3.2 Model for Imprecision Range Formation 
In this section, we depart from the probability perception argument for forming 
the imprecision range; instead we assume that individuals take dispersion into 
account, which can be measured simply with standard deviation. The idea of 
dispersion affecting utility is not a new idea: Allais (1979) proposed a model in 
which the expected utility depends on the variance of the risky prospects. 
Moreover, Hagen (1979) incorporated the third moment of utility, i.e., the 
skewness. The experimental evidence provided by Butler and Loomes (1988) 
find that the higher the variance of a lottery, the broader the admissible range 
of valuations for a lottery (see Chapter 2 for details). Taking this experimental 
evidence into account we assume that the imprecision range is proportionate to 
dispersion. Thus, for any lottery X, the bounds in the first stage of the PCT are 
calculated as: 
    ( )LEU X EU X k u       (35) 
  
      HEU X EU X k u      (36) 
-k
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where , a measure of an individual’s ability to be precise about 
preferences. Notice that the individual has precise preferences and behaves in 
the way that standard theory predicts when . As  increases, the 
imprecision range also increases. This parameter has a similar intuition 
regarding the sophistication level of the individual as in the original version of 
PCT, however in this scheme, imprecision is assumed to be not only caused by 
the probability, but also by the outcome. This scheme might seem 
counterintuitive at first, but if we consider the second stage of the PCT as well, 
the picture becomes clearer: a pessimistic individual will withdraw an amount 
close to the lower end of the imprecision range , whereas an 
optimistic individual will be closer to the upper bound . The 
optimists will attain extra utility of ( )k u   from how much dispersion the 
prospect has, because they see the dispersion as the opportunity not to be 
missed: they see the glass half full. The pessimists want to avoid dispersion, 
because the dispersion would cause them a disutility of ( )k u  : they see the 
glass half empty. 
The advantage with this scheme is that it is easy to extend the theory to the 
cases that include more than two outcomes, whereas to extend the original 
version of PCT, the rank-dependent cumulative probability transformation 
technique can be used. On the other hand, under the  model the extension is 
easy and straightforward, since the bounds are formed around the standard 
expected utility of the lottery,  by adding and subtracting  
4.3.3 Multiple-Selves and Intrapersonal-Planner Approach 
In this section, our focus is providing an alternative framework for the second 
stage of PCT in place of the pessimism/optimism approach of the original 
version of PCT.  
In order to achieve this, it is first useful to discuss how problematic is to 
represent the imprecision with the standard preference relations ( )which 
we argue is not an adequate way to represent the preferences in the case of 
imprecision. It is not sufficient because it does not reflect what exactly is 
happening inside the imprecision range. The data collected in the experiments 
related to preference imprecision usually takes the following form: individuals 
make binary choices and state how sure they are about their choice (Butler and 
Loomes, 2007). In this kind of task one option is usually the risky prospect 
whereas the other is a sure amount of money. Alternatively, in valuation 
experiments, an interviewer asks subjects whether they are willing to pay the 
amount or not and also asks how sure they are (Dubourg et al., 1994). The 
process continues iteratively for a series of amounts. Data produced by this 
0k 
0k  k
( ) ( )EU X k u  
( ) ( )EU X k u  
k
(.)EU ( ).k u 
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method includes a lower bound that the subject is definitely willing to pay and 
an upper bound that the subject is definitely not willing to pay. Thus the values 
in between constitute the imprecision range. Standard preference relations are 
incapable of representing the data elicited in the preference imprecision 
literature, as they do not include such information about how sure or how much 
an individual is willing to pay a particular amount stated in the imprecision 
range, e.g., ‘I am 80% sure that my WTP is $20’. 
For example, an individual thinks that the WTP for good X is a range 
between $5 and $10, but the individual cannot state a precise amount 
confidently. Therefore, in the standard way, one can interpret the admissible 
range of this individual’s WTP for good X as: 
 
   (37) 
  
This is also problematic because it leads us to the following conclusion: 
 
   (38) 
 
This suggests that for the individual there is no difference between any 
amount of money between $5 and $10, which is not plausible at least from the 
monotonicity assumption, i.e., individuals should not be indifferent between 
different amounts of money, they should always prefer more to less.  
To overcome the problem with the standard way of representation and 
incorporate the type of data that is collected in preference imprecision 
experiments (see Section 2.3 and 2.4), we suggest a different scheme that 
captures the difference for the each value within the imprecision range by 
incorporating the level of willingness, denoted as w.  
To accomplish that, we need to define a few more concepts related to our 
approach that is, seeing the imprecision range as the collection of the 
subjective valuations by multiple selves within a self. For example, suppose a 
decision maker ends up having a range of expected utilities for good X equal to 
the utility of the range between $5 and $10. For simplicity, assume that the 
smallest monetary increment is $1, therefore the range implies that there are six 
selves within a self (decision maker), which compete with each other in terms 
of the true subjective value of the good. For example, the most generous self 
thinks that the good is worth $10, whereas the most parsimonious self thinks 
the good is only worth $5. Under this scheme, the decision maker acts as an 
intrapersonal planner, which is analogous to the social planner of welfare 
economics. For simplicity, assume the individual weights each multiple self 
uniformly. Therefore, each self has equal importance for the decision maker, 
       5 ,..., 10u X u GBP u X u GBP
   5 ... 10u GBP u GBP
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but this assumption can be relaxed. Next, define the level of willingness as the 
ratio of the multiple selves who agree with the decision maker’s ultimate 
decision to the total number of multiple selves. Consider the previous example, 
where the individual have a range of subjective valuations between $5 and 10. 
If the market price is $7, it means multiple selves who value the good at less 
than $7 are not agreed on the price, but the ones who value the good at equal to 
and above $7 are convinced to buy the good, thus the level of willingness will 
be 4/6 for $7 and can be denoted as  where the subscript of 
the preference relationship is the level of willingness . The preference 
relation can be represented in the following way: 
 
   (39) 
 
Each decision maker has a required level of willingness, which can be seen 
as an inherent characteristic of the individual’s personality: some individuals 
take actions when they are 50% or less confident about it, however some prefer 
to act in a more rigorous way and want to be totally convinced so that their 
required level of willingness is 100%. Consider the same example again, and 
suppose the individual’s required level of willingness is 100%, and then the 
individual acts only if the decision satisfies all of the multiple selves. Thus, if 
the market price is $7, the individual will not buy the good, since it is not a 
market price that convinces all of the multiple-selves, the ones who value the 
good below $7. To make the intuition clearer, consider the English idiom 
‘having second thoughts’, which means feeling doubts about the decisions you 
have made or about to make. In our conceptual framework, the second 
thoughts are the thoughts of the multiple selves who are not convinced about 
the decision such as paying $7 for the good. The multiple selves who value the 
good less than $7, will cause individual to feel doubt about his or her decision. 
If the required level of willingness is 100%, the individual does not like to have 
second thoughts, but for others, the confirmation of a certain majority of the 
multiple selves is sufficient.  
We also, for simplicity, assume that for all types of tasks such as buying, 
selling, and choice, individuals have the same required level of willingness. 
However, extensions that assume different levels for different tasks are also 
possible. Consider an individual who has an unfortunate experience with 
buying a good in the past, becomes more meticulous as a result, and has a 
higher level of willingness for buying compared to other types of tasks such as 
selling and choice. Similarly, an individual might be an inexperienced seller 
and wishes to be totally convinced before setting his or her valuation for the 
good, therefore employing a higher level of willingness. This modelling 
   4/6 7u X u GBP
 w
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scheme can also explain some real life situations: property advertisements 
tagged as ‘urgent sale’ signalling that the price is lower than the ‘normal’ price. 
In this case, we can explain the sellers’ situation with the decreased required 
level of willingness due to the urgent needs; therefore the price that is put on 
the advertisement is lower than the price that the owner would post in normal 
circumstances. We can extend the model by allowing the required level of 
willingness to depend on other factors as well. 
Formally, we introduce the notations and definitions as follows. For 
simplicity, we assume that the smallest monetary increment is one. The first 
stage of the PCT gives an imprecision range between and for a 
good.  
 
   (40) 
 
The set  is the list of all multiple selves;  is the subjective valuation of 
the multiple self which is an element of , the collection of the subjective 
valuations of all multiple selves; and the elements are determined by the first 
stage of PCT. The elements of are ordered in the following way:  
such that   
In the new scheme for any good x and if and only if 
 where is the baseline utility for a required level of 
willingness, The baseline utility of x is the utility of a baseline degenerate 
lottery (gives the same certain amount of monetary payoff for all states of the 
world) and when it is compared with ,x x is preferred by ( )w n M of the 
multiple selves. It can be formally defined as: 
 
   (41) 
 
where is a function which takes the value 1 when a self weakly 
prefers x over the baseline degenerate lottery and 0 otherwise. 
 
   (42) 
  
   (43) 
 
For example, for two lotteries x and y, an individual ends up having the 
following range of expected utilities ( (.) [ (.), (.)])L HEU EU EU  in the first 
stage of PCT: 
   (44)
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   (45) 
 
Thus for ,x there are four multiple selves, whereas for  there are eight 
multiple selves: 
 
   (46) 
  
   (47) 
 
The sets of subjective valuations for each good can be shown as: 
  
   (48) 
 
   (49) 
 
Next, suppose the individual has a required level of willingness equal to 
0.5. In order to predict whether x or is more attractive for the individual, we 
have to find the baseline utilities for x and for . For ,x it is 5 since 
when it is compared with 5, half of the multiple selves of the individual prefers 
x or 5. For , it is 7 because multiple selves who value the good for at least 7 
constitute half of the total number of multiple selves. Now we can state that the 
individual prefers over x since ;   
This scheme allows WTA and WTP to be different because at the same 
level of willingness the maximum buying price and minimum selling price are 
different, if the individual has imprecise preferences. Before demonstrating 
that, we need to redefine the WTP and WTA concepts for our framework: 
WTP is the maximum amount that ( )w n M of the multiple selves are willing to 
pay in exchange for the good; similarly, WTA is the minimum amount that
( )w n M of the multiple selves are willing to accept to give away the good. 
Consider the example in which the individual articulates the EU equivalent to 
the utility of $1 to $5 and individual has a required level of willingness
equal to 4/5. Table 13 shows an analysis of the buying and selling decisions 
under this scheme; columns list the values inside the imprecision range, 
whereas multiple selves are listed in each row. The cells in the table show the 
responses of each multiple self for different WTA and WTP amounts in the 
imprecision range respectively, for example, the cell written in bold letters 
shows that the third self who thinks that the good is worth $3 is willing to buy 
it for $2 but is not willing to sell it for $2.  
 1 [3,10]EU y 
,y
{1,2,3,4}XM 
{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8}yM 
{3,4,5,6}xV 
{3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}yV 
y
y 0.5w 
y
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Table 13. Buying and selling responses of multiple selves for each value in imprecision range  
Vi: valuation of 
each self 
WTP/WTA 
$1 $2 $3 $4 $5 
$1 YES/YES NO/YES NO/YES NO/YES NO/YES 
$2 YES/NO YES/YES NO/YES NO/YES NO/YES 
$3 YES/NO YES/NO YES/YES NO/YES NO/YES 
$4 YES/NO YES/NO YES/NO YES/YES NO/YES 
$5 YES/NO YES/NO YES/NO YES/NO YES/YES 
 
The number of multiple selves, =5 in the discrete case is listed in the 
first column. Since we assumed that the required level of willingness
equals 4/5, WTP is the sure amount of money which 4 of the multiple selves 
should be willing to pay for the good. In this case it is $2, because multiple 
selves who value the good at $2, 3, 4, and 5 are willing to pay $2 for the good. 
Only the most parsimonious self who values the good at $1 is not willing to 
pay $2 for the good, since . Similarly, WTA is the 
amount of money that should get confirmation from four of the multiple selves 
to give away the good, which is $4 in this example. 
4.4 Explaining the Anomalies 
4.4.1 Valuation Gap 
Standard economic theory predicts that the two measures, WTP and WTA, 
should be equal when the income effects are negligible (Hanemann, 1991). 
However, for the last four decades a considerable amount of experimental 
literature reported that WTA is significantly higher than WTP (Horowitz and 
McConnel, 2002; Sayman and Onculer, 2005; Hammit and Tuncel, 2013). The 
typical setting of the experiments is to separate the subject pool into sellers and 
buyers and to ask for WTA and WTP, respectively, under an incentive 
compatible design such as the BDM and the second price auction, etc. The 
sellers are endowed with the good whereas buyers are not. The gap is 
important because if it does exist it means that Coase Theoremthat no matter 
who owns the property rights first, the parties will reach to a Pareto Optimum 
outcome after a series of transactions, assuming that the transaction costs are 
negligiblefails to hold. This theorem has important implications for 
environmental damage cases and constitutes the basis of the legal system 
related to these issues. Furthermore, if an individual’s subjective valuations 
depend on possession status, the preferences are reference dependent, upending 
standard economic theory.  
To incorporate and explain the observed anomalies researchers developed 
so called non-standard models such as PT and its variants and RDUT. These 
 n M
 w
   1 GBP 2 GBPu u
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non-standard models of preferences try to explain the endowment effect with 
loss aversion concepts that can be summarised as ‘losses loom larger than 
gains’. Loss-averse sellers perceive giving away the good as a ‘loss’ and ask 
for more compensation.  
However, recent findings on valuation gap suggest loss aversion might not 
be the explanation for the observed behaviour, or, at least, not the only one. 
These studies mostly focus on the problem from the Discovered Preference 
Hypothesis, i.e., people have well-defined stable preferences but they need to 
learn and discover them (Plott, 1996). The findings of this line of literature 
suggest that since the experimental mechanisms are not day-to-day procedures 
that subjects come across, they might find them difficult to understand and 
therefore the observed behaviour might not reflect ‘true’ preferences. Subjects 
need to understand the mechanism and find out that telling the true subjective 
valuations is the optimal response for them. Evidence coming from repeated 
setting experiments (List, 2004b, 2003; Loomes et al., 2003; Shogren et al., 
2001) supports this claim as disparity declines with trading experience. Most 
recently, Plott and Zeiler (2005) conducted experiments which include more 
comprehensive training mechanisms, and they found that there is no disparity 
when mugs are traded in the experiments, however, for the lottery tickets the 
gap seems to be persistent and significant. There is also implicit evidence from 
Plott and Zeiler (2005) and Isoni et al. (2011) who find that the endowment 
effect is observed only for the lottery tickets, but not for ordinary market goods 
such as mugs and candies. Their result is important because after they 
implement procedures to minimise subject misconceptions and 
misunderstandings, persistent disparity in lottery tickets but not in ordinary 
market goods cannot be explained by loss aversion, so there is something 
special about the lottery tickets, which must be their uncertain nature.  
PCT anticipates these results: it states that due to the individuals’ vague 
perception of the numerical objective probabilities, they end up having a range 
of expected utilities, and then evaluate the desirability of the bounds in a 
reference dependent way, calculating the weighted average of the range by 
their intrinsic pessimism level. They weight the worst case by their pessimism 
parameter and assign the remaining weight to the best case. 
Consider the previous lottery example: 
 
   (50) 
 
Suppose, an individual perceives the probabilities 0.7 and 0.3 by mapping them 
into the following ranges: and , respectively. This leads to the 
 1 1 2 2: $0, 0.7; $100, 0.3M x x    
 0.6,0.8  0.2,0.4
95 
expected utility range of 0.2 and 0.4 as calculated in (32) and (33). Table 14 
demonstrates the final wealth levels in buying and selling tasks. 
Table 14. Final wealth levels  
Task Type Initial wealth Worst possible final wealth Best possible final wealth 
Buying M M+u
-1
(0.2)-WTP M+ u
-1
(0.4)-WTP 
Selling M M+WTA- u
-1
(0.4) M+WTA- u
-1
(0.2) 
 
Looking at Table 14, it is easy to see that under PCT, WTA, and WTP are not 
necessarily equal if individuals exhibit imprecision and pessimism, i.e., α>0.5, 
and WTA is higher than WTP. In order to see this, consider the following 
equations arising from the definition of WTP and WTA, respectively: 
 
   (51) 
  
   (52) 
 
For both tasks, the individual’s initial wealth is M dollars. In buying the 
individual pays WTP and gets the good, which has an expected utility between 
0.2 and 0.4. In buying, the best-case scenario is to pay WTP and get the good 
which has an expected utility of 0.4, whereas in the worst-case scenario 
individual pays WTP but the good has an expected utility of 0.2. As 
mentioned, the individual forms beliefs and calculates the weighted average of 
this range by assigning the weight  for the worst case and  for the best 
case. In selling, the individual gives away the good for WTA. In the best-case 
scenario the expected utility is 0.2 and in the worst-case scenario expected 
utility is 0.4. Similarly, the individual attaches weight to the worst case and 
 to the best case. Therefore, in selling the upper bound of the imprecision 
range formed in the first stage of PCT corresponds to the worst case, whereas 
in buying it corresponds to the best case. To see this, consider the following 
inequalities which always hold:    1 10.4 0.2M WTA u M WTA u      
   1 10.2 0. .4M WTP u M WTP u    Note that WTA and WTP are 
monetary amounts so the only natural condition imposed is that they are non-
negative.   
In order to make the calculations easy, without loss of generality, we 
assume the individual is risk neutral so equations (44) and (45) become: 
 
   (53) 
 
   (54) 
   1 1( ) [ ( 0.2 ] (  0.4 )]) (1 ) [u M u M u WTP u M u WTP         
1 1( ) [ ( (0.4)] ( [(  0.21 ( ))]) u M WTAu M u uM WTA u         
 1 

1 
( 0.2 ) (1 )  0.4( )M M WTPM WTP         
( 0.4) (1 )  0. )( 2M WTM AM WTA         
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After arranging the equations for WTA and WTP: 
 
   (55) 
  
   (56) 
 
PCT predicts WTA to be higher than WTP if the following condition holds: 
 
   (57) 
 
Therefore, an individual who decides according to PCT will state higher 
WTA than WTP if the individual exhibits imprecision, , and forms 
pessimistic beliefs,  To sum up, the WTA-WTP disparity is the 
product of the pessimism under imprecision.  
This also has intuitive appeal from the perspective of economic bubbles. If 
individuals are not good enough in evaluating outcomes and probabilities, they 
will end up with a range of expected utilities for goods, and thus a range of 
admissible subjective values. When the economic environment makes them 
optimistic, buyers overvalue assets causing market prices to increase and create 
bubbles. When the economic environment signals pessimism, the continuously 
overvalued assets are not as appealing to buyers, causing a sharp decrease in 
prices, which leads the bubble bursting. 
4.4.2 Preference Reversals 
Preference reversals (PR) were first documented in experimental studies by 
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) and Lindman (1971). The early literature was 
sceptical about the existence of this anomaly and claimed that it was an artefact 
of experimental design features, and thus tested its existence under various 
alterations of the experimental design, all of which ended up confirming the 
robustness of the phenomenon (Machina, 1992; Roth, 1988). Another group of 
researchers focused on investigating the issues such as whether PR might be a 
result of subjects’ misunderstanding and/or insufficient incentives (Grether and 
Plott, 1979b; Pommerehne et al., 1982; Reilly, 1982).  
In addition, there are also studies which criticise the preference reversal 
experiments from a theoretical perspective (Holt, 1986; Karni and Safra, 1987; 
Segal, 1988): The common argument of these studies is that if the individuals 
have non-expected utility preferences, violating either the independence axiom 
of EUT and/or the reduction of compound lotteries principle, the experimental 
procedures such as BDM and the random lottery incentive system could be 
biased, which might generate PR. In other words, if individuals have non-
0.4 0.2WTP  
0.2 0.2WTA  
0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 1 2      
0 
0.5. 
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standard preferences, then the choice and the valuation tasks are no longer 
separable. In this case an individual might value one lottery more than another, 
but choose the less-preferred lottery at the same time. Therefore, observed 
valuations might not be the true certainty equivalents of the lotteries and the 
experimenter observes a spurious PR. However this line of criticism has been 
falsified in a series of experimental papers using modified mechanisms which 
are immune to those points, such as reduction of compound lotteries and 
violation of independence axiom research (Cubitt et al., 2004; Tversky et al., 
1990). After these sceptical studies, the PR phenomenon is seen as replicable 
and robust, thus the focus of the succeeding literature has concentrated on the 
possible explanations and the factors affecting the phenomenon (Loomes, 
1990). 
There still remains a considerable interest in trying to find a satisfying 
explanation for PR, which can be summarised as three strands of explanations: 
Regret Theory, Reference-Dependent Theory, and Constructed Preference 
Theory. 
Regret Theory, reviewed in Chapter 1, provides an explanation by 
incorporating the violation of the transitivity axiom. Loomes and Sugden ( 
(1983) formulated the PR as three acts, $-bet, P-bet, and M, which are listed in 
Table 15 where x, y, and m are monetary consequences with following 
ordering: x>y>m. 
Table 15. Formulating preference reversals over three acts 
Acts State 1 State 2 State 3 
$-bet x 0 0 
P-bet y y 0 
M m m m 
 
In line with the PR literature, $-bet gives a higher prize than P-bet with a 
lower winning probability and M is a degenerate lottery which gives $m with 
certainty. If individuals exhibit regret aversion then the intransitive cycle 
occurs in a specific direction under the Regret Theory preference functional. 
Thus, P-bet is preferred over $-bet, M over P-bet; and $-bet over M. To see 
how this explains PR, consider interpreting the valuation of P-bet and $-bet as 
two binary choice questions such as the valuation of $-bet is a choice between 
$-bet and M whereas the valuation of P-bet is a choice between P-bet and M. 
For example for $-bet, this interpretation can be understood as ‘which one is 
worth more, $-bet or m?’ The experimental tests for Regret Theory’s 
explanation of PR confirm the cycles predicted by Regret Theory (Loomes et 
al., 1991). However, Starmer and Sugden (1998) provided evidence which 
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raises doubts about the account of Regret Theory on these intransitive cycles. 
In other words, tests of Regret Theory pointed out a new type of choice 
anomaly, however it does not seem to be the right explanation for it (Starmer, 
2008).  
The second explanation for PR is provided by the reference dependent 
models such as Subjective Expected Utility Theory (Sugden, 2003), and 
Prospect Theory and its variants. The common feature of these models is that 
preferences are defined over gains and losses relative to an initial reference 
point, and losses are weighted more than the gains in utility terms (loss 
aversion).  
Subjective Expected Utility Theory is similar to the EUT in terms of having 
linear probabilities and being defined over acts, but each state of the world is 
seen as gains and losses and therefore it can accommodate loss aversion. It 
predicts PR when valuation tasks are the elicitation of selling prices. In selling, 
individuals are endowed with the lottery tickets and therefore the reference acts 
are the corresponding bets. Since $-bet has a higher winning prize and in 
selling it is perceived as a probabilistic loss if the sale occurs, individuals 
exhibiting loss aversion might choose P-bet but value $-bet higher.  
Other reference-dependent models such as Prospect Theory and its variants 
have a similar approach to explaining PR, which is centred on notions of 
reference dependency and the asymmetric treatment of gains of losses. The 
third type of explanation for PR belongs to the psychology literature, which 
sees preference reversals as evidence against the central assumption of 
economics: individuals behave according to their stable preferences. Instead, 
the third type of explanation focuses on the decision processes and the factors 
affecting it, such as the stimuli P-bet and $-bet and the task type such as 
buying, selling, and choice. According to this line of explanation, individuals 
might reveal or state different rankings and ordering depending on task type as 
each task might invoke different heuristics and therefore alter the decision 
process and its outcome (see Lichtenstein and Slovic (2006) for further 
discussion). 
A relatively recent explanation is the preference imprecision, also the focus 
of this study, proposed by MacCrimmon and Smith (1986). They conjectured 
that most of the individuals cannot come up with a precise valuation of the 
bets, but they can form a range of values as their potential responses for 
certainty equivalence questions. Moreover, they proposed that the range for the 
$-bet is wider than the P-bet because there is a wide range of potential 
responses for the $-bet which does not violate first-order stochastic dominance. 
Therefore, it is more likely to observe a higher valuation for $-bet than the P-
bet.  
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In order to understand their idea, consider the two binary outcome bets: P-
bet offering $10 with a probability of 0.8 and $-bet offering $32 with a 
probability of 0.25. For both lotteries the losing payoff is zero. The individual 
will be sure that the certainty equivalent for the P-bet lies somewhere between 
$0 and $10 whereas for the $-bet it is between $0 and $32. These ranges 
correspond with the potential response ranges for two bets, but for some 
individuals it will be easy to narrow these ranges further and others will 
confidently state a single valuation for the bets. However, most individuals 
might not be capable of doing so. For example, an individual might think that 
the certainty equivalents are between $1 and $4 for P-bet and $1 and $8 dollars 
for $-bet. MacCrimmon and Smith (1986) call these ranges ‘imprecision 
ranges’ or imprecise equivalences from which an individual cannot confidently 
state a single value. In other words, individuals find it difficult to state a single 
amount from this range to reflect their true preferences, because they cannot 
articulate their preferences precisely. It is also assumed that the width and the 
location of the range are subjectively determined.  
Based on MacCrimmon and Smith (1986), Butler and Loomes (2007) 
conducted an experiment in which they elicited imprecision intervals by an 
incremental choice method: subjects were asked a series of binary choice 
questions in which the first option is either P-bet or the $-bet depending on the 
task, and the second option is a degenerate lottery which gives a sure sum of 
money. They used a P-bet offering of AUD 24 with a probability of 0.7; and a 
$-bet offering of AUD 80 with a probability of 0.25. Half of the subjects are 
given ‘iterating up’ treatment and other half ‘iterating down’ treatment. In the 
first treatment, the second option starts with AUD 1, and iterates up in each 
question by AUD 1. In the second treatment, suppose the first option is P-bet, 
therefore the second option starts with AUD 24 and iterates down by AUD 1 at 
each question. If the first option is a $-bet, it starts iterating down from AUD 
80. For each question, subjects are also asked to select one of the four phrases 
signifying strength of preference such as ‘I definitely prefer Lottery A’, ‘I think 
I prefer Lottery A, but I'm not sure’, ‘I think I prefer Lottery B, but I'm not 
sure’ and ‘I definitely prefer Lottery B’. Therefore, the range between the 
switching points 1 to 2 and 3 to 4 might give some idea about the imprecision 
range conjectured by MacCrimmon and Smith (1986). Overall, the summary 
statistics reported by Butler and Loomes (2007) seems to support 
MacCrimmon and Smith’s conjectures: the imprecision range for the P-bet is 
between AUD 8 and AUD 13.98 whereas for the $-bet it is between AUD 
13.30 and AUD 32.11 for the iterating-down treatment. For the second 
treatment the imprecision range of P-bet is between AUD 13.73 and AUD 
19.42, whereas for the $-bet it is between AUD 14.96 and AUD 35.02.  
100 
Preference reversals can arise with our model, and can be illustrated using 
the CRRA utility function for  
  
   (58) 
 
For , the function is concave, implying risk aversion. For simplicity, 
we focus on P- and $-bets that give either a positive payoff or zero: P-bet
 and $-bet with and  where  and  
are the winning probabilities, and and are the winning prizes of the P-bet 
and $-bet, respectively. Following Schmidt et al. (2008), we normalise the 
expected value (EV) of the P-bet by setting its payoff equal to is the EV 
of the $-bet as a ratio to the EV of the P-bet. Therefore the winning prize of the 
$-bet equals  
If the individual prefers the P-bet over the $-bet in the choice task, we can 
write: 
 
   (59) 
 
Additionally, we assume that the initial wealth of the individual, M, is zero. 
In the first stage of PCT, an individual calculates the imprecision bounds for 
the two lotteries: 
 
   (60) 
 
   (61) 
 
   (62) 
 
   (63) 
 
Naturally, when calculating the lower bound of the expected utilities for the 
two lottery tickets, individuals take the lower bound of the imprecisely 
perceived winning probabilities,  and , into account, whereas in 
calculating the upper bound of the expected utilities, individuals use the upper 
bound of the perceived winning probabilities, and . The 
remaining probabilities are assigned to the second event, which pays out 
nothing if it occurs. In the second stage, the individual weights the worst final-
level case by the pessimism parameter,  and the best case with  Since 
it is a choice task, the lower bound of the imprecision range corresponds to the 
 .u
( ) au z z
0a 
 , ;0x p  , ;0y q 0y x  1 0p q   p q
x y
1 ;p r
.r p
( ) ( $ )EU M P bet EU M bet    
( ) ( ) (1 ) 0a aLEU P bet p x p        
( ) ( ) (1 ) 0a aHEU P bet p x p        
($ ) ( ) (1 ) 0a aLEU bet q y q        
($ ) ( ) (1 ) 0a aHEU bet q y q        
( )p  ( )q 
( )p  ( )q 
, (1 ).
101 
worst case:  where M is the initial wealth and is 
zero. Therefore we can rewrite the binary choice problem as follows: 
 
   (64) 
 
As mentioned before in standard PR, individuals pick the P-bet implying 
that it leads to a higher final wealth utility than the $-bet. Thus the critical 
value for in determining whether the P-bet is preferred to the $-bet is: 
 
   (65) 
 
If the actual is greater than , the individual chooses the P-bet; if it is 
less, the individual chooses the $-bet.  
When we come to valuations as in Table 12 and 14, we see that the lower 
bound of the imprecision range calculated in the first stage does not correspond 
to the worst case because it does not lead the individual to the worst-case final 
wealth level. The valuation problem can be written as: 
 
   (66) 
 
   (67) 
 
which implies that an individual with an assumed initial wealth, M, of zero, 
pays WTA for the bet and gives it away. The left-hand side is always higher 
than the right-hand side since WTA is non-negative and is greater than
by definition. Thus, the lower bound of the expected utility range 
calculated in the first stage of PCT corresponds to the worst-case final wealth 
for selling, unlike for buying and the choice task. Next, the individual 
calculates the weighted average of the bounds by multiplying the worst-case 
utility level by the pessimism parameter,  and the best case by  WTA 
is defined as the amount of money that keeps the individual at the same wealth 
level before the transaction: 
 
  (68) 
 
(69) 
 
We further simplify by separating the utility of WTA amounts and the 
lottery tickets, and plug in the expressions for and  which leads 
to the WTA amounts for the two bets: 
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   (70) 
 
Similarly, 
   (71) 
 
The critical value for  is: 
 
   (72) 
  
If is greater the individual values the $-bet more than the P-bet; if it 
is lower, the P-bet is valued more than the $-bet. 
We explore the parameters of PCT in three cases: risk neutral, risk averse, 
and a risk loving. Consider Figure 7, where  is set to 1; P-bet
$-bet
17
 
The dashed line shows the boundary and the solid line is the
boundary. Above the dashed line, the $-bet is valued more and above the solid 
grey line the P-bet is chosen; the region between the two lines is called the 
consistency range where the chosen bet is valued more. For a risk-neutral 
individual, in the case of imprecision a standard preference reversal 
occurs if a > 0.5;  when it is less than 0.5, the model predicts a non-standard 
preference reversal. One prominent and natural difference between the risk-
loving and risk-averse individual is that in the consistency range a risk-averse 
individual chooses the P-bet and values it more; whereas the risk-loving 
individual chooses the $-bet and values it more. It is a natural conclusion since 
the P-bet would be more attractive for a risk-averse individual. Overall, in the 
case of imprecision a sufficiently high level of pessimism results in a 
standard preference reversal while optimism implies a non-standard preference 
reversal. 
                                                        
17
 For the imprecision level, we use although there is no particular 
reason behind choosing this except that it is simple and satisfies the assumptions of the theory. 
We normalise the expected value (EV) of the P-bet by setting its payoff equal to is the 
EV of the $-bet as a ratio of the EV of the P-bet. Therefore the winning prize of the $-bet equals
 
1( ) [( ) ] (1 )[( ) ]a aP betu WTA p x p x   

     
1
$( ) [( ) ] (1 )[( ) ]
a a
betu WTA q y q y   

     

** [ ( ) ( )] 2 ( )a a a ax p y q y x       
 **
r  1.25,0.8;0 ,
 5,0.2;0
** *
( 0), 
( 0), 
   , 1 ,p p p    
1/ ;p r
/ .r p
103 
   
Next we consider the case in which the winning probabilities remain the 
same, but the winning prize of the $-bet varies.  
The dashed lines show the valuation bounds and the solid lines show the 
choice bounds for three levels of r (0.8,1,1.2); these are coloured light grey, 
dark grey, and black, respectively. For a risk-averse individual in Figure 8, the 
consistency range shrinks as r increases up to a certain level. The parameter 
values to induce standard and non-standard preference reversals converge to 
the risk-neutrality baseline case. However, above this critical level of r, the 
consistency range favours the $-bet and it expands as r increases. In other 
words, since implies the relative attractiveness of the $-bet, as it increases up 
to a certain level it makes the $-bet more attractive than the P-bet for a risk-
averse individual. Even if we increase the relative attractiveness of the $-bet to 
r
Figure 7. Preference reversals and parameters of Preference Cloud Theory (Starting from top left 
a equals 0.7 (risk averse), 1 (risk neutral) and 1.3 (risk loving) to reflect different levels of the 
curvature of the CRRA utility function.) 
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extreme values, the model predicts that both standard and non-standard 
preference reversals can be observed. 
 For the risk neutrality case in Figure 8, as the relative attractiveness of the 
$-bet in terms of EV is increased or decreased, consistency range expands. The 
difference is that, as increases above 1, the individual chooses $-bet and 
values it more inside the consistency range. This pattern resembles the risk-
loving case. On the other hand, as  is decreased further below 1, P-bet is 
chosen and valued more inside the consistency range, which resembles the 
risk-aversion case. 
For the risk-loving case in Figure 8, as the relative attractiveness of the $-
bet increases the consistency range expands further. Overall, the regions which 
r
r
Figure 8. Increase in relative attractiveness of the $-bet (starting from top left, a equals 0.7 (risk 
averse), 1 risk neutral, and 1.3 (risk loving) to reflect different levels of the curvature of the 
CRRA utility function.) 
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allow for standard and non-standard preference reversals seem to shrink as the 
relative attractiveness of the $-bet is increased. The required level of 
pessimism to observe standard preference reversals increases as we increase 
further; this can be seen in the shrinking region of standard preference 
reversals and interpreted as the tendency to exhibit reversal decreases as the 
difference between the lotteries becomes more prominent. Therefore, 
individuals with even greater imprecision and thus less probabilistic 
sophistication will behave consistently in terms of their choices and valuations 
as we increase the attractiveness of the $-bet.  
4.4.3 Allais Paradox 
As introduced in Chapter 1, the Allais Paradox is the first challenge proposed 
to EUT in which individuals violate the independence axiom. The inconsistent 
patterns pointed out in the Allais Paradox have led to the development of the 
alternative models reviewed in Chapter 1. In order to see the differences 
between the EUT and the alternatives, it will be helpful to use the probability 
triangle and demonstrate the Allais type of bets on the triangle. These bets are 
characterised as three outcome lotteries where the outcomes are  and  
which have the following order in terms of magnitude:  The 
corresponding probabilities of these outcomes are a vector of probabilities:
 For the original version of the Allais problem the outcomes
are $0, $1M, and $5M. The probabilities for the four bets (S1, R1, 
S2, R2) are shown in Table 16 below: 
Table 16. Bets in Allais Paradox 
Outcomes (xi) S1 R1 S2 R2 
$0 - 0.01 0.89 0.90 
$1M 1.00 0.89 0.11 - 
$5M - 0.10 - 0.10 
 
As introduced in Chapter 1, in an Allais type of problem, individuals 
respond to two binary choice questions: in the first question they make a choice 
between S1 and R1 whereas in the second question they choose either S2 or R2. 
According to EUT, individuals should either choose S or R types of lotteries in 
both questions, however the observed tendency is to choose S1 in the first 
question and R2 in the second one. It is inconsistent with EUT, because the 
second set of lotteries is formed by subtracting the common question from S1 
and R1. As in EUT the probabilities enter into the calculation in a linear 
manner, this subtraction should not alter a change in the ranking of the 
lotteries. Figure 9 demonstrates the problem in a probability triangle where the 
1 2, x x 3 ,x
1 2 3.x x x 
1 2 1 2( , ,1 ).p p p p 
1 2 3,  and x x x
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vertical axis shows the probability of best consequence, whereas the horizontal 
axis measures the probability of the worst consequence. Therefore the 
remaining probability corresponds to the consequence, which is $1M. 
The bets that are located on the triangle boundaries assign positive 
probabilities only for two consequences out of four. Since S1 gives $1M with a 
probability of 1, it is centred in the corner where the probabilities of other 
consequences are zero  In addition, since S2 has positive 
probabilities for the consequences such as 0 and $1M, it lies on the horizontal 
axis. Similarly, R2 does not assign a positive probability for winning $1M 
therefore it is on the hypotenuse, which depicts the probability of winning 
$1M. The interior of the triangle includes the bets that assign positive 
probability to all three consequences; in this case it is R1. The crucial point on 
Figure 9 is that the lines joining the two pairs (R1-S1 and R2-S2) are parallel. 
 
Figure 9. Probability triangle and Allais bets 
We can demonstrate the preferences on the triangle with indifference 
curves. They are parallel lines because probabilities are treated linearly in 
expected utility calculations. Moreover, they are increasing in terms of 
1 3( 0).p p 
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desirability towards the northwest of the triangle since the best outcome is 
located on the vertical axis and the worst outcome is on the horizontal axis. 
Figure 10 shows an example of indifference curves drawn according to EUT. 
 
Figure 10. Expected Utility Theory and indifference curves 
Under EUT, the slope of the indifference curves implies the risk attitude of 
the individuals: the steeper the slope, the more risk averse the individual is, as 
shown in Figure 11. 
The solid line in the figure implies relatively more risk aversion compared 
to the dashed line: x on the figure gives  $1M with certainty, whereas y and z 
are the risky prospects that assign positive probability to the worst ($0) and the 
best consequences ($1M), but zero for the middle-ranked consequence ($1M). 
Furthermore, y assigns a higher probability to $5M than z. Therefore the solid 
line belongs to an individual who demands a higher probability of getting $5M 
to be indifferent between the risky prospect and $1M with certainty.  
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Figure 11. Risk Attitudes on Probability Triangle 
So under EUT, throughout the triangle the individual maintains the risk 
attitude by having the parallel indifference curve covering the triangle. Since 
the lines connecting the pairs are also parallel (Figure 9), according to EUT the 
individual should pick either S- or R-type lotteries in both questions to 
maintain consistency. However the actual behaviour observed in the literature 
contradicts the prediction of EUT. Figure 12 demonstrates the observed 
behaviour: the individual choosing S1 in the first question signals an 
indifference curve similar to c1, which means that the indifference curve that 
passes through R1 lies somewhere below c1, which is in the less desirable 
region. On the other hand, if the individual chooses R2 in the second question it 
means that the indifference curve passes through S2 and lies somewhere below 
c2. It is easy to see that c1 and c2 are not parallel which means that individual 
acts as though less risk averse while making a choice between S2 and R2 as 
compared to when making the choice between S1 and R1. This behaviour is 
inconsistent with EUT, because it implies that the risk attitude of the individual 
does not remain the same across the choices between two pairs. This pattern of 
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unstable risk attitudes is hypothetised as indifference curves being fanning out 
from the bottom-left corner of the triangle. 
 
Figure 12. Observed behaviour in Allais Paradox 
To maintain transitivity it is assumed that the starting point of fanning out is 
located outside the triangle as shown in Figure 13. 
Figure 13 shows the typical linear but fanning out indifference curves under 
the Weighted Utility Theory developed by Chew and MacCrimmon (1979). 
There are also different patterns produced by alternative theories, which allow 
for Allais behaviour. Figure 14 shows the indifference curves of Rank-
Dependent Utility Theory with a concave probability weighting function. 
The curves are steepest in the bottom-right corner where the probability of 
the middle-ranked outcome ($1M) equals one. They get flatter as we move 
along the horizontal and vertical axes and finally become parallel close to the 
hypotenuse where the probability of the middle-ranked outcome equals zero. 
Overall, alternative theories treat the probabilities in a nonlinear manner, which 
then relaxes the linearity and/or parellelism of the indifference curves (see 
Camerer (1989) for a detailed analysis).  
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Figure 13. Fanning-out hypothesis 
 
Figure 14. Indifference curves of Rank-Dependent Utility Theory 
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Besides the theoretical advances in the literature to explain Allais Paradox, 
there are also studies that empirically question and test its robustness. Studies 
in this line of literature are defenders of EUT that claim that the violations can 
be explained by misunderstandings and inattentiveness (Allais, 1990; Amihud, 
1979a, 1979b; Morgenstern, 1979).  In an experimental study, Savage (1954) 
modifies the representation of the lotteries in order to highlight the similarity of 
the bets in two questions, as shown in Table 17. 
Table 17. Savage’s representation of the Allais bets 
 1 2-11 12-100 
A 1000 1000 1000 
B 0 5000 1000 
A’ 1000 1000 0 
B’ 0 5000 0 
 
The last three columns include the different way of presenting the 
probabilities associated with the three outcomes. For example, suppose a 
subject chooses B in the first question and the random number drawn equals 9, 
then the subject wins 5000, since it is between 2 and 11. This representation 
facilitates understanding the similarity between the first and the last two 
lotteries shown in the table: discarding the common consequence of winning 
1000 if the random number is between 12 and 100 from A and B produces A’ 
and B’. Although this modification in the presentation of the lotteries decreases 
the inconsistencies from 60% to 40%, they do not disappear (Incekara-Hafalir 
and Stecher, 2012). Conlisk (1989) also focuses on the presentation of the 
lottery tickets and finds that the inconsistencies decrease from 50% to 28%. In 
addition to the subject misunderstandings, Harrison (1994) criticises the 
hypothetical nature of the surveys that document the inconsistencies and 
suggests that it would be premature to discard EUT based on them. Burke et al. 
(1996) takes the critics of Harrison into account and use real monetary payoffs 
in an experimental study which again reduces the inconsistent preference 
statements but does not eliminate them completely (see Camerer (1989) for 
another example with real payoffs). Finally, in a more recent and 
comprehensive study, Harman and Gonzales (2015) find that the inconsistent 
statements disappear with experience, which can be seen as a support for the 
preference imprecision argument that is reviewed in detail in Chapter 2. As 
subjects gain experience they will be more precise about their probability 
judgments and exhibit lower imprecision. 
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In order to see how PCT incorporates the Allais Paradox, the same 
approach is used as was used to explain PR in Section 4.4.2 using CRRA 
utility function for : 
 
   (73) 
 
For , the function is concave, implying risk aversion. Here, use 
model for the first stage of PCT and  pessimism specification for the second 
stage to explain the Allais Paradox in this section. It is also possible to use the 
original version of PCT to explain the preference reversals but the original 
version is applicable for only the two-outcome lotteries. In order to extend it 
for the lotteries that have more than two outcomes one can use rank-dependent 
probability transformation technique as in Cumulative Prospect Theory and 
Rank-Dependent Utility Theory. The bets that are used in this section are same 
as the ones listed in Table 17 above. Remember that under the model, an 
individual forms the imprecision range that has a width of
 
in the first 
stage of the PCT and the standard expected utility of the bet is at the centre of 
this range. Thus for any lottery X the bounds are calculated in the first stage as: 
 
   (74) 
 
   (75) 
  
For the second stage of the theory, assume that individuals weight the worst 
case for final wealth level by , the pessimism parameter. Since the tasks 
under Allais problems are simple choice tasks, we can take the lower bound of 
the imprecision range as the worst case and the upper bound as the best case. 
Remember that in preference reversals or valuation gap problems, for selling, 
the upper bound corresponds to the worst case because it is associated to the 
worst-case scenario in terms of final wealth (see Section 4.2 for a detailed 
discussion). 
Thus an individual calculates the expected utility of a bet X under PCT by 
calculating the weighted average of the bounds as: 
 
   (76) 
 
If an individual prefers S1 to R1 in the first task and R2 to S2 in the second 
task, this can be represented by the following inequalities:  
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These inequalities simply say that individual prefers S1 over R1 because the 
first one gives higher satisfaction to the individual calculated in accordance 
with the PCT. Similarly the second inequality implies that the chosen bet in the 
second question (R2) gives higher utility than the other one (S2) according to 
PCT. 
In order to find the critical values for the parameters of PCT that allow for 
this kind of behaviour, we need to plug in the expressions for
and  
 
   (79) 
 
(80) 
 
   (81) 
 
   (82) 
 
Since S1 gives $1M with certainty, the standard deviation is zero, which 
then reduces to the standard expected utility formulation. For the other three 
lotteries, the standard deviations are 1.21, 0.31, and 1.5, respectively. All of the 
payoffs are simplified, and the common multiplier is suppressed. For the 
benchmark case, set to 0.5, which determines the curvature of the utility 
function. Next, solve the inequalities (70) and (71) for to find the critical 
values. For this analysis, it is useful to graph the combinations of parameters (
k and ) that allow for Allais Paradox as shown in Figure 15.  
The vertical axis measures values whereas the horizontal axis lists values 
for  the solid curve shows the critical values for the first task where the 
individual has to make a choice between S1 and R1, and, above this curve, S1 is 
chosen over R1. Second, the dashed curve shows the critical values for in the 
second task where the individual has to make a choice between S2 and R2, and 
below this curve, R2 is chosen over S2. Thus, below the solid curve the 
individual prefers R1 and R2 in both tasks whereas above the dashed line the 
individual prefers S1 and S2 in both tasks. These regions include the 
combination of parameters, and k which result in consistent behaviour with 
EUT. On the other hand, the region between these two curves includes the 
parameter combinations that allow for the paradoxical behaviour: the 
individual prefers S1 in the first task and R2 in the second task. Overall, as the 
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level of imprecision increases, the critical value that allows for the Allais 
Paradox decreases to 0.5.  
 
Figure 15. Allais Paradox and PCT parameters. (Solid line shows the critical α values in the first 
task, whereas the dashed line shows the ones in the second task. Above the solid curve, S1 is 
chosen over R1, whereas above the dashed curve, S2 is chosen over R2). 
 
For the benchmark case, I set the parameter  to 0.5; decreasing this 
parameter moves the two curves towards southeast of the origin and expands 
the region, which includes the parameters allowing the Allais Paradox. 
4.5 Conclusion 
There is a theory similar to the original version of PCT but it is for decision 
under ambiguity: α-MaxMin model of decision under ambiguity. It asserts that 
under ambiguity individuals form multiple priors and select one of them 
depending on the pessimism/optimism parameter. However, α-MaxMin 
becomes EUT when the probabilities are known, therefore for decisions under 
risk it reduces to EUT (Wakker, 2010): the individual forms multiple priors 
when the probabilities are unknown (consider the two ambiguous Ellsberg 

a
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urns); on the other hand, it asserts that, as in EUT, individuals can perceive the 
numerical, objective probabilities perfectly when they are given as information.  
The disadvantage with α-MaxMin is that for some cases its predictions 
contradict the notion of monotonicity. Consider two ambiguous lotteries, and 
three states of the world: A=(1,0,0) and B=(1,1,0). An individual who decides 
according to α-MaxMin will end up having the same expected utilities for the 
two lotteries, but B is obviously better. The reason is that the set of multiple 
priors under α-MaxMin is assumed to include all of the possible probability 
distributions over state space. Therefore, the problem of α-MaxMin is that it 
does not provide a method or formulation for how individuals form these 
priors. Instead, it is assumed to be the same for all individuals: a set of priors is 
the set of all possible probability distributions. But PCT tells us how 
individuals form multiple priors: by imprecision parameter, 
 
When we 
extend PCT for the risky prospects with more than three outcome by using rank 
dependent probability weighting, there is no violation of dominance or 
monotonicity. 
Another close companion of PCT is RDUT in terms of including factors 
such as optimism/pessimism; however this theory cannot explain anomalies 
such as PR and valuation gap. The reason is that it predicts the same expected 
utility for the same good in different tasks such as choice, buying, and selling. 
The major problem with RDUT is that it lacks a plausible behavioural 
foundation: the rank dependent cumulative probability 
transformationranking the outcomes and converting the probabilities into 
decision weights in a cumulative wayis a complicated task for the ordinary 
person whose cognitive capabilities are indeed questioned by the literature 
proposing these alternative models to EUT. While these models are 
questioning the cognitive capabilities of the individuals, it seems paradoxical to 
model their behaviour with a more complicated manner, i.e., by asserting that 
they can do complicated calculations such as rank-dependent cumulative 
probability transformation. One way to make RDUT explain preference 
reversals and a valuation gap is to add loss aversion, but then it becomes 3
rd
 
Generation Prospect Theory which includes both rank dependency and loss 
aversion. However, it cannot offer plausible parameter values that can capture 
the strong reversals and non-standard reversals that are reported in Butler and 
Loomes (2007).  
Another theory that we should pay attention to is Regret Theory, which can 
also explain preference reversals, however the theory itself depends on the 
state-wise comparison of the two options (e.g., P-bet and $-bet), and 
individuals develop disutility of regret for the states in which the option that is 
not chosen has higher utility. Moreover, it also failed other tests (Starmer and 
.
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Sugden, 1998). The disadvantage with Regret Theory is that the utility of an 
option not only depends on its consequences, but also on the available options. 
The extension of Regret Theory for the cases that include more than two 
outcomes is not straightforward.  
Most importantly, besides the disadvantages stated above, none of these 
theories can predict that individuals might have imprecise preferences; 
therefore they do not take into account the evidence recently emerging in the 
literature. In Chapter 2, I reviewed the stochastic preference approach as a 
possible incorporation of the imprecision in existing theories, but the results 
suggest that even with stochastic specifications, existing theories cannot 
explain a significant portion of the observed behaviour. PCT accomplishes 
incorporating the imprecision in preferences by the first step in which the 
individuals’ vague perception of the numerical probabilities plays a central 
role. This vagueness of perception causes individuals to have a range of 
expected utility, the imprecision range. For obvious reasons, both the 
experimental settings and the real life situations demand a single amount from 
individuals: for example, you cannot pay for goods in terms of intervals. Thus, 
the nature of the experiments and of the real world forces individuals to 
withdraw a single amount from the imprecision range formed at the first step.  
The second step of PCT describes how individuals reduce the range to a 
single amount, which is modelled by incorporating Hurwicz’s α. We rationalise 
it in the following way: since the individual does not have prior information 
about the probability distribution of the imprecision range, i.e., does not know 
which value is the true expected utility, an individual has to form beliefs. 
Belief formation depends on the individual’s degree of optimism or pessimism. 
According to the pessimism/optimism level, the individual calculates the 
weighted average of this range and considers that single amount as a criterion 
for decisions. To sum up, PCT offers a final product that is a single precise 
amount, as the other theories do, but also it provides the imprecision range as a 
product embedded in the first step of PCT.  
Moreover, an alternative that we suggest for the second stage of the PCT, 
the multiple selves framework, provides a meaningful preference 
representation for the values stated as the imprecision range by incorporating 
the level of willingness in preference relations. The standard way of 
representing the preferences sees the values inside the imprecision range as 
equally desirable, but this view is problematic for monotonicity. Thus, PCT 
provides insights and a more meaningful picture about the imprecision range 
observed in emerging literature, but also explains the anomalies of standard 
economic theory.  
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There is also a probabilistic choice model proposed by Blavatsky (2009), 
which accommodates preference imprecision by taking EUT and embedding it 
in some particular stochastic specification. However, PCT incorporates the 
preference imprecision in a much simpler way by providing a preference 
functional. Finally, I do not rule out extensions such as modifying PCT with a 
stochastic component, as in stochastic preferences literature. The pessimism 
parameter, , can be assumed to be randomly drawn for each task as in a 
random preference approach. Moreover, an error term such as white noise can 
be added to the deterministic part of PCT, which is similar to the approach that 
Hey and Orme (1994) used. Another possible extension is to assume the 
pessimism parameter is dependent on several factors such as the ratio of past 
winning for the individual and/or the moving average of past winning, etc. It is 
plausible to assume that pessimism itself depends on the good and the bad 
outcomes that an individual experienced. That past experiences determine 
individual’s beliefs about future outcomes is just a simple and natural 
extension and can be easily incorporated in PCT. 
Another point where PCT has an advantage over other theories is that none 
of the theories can explain the findings of what is called ‘preference paradox’ 
in the psychophysics literature, that is, the bidding pattern is identical no matter 
how we present the probabilities: numerically, verbally, and/or graphically (see 
Section 4.2 for the related studies). How can RDUTor any other theory in 
which the expected utility calculation is done by the precisely perceived 
probabilityexplain the similar bidding patterns between the qualitative and 
quantitative representations of the probabilities? Suppose you are told that it is 
‘less likely’ you will get $10 or that you will get $10 with a 30% probability. 
Given that, in those experiments, subjects are not given any information about 
what ‘less likely’ means to the experimenter, they are expected to derive a 
subjective meaning from the phrases on their own. None of the existing 
theories can explain this phenomenon. The only way to explain this 
phenomenon is to assume that individuals perceive the numerical objective 
probabilities in a vague way, similar to the way that they perceive the verbal 
expressions. PCT accomplishes this by imprecision parameter,  
Another issue that needs to be discussed is which criteria we should assess 
the theories on. Some theories might make similar predictions but they might 
provide different underlying stories for the observed behaviour. Predictive 
power is not the only criteria to assess a theory on; the ‘true’ insights are also 
an important criterion.  
Economics is interested in developing homeomorphic models, not 
paramorphic models. The reason is that economists demand the parameters and 
assumptions to have psychologically plausible stories (Wakker, 2010). 

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Paramorphic models correctly describe the data and make perfect predictions, 
but they are not concerned with the ‘true’ underlying decision process. Because 
the aim of these models is to predict market outcomes, they are not concerned 
with how people actually make decisions, and do not reflect the true underlying 
decision process. As Friedman (1953) states, market models can make correct 
predictions even if their assumptions about consumers do not match actual 
consumers’ behaviour.  
On the other hand, homeomorphic models not only match their predictions 
with the data but also describe how individuals really think. Economists are 
interested in homeomorphic models, because the aim of economics as a science 
is not just predicting, but also, designing economic policies and market 
schemes. The effectiveness and success of such policies and market schemes 
depend on the extent to which we can understand the underlying decision 
mechanism of individuals. Relying on erroneous but seemingly true 
assumptions and models while designing economic policies is like barking up 
the wrong tree; it can be a winning strategy by chance, but in the long run will 
reveal its weaknesses.  
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Appendix 
Appendix includes the instructions used in the experiment presented in Chapter 
3. These are the instructions used in the interval treatment for the Buyer-Seller 
uncertainty and buyers group, the instructions for the rest of the treatments 
and groups can be easily reproduced by making obvious modifications. 
 
Instructions for Buyer-Seller Uncertainty Group in Intervals Treatment 
This is an experiment in individual decision-making. Our purpose is to study 
technical issues involved in decision-making. The instructions are simple, and 
if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn some 
money and/or other things. What you earn will depend on the decisions you 
make and some chance. The responses of others do not affect your payoff. It is 
for your interest to answer truthfully since there is no right or wrong answer in 
this experiment.  
 
Important Rules 
We ask that you do not communicate with other people during the experiment. 
Please refrain from verbally reacting to events that occur during the 
experiment. If you have any questions, write your questions on the paper titled 
as ‘Write Your Question Here’ which is placed on your desk. After writing 
your question raise your hand, experimenter will come to your desk and will 
write the answer on the same sheet. 
 
Important Notice about How to Retrieve Rewards 
Please write your ID on each task sheet when you receive them. Keep your ID 
card because you will retrieve your rewards by showing this card to person in 
charge with payoff distribution after the experiment. Note that the 
experimenter will not be able to link any specific participant name to a 
participant identification number. Therefore the experimenter will not know 
subject payoffs by individual. The person that does this experiment and the 
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person that you will get your earnings from is different. So anonymity of the 
responses is maintained. 
 
Tasks 
You have 4 tasks to complete. In each task there are different goods. So there 
will be totally 4 goods. After all the tasks are completed, one of the tasks will 
be selected and played for real. The selection will be done like this: 
experimenter will write the task numbers on papers and will put them in 
different envelopes and place the envelopes in an opaque bag and select one of 
the tasks randomly. All of these will be done in front of you. So each task has 
equal chance of being selected. It is for your interest to see all of these tasks as 
real and make your decisions according to it, because each one of them have 
equal chance to be selected and played for real. 
 
General Instructions for the Tasks 
You all are given 100 SEK and the good. You will state your offer and after 
that, experimenter will determine whether you are buyer or seller by a random 
mechanism. The mechanism works as follows: right after you wrote your offer 
in each task, experimenter will collect your response sheet. Next, experimenter 
will select one of four tasks to run for real randomly. After that, experimenter 
will write “buyer” on a piece of paper and “seller” on another piece of paper. 
Experimenter will place these two papers in different envelopes and put the 
envelopes in an opaque bag. From that bag, experimenter will pick one of the 
envelopes which will determine whether you are buyer or seller. After you’re 
determined as buyer or seller, experimenter will announce the randomly 
selected market price. The random mechanism for market price selection works 
as follows: The market price will be determined randomly by using the 30 
Ping-Pong balls. On each Ping-Pong ball; there is a number written on. The 
numbers are between 1 and 30 SEK. There are totally 30 Ping-Pong balls, so 
the market price can be any number between 1 SEK and 30 SEK. Experimenter 
will select one of the Ping-Pong balls and that will be the market price.  Notice 
that each ball has equal chance of being selected so the market price can be any 
number between 1 and 30. All of these will be done in front of you. You are 
free to inspect the material that is used in random mechanisms after the 
experiment. 
 
Depending on whether you are buyer or seller the outcome will be determined 
like this: 
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1. Seller: If the random process determines you as seller, it means that you 
own the good. If your offer is higher than the market price you will not sell 
the good. But if your offer is equal or lower than the market price, you will 
sell the good and get the amount of money equal to  the market price. The 
important point here is that you will get the market price not your offer. The 
comparison between your offer and market price will determine whether 
you will sell the good or not.  
2. Buyer: If the random process determines you as buyer, it means that you do 
not own the good. If your offer is below the market price you will not buy 
the good. But if your offer is equal or higher than the market price, you will 
buy the good and pay the market price. The important point here is that you 
will pay the market price not your offer. The comparison between your 
offer and market price will determine whether you will buy the good or not. 
 
Notice the following two things: 
 
1. Your decision can have no effect on the market price actually used because 
the market price will be selected at random. 
2. It is in your interest to indicate your true preferences.  
 
The Experimental Steps: 
1. First you will write your offer. After you write your offer experimenter will 
collect the response sheets. 
2. Experimenter will select the 1 out of 4 tasks, randomly. 
3. Than experimenter will determine whether you are buyer or seller, 
randomly. (As explained above). 
4. After that experimenter will announce the market price which is selected 
randomly between 1 and 30 SEK by using the Ping-Pong balls. 
 
Remember, there are no advantages to strategic behavior. Your best strategy 
is to determine your personal value for the item and record that value as your 
offer. There is not necessarily a “correct” value. Personal values can differ 
from individual to individual. 
Example: Suppose wrote 1000 as your offer on the response sheet. And 
suppose by the random mechanism you happen to be buyer. Next, 
experimenter will announce the market price which is selected randomly. In 
this case you happen to be a buyer so if the market price equals 1000 or lower 
than 1000 you will buy the good and pay the market price, not your offered 
amount. Suppose market price is 900, so you buy the good and pay 900 for the 
good.  
132 
If the market price is higher than your offer such as 1100, you will not buy 
the good, you keep your money. If the market price is 1000 then you will buy 
the good and pay 1000. 
Example: Suppose you wrote 1000 as your offer on the response sheet. And 
suppose by the random mechanism you happen to be seller. That means that 
you own the good. Next experimenter will announce the market price which is 
selected randomly. In this example you happen to be a seller so if the market 
price equals or higher than 1000 you will sell your good and get the amount of 
money which equals market price by giving away your good. Suppose market 
price is 1200, so you sell the good and get 1200 in return.  
If the market price is lower than your offer such as 800, you will not sell the 
good, you will keep your good. If the market price is 1000, you will sell the 
good and get 1000 in return. 
You will see in the answer sheet that there are two boxes to enter your 
offer: 
 
 
 
 
If your offer a single amount then write the same number inside the two 
boxes such as: 
 
 
 
 
 
If you cannot provide a single amount such as 1000-1020 than you can 
write a range such as:  
 
 
 
 
 
If you wrote a range and you happen to be a seller by the random process 
(that means you own the good) you will sell the good if the market price falls 
inside or above the range you specified. In this example if the market price is 
between 1000 and 1020 or above 1020 you will sell the good and get the 
market price. So it means you will sell the good if the market price is higher 
than 1000. 
                  
1000                  1000 
                  
 1000                  1020 
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Example: Suppose you wrote 1000-1020 and random mechanism 
determined you as seller. After that, experimenter selected 900 randomly as 
market price. It means that you will not sell the good and you will keep the 
good. Because it is lower than your specified range.  
What if the random market price happens to be 1010? You sell the good 
because it is inside the range you specified and get 1010 in return. 
What if the random market price happens to be 1021? You do sell the good 
because it is higher than your specified range. So you will sell the good and get 
1021 in return. 
If you wrote a range and you happen to be a buyer by the random process 
(that means you do not own the good) you will get the good if the market price 
falls inside or below the range you specified. In this example if the market 
price is between 1000 and 1020 and below 1000 you will buy the good and pay 
the market price. So it means you will buy the good if the market price is lower 
than 1020. 
Example: Suppose you wrote 1000-1020 and random mechanism 
determined you as buyer. After that, experimenter selected 900 randomly as 
market price. It means that you will buy the good and pay 900. Because it is 
lower than your specified range.  
What if the random market price happens to be 1010? You buy the good 
because it is inside the range you specified and pay 1010 and get the good. 
What if the random market price happens to be 1021? You do not buy the 
good because it is higher than your specified range. So you keep your money. 
Notice that at the beginning of each task you have 100 SEK. As it is 
mentioned before, only one of the tasks will be selected randomly and will be 
played for real. 
 
Guidelines 
 
What Is Your ‘Best Strategy’? 
Remember there is no right or wrong answer but it is for your advantage to 
be honest and answer truthfully.  
 
What Happens If I State A Lower Amount Than My True Value? 
Let’s assume that your true value is 1000 SEK, however you wrote a 
smaller amount on your sheet, let’s say 950 SEK. Next experimenter will 
determine whether you are buyer or seller, randomly. Suppose you are assigned 
as seller. After that, let’s say, experimenter announces the market price as 970 
SEK. Since your offer (950 SEK) is lower than the market price (970 SEK), 
you will sell the good and get 970 SEK. Remember your true value was 1000 
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SEK. So by stating a lower value than your true value, you give away the good 
for a lower amount (970) than your true value (1000). If you had told the truth 
by stating 1000 SEK, you could have kept the good and will not sell it for 970 
SEK.  
 
What Happens If I State A Higher Amount Than My True Value? 
Let’s assume that your true value is 1000 SEK, however you wrote a higher 
amount on your sheet, let’s say 1100 SEK. Next experimenter will determine 
whether you are buyer or seller, randomly. Suppose you are assigned as buyer. 
After that the experimenter announces the market price and it happened to be 
1050 SEK. Since the market price (1050 SEK) is lower than your stated offer 
(1100 SEK), you buy the good and pay 1050 SEK. Remember your true value 
was 1000 SEK but you have stated a higher amount (1100 SEK). You get the 
good by paying 1050 SEK; however the good is worth only 1000 SEK to you. 
So if you pay a higher amount than your true value, you lose out. 
Notice that it is your interest to state your true value. Since being a buyer 
and seller has equal chance of being selected you have to consider the two 
possible cases. As explained above, experimenter will prepare two envelopes: 
one of them has the word ‘seller’ and the other one has the word ‘buyer’. Since 
there are two envelopes they have equal chance of being selected from the 
opaque bag. 
Being a seller means that you will be given the good in the task, so you own 
the good (plus the 100 SEK). Your offer will be compared to market price. 
This comparison will determine whether you sell the good or keep the good. 
Being a buyer means that you do not own the good (only 100 SEK). Your 
offer will be compared to market price. This comparison will determine 
whether you buy the good or not. 
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HYPOTHETICAL TASK 
 
 
The Aim of the task is to train you and make you understand the procedures 
 
Write you ID here:________ 
 
Training Task 1: In this task the good is a candy. Now state your offer 
for that good. The market price will be selected from the range of 1-30 
SEK. Each amount in this range has equal chance to be selected. The price 
increments are 1 SEK. Therefore there are 1,2,3,4,….30 SEK in this range. 
If your offer is a single amount write the same amount in both of the 
boxes below. However If you cannot provide a single amount, you can 
enter a range of values. Therefore write the lower bound on the box left and 
the upper bound on the box right. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After everyone completes answering their offer, experimenter will 
announce whether you are buyer or seller, which is selected randomly by 
using the two envelopes. After that experimenter will select the market 
price randomly by using 30 Ping-Pong balls which are numbered from 1 to 
30.  
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TASK 1 
 
Write you ID here:________ 
 
In this task the good is Maribou Premium (86 %Cocoa) Chocolate. 
Now state your offer for this chocolate: 
If your offer is a single amount write the same amount in both of the boxes 
below. However If you cannot provide a single amount, you can enter a range 
of values. Therefore write the lower bound on the box left and the upper bound 
on the box right. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
137 
TASK 2 
 
Write you ID here:________ 
 
In this task the good is 3 cans of Coke. Below are the 5 types of Coke. Now 
create your own pack by selecting three. You are free to mix and match.  
For example if you want all of them to be Coca Cola Zero then write 3 inside 
the box next to Coca Cola Zero. If you want 2 Zero and 1 Cherry write 2 next 
to Coca Cola Zero and 1 Coca Cola Cherry. 
 
 
Amount Types 
 Coca Cola Light 
 Coca Cola Zero 
 Coca Cola Regular 
 Coca Cola Cherry 
 Coca Cola Vanilla 
 
Now state your offer for this package includes 3 cans of Coke that you 
specified above. 
If your offer is a single amount write the same amount in both of the boxes 
below. However If you cannot provide a single amount, you can enter a 
range of values. Therefore write the lower bound on the box left and the 
upper bound on the box right. 
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TASK 3 
 
Write you ID here:________ 
 
Below is the list of Maribou chocolates with different flavors. Mark your 
favorite one with “X” inside the box next to it.  
 
 Vit Choklad med Smak av vanilj (white chocolate) 
 Jordgubb (Strawberry) 
 Mörk Choklad (Dark) 
 Mjölk Choklad (Milk) 
 With Oreo 
 Helnöt (Hazelnut) 
 M Peanut 
 Frukt & Mandel (Fruit and Almond) 
 Digestive 
 Daim 
 
Now state your offer for your favourite Maribou chocolate that you 
specified above. 
If your offer is a single amount write the same amount in both of the boxes 
below. However If you cannot provide a single amount, you can enter a range 
of values. Therefore write the lower bound on the box left and the upper bound 
on the box right. 
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TASK 4 
 
Write you ID here:________ 
 
In this task the good is a lottery ticket gives 30 SEK with 0.5 chance and 0 
SEK with 0.5 chance. There is a bag which includes 100 Ping-Pong balls. Each 
ball is numbered from 1 to 100. At the end experimenter will select a ball 
randomly from the bag in front of you. If the number on the ball is 50 or 
below; lottery gives 30 SEK, if the number is 51 and higher it gives nothing. 
As you can see there is 50:50 chance of winning and losing. Because there are 
equal numbers of balls (50) that can make you win and equal number of balls 
(50) that can make you lose. Each ball has equal chance of being selected. 
Experimenter will select a ball from an opaque bag. You can inspect the 
material that is used after the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
         
         
         
        
Now state your offer for the lottery ticket: 
If your offer is a single amount write the same amount in both of the boxes 
below. However If you cannot provide a single amount, you can enter a range 
of values. Therefore write the lower bound on the box left and the upper bound 
on the box right. 
                                        
         
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 2 3 ............................48 49 50             51 52 53.....................98 99 100 
         50 balls for winning       50 balls for loosing 
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Instructions for Buyers Group in Intervals Treatment 
This is an experiment in individual decision-making. Our purpose is to 
study technical issues involved in decision-making. The instructions are 
simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might 
earn some money and/or other things. What you earn will depend on the 
decisions you make and some chance. The responses of others do not affect 
your payoff. It is for your interest to answer truthfully since there is no right or 
wrong answer in this experiment.  
 
Important Rules 
We ask that you do not communicate with other people during the 
experiment. Please refrain from verbally reacting to events that occur during 
the experiment. If you have any questions, write your questions on the paper 
titled as ‘Write Your Question Here’ which is placed on your desk. After 
writing your question raise your hand, experimenter will come to your desk 
and will write the answer on the same sheet. 
 
Important Notice about How to Retrieve Rewards 
Please write your ID on each task sheet when you receive them. Keep your 
ID card because you will retrieve your rewards by showing this card to Mr. 
Brian Danley after the experiment. Note that the experimenter will not be able 
to link any specific participant name to a participant identification number. 
Therefore the experimenter will not know subject payoffs by individual. The 
person that does this experiment and the person that you will get your earnings 
from is different. So anonymity of the responses is maintained. 
 
Tasks 
You have 4 tasks to complete. In each task there are different goods. So 
there will be totally 4 goods. After all the tasks are completed, one of the tasks 
will be selected and played for real. The selection will be done like this: 
experimenter will write the task numbers on papers and will put them in 
different envelopes and place the envelopes in an opaque bag and select one of 
the tasks randomly. All of these will be done in front of you. So each task has 
equal chance of being selected. It is for your interest to see all of these tasks as 
real and make your decisions according to it, because each one of them have 
equal chance to be selected and played for real. 
 
General Instructions for the Tasks 
You all are given 100 SEK. You will state your offer and after that, 
experimenter will announce the randomly selected market price from a 
141 
specified range (1 SEK to 30 SEK). If your offer is below the market price you 
will not buy the good. But if your offer is higher than the market price, you 
will buy the good and pay the market price. The important point here is that 
you will pay the market price not your offer. The comparison between your 
offer and market price will determine whether you will buy the good or not. 
Notice the following two things: 
1. Your decision can have no effect on the market price actually used because 
the market price will be selected at random. 
2. It is in your interest to indicate your true preferences.  
As you will see, your best strategy is to determine the maximum you would 
be willing to pay for the item and offer that amount. It will not be to your 
advantage to offer more than this maximum, and it will not be to your 
advantage to offer less. Simply determine the maximum you would be willing 
to pay and make that amount as your offer. 
The market price will be determined randomly by using the Ping-Pong 
balls. Experimenter will select one of the Ping-Pong balls and that will be the 
market price. On each Ping-Pong ball; there is a number written on. There are 
totally 30 Ping-Pong balls, so the market price can be any number between 1 
SEK and 30 SEK. Your offer will be compared to the market price. If it is 
higher than the market price you will buy the good and pay the market price. 
As you can see the market price will be completely unrelated to your offer and 
to the offers of all other persons in the room. 
Example: if you offer 1,000 and the market price is happen to be 950, you 
have the high offer. You buy the item but pay only 950. 
If your offer is less than the market price then you do not buy the item. 
Instead, you keep your money. 
Example: if you offer 1,000 and the market price is happen to be 1,020; you 
do not have the high offer. Therefore, you do not buy the item. You keep your 
money. 
Remember, there are no advantages to strategic behavior. Your best strategy 
is to determine your personal value for the item and record that value as your 
offer. There is not necessarily a “correct” value. Personal values can differ 
from individual to individual. 
You will see in the answer sheet that there are two boxes to enter your 
offer: 
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If your offer a single amount then write the same number inside the two 
boxes such as: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you cannot provide a single amount such as 1000-1020 than you can 
write a range such as:  
 
 
 
 
 
If you wrote a range: you will get the good if the market price falls inside or 
below the range you specified. In this example if the market price is inside 
1000 and 1020 and below 1000 you will buy the good and pay the market 
price. So it means you will buy the good if the market price is lower than 1020. 
Example: Suppose you wrote 1000-1020 and experimenter selected 900 
randomly as market price. It means that you will buy the good and pay 900. 
Because it is lower that your specified range.  
What if the random market price happens to be 1010? You buy the good 
because it is inside the range you specified and pay 1010 and get the good. 
What if the random market price happens to be 1021? You do not buy the good 
because it is higher than your specified range. So you keep your money. 
Notice that at the beginning of each task you have 100 SEK. As it is mentioned 
before, only one of the tasks will be selected randomly and will be played for 
real. 
 
Guidelines 
 
Guidance to Find Your Offer 
After you see the good, start thinking about the smallest monetary unit such as 
1 SEK. Ask yourself: 
-Do I want to pay 1 SEK for this good?  
If your answer is ‘YES’, try to think about a higher amount such as 2 SEK.  
-Do I want to pay 2 SEK for this good? 
If the answer is ‘YES’, try to think about a higher amount such as 3 SEK.  
                  
 1000                  1000 
                  
 1000                  1020 
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Increase until you reach an amount that makes you indifferent between getting 
the good and keeping that amount of your money.  
 
EXAMPLE: Suppose we reached 800 SEK by this reasoning and ask 
yourself: Would I pay 800 SEK for the good? Yes. Would I pay 900 SEK for 
the good? No, not that much. Then decrease a little bit. Would I pay 895 SEK 
for the good? No, not that much. What about 892 SEK? Well, I don’t care 
whether I end up with 892 SEK or the good. Then that is the maximum I’d be 
willing to pay for the good. You are indifferent between getting the good for 
892 SEK and keeping your money. You will record that number on your 
information sheet. 
 
If you are indifferent between more than one value, you can state a range of 
values. For example if you think: “paying 892 SEK, 893 SEK and 894 SEK 
does not matter”.  
Then you can write 892 SEK – 894 SEK inside the two boxes.  
 
What Is Your ‘Best Strategy’? 
Remember there is no right or wrong answer but it is for your advantage to be 
honest and answer truthfully.  
What happens if I state a lower amount than my true value? 
For example, suppose you think that you would pay a maximum of 1000 SEK 
for the good, however you wrote a smaller amount in your record sheet, let’s 
say 950 SEK. The experimenter announces the market price as 970 SEK. Since 
your offer (950 SEK) is lower than the market price (970 SEK), you will not 
get the good. Remember your true value was 1000 SEK. So by stating a lower 
value than your true value, you miss the opportunity to get the good that is 
worth 1000 SEK for you. If you had told the truth by stating 1000 SEK, you 
could have got the good by paying only 970 SEK.  
What happens if I state a higher amount than my true value? 
Let’s assume that your true value is 1000 SEK and you wrote 1100 SEK on 
your sheet. The experimenter announces the market price and it happened to be 
1050 SEK. Since the market price (1050 SEK) is lower than your stated offer 
(1100 SEK), you buy the good and pay 1050 SEK. Remember your true 
maximum offer was 1000 SEK but you have stated a higher amount (1100 
SEK). You get the good by paying 1050 SEK; however the good is worth only 
1000 SEK to you. So if you pay a higher amount than you are willing to pay 
for the good. You lose out. 
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HYPOTHETICAL TASK 
 
 
The Aim of the task is to train you and make you understand the procedures 
 
Write you ID here:________ 
 
Training Task 1: In this task the good is a candy. Now state your offer for 
that good. The market price will be selected from the range of 1-30 SEK. Each 
amount in this range has equal chance to be selected. The price increments are 
1 SEK. Therefore there are 1,2,3,4,….30 SEK in this range. 
If your offer is a single amount write the same amount in both of the boxes 
below. However If you cannot provide a single amount, you can enter a range 
of values. Therefore write the lower bound on the box left and the upper bound 
on the box right. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After everyone completes answering their offer, the experimenter will select 
the market price.  
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TASK 1 
 
Write you ID here:________ 
 
In this task the good is Maribou Premium (86 %Cocoa) Chocolate 
Now state your offer for this chocolate: 
If your offer is a single amount write the same amount in both of the boxes 
below. However If you cannot provide a single amount, you can enter a range 
of values. Therefore write the lower bound on the box left and the upper bound 
on the box right. 
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TASK 2 
 
Write you ID here:________ 
 
In this task the good is 3 cans of Coke. Below are the 5 types of Coke. Now 
create your own pack by selecting three. You are free to mix and match.  
For example if you want all of them to be Coca Cola Zero then write 3 
inside the box next to Coca Cola Zero. If you want 2 Zero and 1 Cherry write 2 
next to Coca Cola Zero and 1 Coca Cola Cherry. 
 
Amount Types 
 Coca Cola Light 
 Coca Cola Zero 
 Coca Cola Regular 
 Coca Cola Cherry 
 Coca Cola Vanilla 
 
Now state your offer for this package includes 3 cans of Coke.  
If your offer is a single amount write the same amount in both of the boxes 
below. However If you cannot provide a single amount, you can enter a range 
of values. Therefore write the lower bound on the box left and the upper bound 
on the box right. 
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TASK 3 
 
Write you ID here:________ 
 
Below is the list of Maribou chocolates with different flavors. Order them 
from your most preferred one to the least preferred one. For example: write 1 
next to the type of Maribou that you like most.  
 
 
 Vit Choklad med Smak av vanilj (white chocolate) 
 Jordgubb (Strawberry) 
 Mörk Choklad (Dark) 
 Mjölk Choklad (Milk) 
 With Oreo 
 Helnöt (Hazelnut) 
 M Peanut 
 Frukt & Mandel (Fruit and Almond) 
 Digestive 
 Daim 
 
Now state your offer for your favourite Maribou chocolate that you stated 
above. 
If your offer is a single amount write the same amount in both of the boxes 
below. However If you cannot provide a single amount, you can enter a range 
of values. Therefore write the lower bound on the box left and the upper bound 
on the box right. 
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TASK 4 
 
Write you ID here:________ 
 
In this task the good is a lottery ticket that gives 30 SEK with 0.5 chance 
and 0 SEK with 0.5 chance. There is a bag which includes 100 Ping-Pong 
balls. Each ball is numbered from 1 to 100. At the end experimenter will select 
a ball randomly from the bag in front of you. If the number on the ball is 50 or 
below; lottery gives 30 SEK, if the number is 51 and higher it gives nothing. 
As you can see there is 50:50 chance of winning and losing. Because there are 
equal numbers of balls (50) that can make you win and equal number of balls 
(50) that can make you lose. Each ball has equal chance of being selected. 
Experimenter will select a ball from an opaque bag. You can inspect the 
material that is used after the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
         
         
         
        
 
 
Now state your offer for the lottery ticket: 
If your offer is a single amount write the same amount in both of the boxes 
below. However If you cannot provide a single amount, you can enter a range 
of values. Therefore write the lower bound on the box left and the upper bound 
on the box right. 
                                        
         
       
 
 
  1 2 3 ............................48 49 50             51 52 53.....................98 99 100 
         50 balls for winning       50 balls for loosing 
